A MULTIDIMENSIONAL VIEW OF POWER IN SAN JOSE, COSTA RICA

By

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A DISSERTATION PRESENTED TO THE GRADUATE COUNCIL OF
THE UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA
IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE
DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA

1974

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I wish to express my gratitude to the members of my Doctoral Committee, William E. Carter (Chairman), Solon Kimball, Martha Hardman-de-Bautista, G. Alexander Moore, and Walter Weyrauch for their help in the preparation of this work as well as their influence during my graduate training. Many Costa Ricans were helpful during the field research in many ways. Among those who were particularly helpful were Virginia Ramírez de Barquero, Dr. Romano Soto Delcore, María Eugenia Bozzoli de Wille and my student assistant, Carlos Vargas Dengo. This acknowledgment should not be construed to mean that the above-mentioned persons concurred in the conclusions drawn here, since in some cases the opposite would be true. Special thanks must go to Dr. Samuel Stone, who read an early draft of the dissertation and who provided a useful critique of many aspects of the work.

Finally, my wife, Carola, deserves special thanks for the many sacrifices made during a long period of graduate training.

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Abstract of Dissertation Presented to the Graduate Council
of the University of Florida in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements
for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

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June, 1974

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Major Department: Anthropology

San José is the capital of Costa Rica and exercises a dominance over the nation which dwarfs the importance of other population centers. Paralleling the geographical power which San José derives from its central position in the nation is the political and economic power position occupied by the political elite which has maintained control over all important national institutions since the colonial period. This group has managed to maintain its boundaries through selective marriage patterns which vary from generalized endogamy to marriage alliances. The image of Costa Rica and the political ideology which represents Costa Rica disguise the elitist and exclusive nature of Costa Rican society and politics. Power is examined in many facets, including institutional control, ideological manipulation, social interaction, geographical position, and politics.



Chairman

INTRODUCTION

To appreciate the chapters which follow, one must have some understanding of how this work came into being. By focusing on a city, we depart from the usual subject matter of ethnographic research in anthropology which generally centers upon so-called "tribal" peoples or peasant communities. Urban studies are relatively new to anthropology and the urban context presents problems which are either absent or avoidable in small, homogeneous settlements. Size, in and of itself, is a problem, especially when, as in this study, the research is accomplished by one person. Since anthropology has traditionally been committed to the study of entire communities, covering the gamut of human thought and action, a city of some four hundred thousand persons presents a monumental task. The people of even a small community provide an endless fund of relevant information; the city not only has more people but also provides additional sources of information through the written word. Urban institutions tend to be large and complex, with infrastructures which are often obscure to the newcomer (and even to the old-timer). Unraveling complexity is time-comsuming, but this is not the greatest problem for the urban anthropologist.

Other social scientists have studied cities, or at least operated within the context of modern urban societies. If anthropologists intend to examine the meaning of urban life, we ought to approach this study with new procedures and attitudes which can justify entering a field where

there are already many experienced hands. Anthropology has emphasized holistic study of culture on the basis of field research through participant-observation. Although sociologists also use participant-observation as one type of research method, they are neither as devoted to it nor as well-grounded in the method. In addition, sociologists are commonly problem- or policy-oriented so that field research infrequently aims at total systems. Anthropologists often study more than sociologists in the sense that "culture," including thoughts, perceptions, and values, is a more encompassing concept than "society," which is the concern of sociologists and often leads to a concentration on institutions. Without intending to suggest that anthropologists have interests opposed to other social scientists, it is possible, nonetheless, to argue that the differing orientations of the different disciplines ought to lead to different approaches and even different results. With some cross-fertilization, all the disciplines involved in urban research could advance in useful material as well as in the important intellectual provocation which different perspectives can bring.

Embarking upon urban field research, the anthropologist is faced with the burden of offering something different, if not necessarily revolutionary. To replicate what sociologists have done elsewhere is not very satisfying, especially in the presence of scholastic chauvinism, a characteristic of anthropologists. One begins with the intention of demonstrating the inherent superiority of anthropology by providing a better explanation of urban life. Unfortunately, the field researcher is immediately confronted by basic methodological problems without ready solutions. How, for instance, does one participate in the life of the

city? How does one observe thousands of lives? San José, Costa Rica, a city of some 400,000 inhabitants, seemed a good choice for research because of a relatively homogeneous population, sharing a single language, a generalized racial stock, and a common tradition. It is difficult, however, to get Josefinos ("those who live in San José") to agree on any one matter--unanimity is rare even with a small sample. In a great many matters, they express themselves freely, and are even argumentative when provoked. This behavior may constitute a generally shared Latin American characteristic of verbal facility and expressiveness combined with an individualism based upon highly valued personal dignity. For all their real and purported homogeneity, the Josefinos display an endless diversity of opinion and outlook. This should serve as a word of caution with regard to generalization encountered in the following chapters--we cannot, in truth, say that all Josefinos "express themselves freely." In initial field research many opinions, even apparently factual statements, which had been recorded, were cross-checked with subsequent informants. The following interchange, which investigated the alleged Costa Rican "hospitality," shows the type of response which was repeated on numerous other occasions:

> "Why did you choose Costa Rica to study?"
> "I felt that Costa Ricans were kind and hospitable and this would be helpful in getting to know the people."
> "Kind and hospitable? Just the opposite. If you went to Mexico and you met a stranger on the street and he said, 'Come to my house,' he would take you to his house and introduce you to his family and serve you a sumptuous dinner. A Costa Rican would make the same invitation, but you would never see the inside of his house."

With contradictory statements, it becomes impossible to generalize about what Josefinos say about themselves, without arriving at the question of

what they think. One is led eventually to rely upon some statistical measure, however crude it may be. The results of this approach are discussed in Chapter VI, which examines, among other things, responses to a questionnaire administered to university students. The questionnaire (Appendix H) was purposely subjective in order to require respondents to put on paper categorizations of Josefinos and other Costa Ricans to test the presence or absence of generalized attitudes toward people. The questionnaire was based upon a few months' impressions gained through interview and observation. The questionnaire aimed to test these impressions as well as to clarify them. Many notions were confirmed and additional facets of the Costa Rican character emerged. A much greater consensus was achieved in the questionnaire than had been achieved in interview. This was due in part to the increasing sophistication of the researcher, i.e., he was no longer asking many of the naive or unproductive questions of the first few weeks. One unforeseen result of the questionnaire was help rendered in subsequent relations with the Costa Ricans. Once armed with a general picture of the way Costa Ricans, albeit university students, viewed themselves, the researcher was able to respond to questions in a manner compatible with the notions of the questioners. This was very important since statements which sound suspiciously Yanqui in point of view engender distrust and defensiveness. On the other hand, statements which echo commonly held Costa Rican veiwpoints indicate an appreciation for things Costa Rican not commonly encountered in American visitors. Henceforward, discussions with acquaintances became more open and friendly and less argumentative. Disagreement was still present and heterogeneity of opinion still expressed,

but the atmosphere in which discussion and argument took place was noticeably changed. While such things may seem strangely unscientific and subjective to other social scientists, they are comforting to the anthropologist who must often deal with subjective impressions, validated by whatever reasonable means are available to him. Cultural anthropologists oriented towards linguistics have emphasized the importance of native categorizations (see the articles reprinted in Tyler 1969:191-504). Goodenough (1957) suggests that the grammar of a culture is similar to that of a language, consisting of what one needs to know in order to behave appropriately within the context of that culture. As a participant-observer, the anthropologist examines the behavior of his subjects (observation) and he tests his conclusions by predicting the outcome of sequences of actions taken by others and often by his own actions (participation). This procedure does not constitute formal hypothesis testing, although it would be possible to graft such a method on to this process. It is instead a process of growth for the field researcher in which, when it runs according to plan, the final product is an individual who can think and act like a native without forgetting that he is an anthropologist. It is a form of voluntary schizophrenia with both good and bad moments. It must happen as it did in Costa Rica, that many fieldworkers find themselves beginning to behave in a fashion which once appeared to them outrageous native custom (see Chagnon 1974:1-45). Unfortunately, only the anthropologist and the natives he studies can effectively judge the extent to which he has assimilated native ways. We could accept his judgment with greater confidence if we could believe his implicit assurances that he learned their ways.

One of the problems with participant-observation in the city is the status of the participant. Learning to act like a rich Josefino does not prepare one to associate with poor Josefinos on their terms. Where should one live? In an affluent neighborhood? In a slum? A workingclass neighborhood? Should one live according to the high living standard appropriate for Americans or should one pretend poverty with the risk that this hypocrisy will be transparent? Can one ask a member of the upper class to a modest home or a poor man to a sumptuous one? These questions were asked at the beginning of the field work and later personal relations showed them to be pertinent questions. The participant-observer who seeks to study the whole city and all its people may end up acting like a native, but he is bound to be a very inconsistent native. This is a problem of sorts in the city since, unlike the researcher in a remote village, the anthropologist cannot even play the role of the awkward and ignorant, but accepted, intruder. People met each day are strangers who will never become accustomed to the manner of this foreigner and who will furnish him the information he requests only if it is to their liking to do so.

If participant-observation in the city is awkward, difficult, and imperfect, it may be the sine qua non of urban anthropological fieldwork, nonetheless. Through the unpleasant and uncomfortable experiences of wandering about the city and poking one's nose in places it was not meant to be, one comes to learn the city and its people beyond the American Embassy, beyond knowing the especialité de la maison and how to bargain in the marketplace. A moderately intrepid fieldworker comes to know far more people and places in the city than any native. The anthropologist can justify his interest in every aspect of the city and he can

go anywhere.[1] Unlike local scholars, he need not remain permanently with the people he may have offended in the country he may criticize. As a foreigner, a certain amount of peculiar behavior is to be expected. Thus, he can do more and see more than most natives. In the process of experiencing the city, the fieldworker should arrive at insights which can be obtained in no other way. Personal experience is unique, but this tautological observation suggests that the knowledge to be gained by experience is also unique.

There is an inclination on the part of anthropologists (and sociologists abroad) who deal with the city to search for "street-corner societies" and squatter settlements. Apparently these groups resemble the peasant communities so much a part of anthropological research in Latin America and appeal to the anthropologists' penchant for marginal and exotic peoples. This inclination may be undesirable insofar as it contradicts the holistic dogma which anthropologists have for many years claimed as one of the essential ingredients in anthropological research and theory. We may find ultimately that urban anthropologists and sociologists are doing the same thing even though coming from different intellectual backgrounds. Before coming to this conclusion, however, we ought to consider the possibility that the two disciplines suggest two different conceptions of urban research. The holistic concept in anthropology is a major distinction between that discipline and sociology. We may consider the city in its totality, whether or not we conceive of it as a community. Wedded to participant-observation, with its personal and subjective nature outlined above, we are faced with the problem: Participant-observation has strong individualistic tendencies which make it difficult for team research, the sort of research which would seem to

be required in the urban context. This is a reasonable argument in light of what has already been stated above; participant-observation in the city must always be partial and incomplete. In rebuttal, we argue that all studies of human behavior are incomplete, only the degree of completeness is here in question. Also, there is some doubt as to whether size and complexity are proportionate. Only at the level of pure description need there be a direct relation between size and scholarship. The principles which underly a large community may be as simple or as complex as those underlying a small community. These principles, whether they be structural, systemic, processual, or ideological, are the concern of serious scholars. The question is whether it is preferrable to seek these principles piecemeal or all at once. Anthropology has traditionally argued the latter approach. Functional theory in anthropology has always stressed the integration of parts within the whole, meaning that the whole is not simply the sum of its parts. Structuralism has similarly required broad-spectrum study in order to comprehend structural principles within a society, even though there may be conceptually separable structures susceptible of analysis.

San José was studied in this spirit. The nagging question of what the city meant was let to nag. Parts, experiences, questions, and answers were added in and not added up. The picture was never complete, but slowly an explanation of the city began to grow which appeared to tie together many of the loose ends. In the following chapters, relatively few pages are devoted to direct accounts of participant-observation although this method was the foundation upon which the ideas were built. Most of the historical and genealogical work was accomplished subsequent

to the year of field work (1971-1972). The attempt in the last chapter to present theoretical arguments thought to be pertinent to San José and Costa Rica is based upon research following the field experience. The theoretical assumptions carried to the field, namely, functionalism, proved unserviceable and were abandoned only with growing awareness of the operating force of the imbalance of power. This awareness was brought to a head in a discussion of inherited power with Dr. Samuel Stone, whose influence over subsequent development of theme can be noted in Chapter III.

A physical description of San José will not be encountered until Chapter V. Those unfamiliar with the fundamentals of Central American geography are advised to read the first few pages of that chapter first if guidebook data are desired. Elsewhere geography will be treated in a schematic and abstract fashion. Geography is important because space is important. Chapter I presents in spatial terms the principle theme of our work: Power is organized about central cores of dense concentration. The principle operates on the levels of geography (Chapter I), ideology (Chapter II), kinship (Chapter III), and formal institutions (Chapter IV). Although the germinal principle can be derived from geographical theory (Central Place Theory), it underlies the elite theories of sociology and political science, which are somewhat older. Michels' "Iron Law of Oligarchy" may be the most emphatic statement of this power principle in the social sciences.

While our study concerns Costa Rica alone, the power principle is neither Costa Rican, nor even Latin American. Major influences in the development of our line of thought have been Italian, German, and American.

However, dominant schools in England and the United States have tended to avoid elite theories and the study of elites. The reason for this may well lie in the embarrassing but logical conclusion that the imbalance of power at the international level has worked in favor of the United States and England more than any other nations in modern times. Elites have been discussed in Latin America (Lipset and Solari 1967), but they have been distinguished as feudal, traditional, particularistic, Catholic, and personalistic, i.e., by all those characteristics which English and Americans choose not to call themselves. These characterizations and their implications are currently coming into question, especially by Latin American social scientists, one of whom (Stavenhagen 1971) has put into serious question the entire foundation of American assessment of Latin America. Our discussion of power distribution and the ideology it encourages in Costa Rica may be read, mutatis mutandum, in terms of American policy toward Latin America and the ideological supports which American scholars have provided that policy. But that is not our purpose here, although the logical extension of the holistic premise would insist that we examine the whole international scene.

Another approach to elites has been to conceive of plural elites, and this is the approach used in Lipset and Solari (1967). This usage refers to "...those positions in society which are at the summits of key social structures" (Lipset and Solari 1967:vii). Thus we may have a labor elite, a managerial elite, a political elite, etc. Unfortunately, the term "elite" in this context loses the sense in which we most frequently use it. The elite is not simply an arbitrary apex of a social pyramid, it is distinct from the rest of society. Costa Rica is a small

country with a small elite; it is possible that her society has not grown to the complexity of nations with plural elites. It is also possible, however, that the elites of other nations have remained hidden. Even in Costa Rica talk of "the oligarchy" is commonly condemned as the ravings of the lunatic fringe, namely, the Communists. Dr. Stone's work with the genealogies of important political families in the history of Costa Rica demonstrated an incredible nexus between family and political power throughout Costa Rican history. We have attempted here (Chapter III) to clarify some of the principles operating among these important families which show that the elite may indeed be distinguished from the rest of society on the basis of kinship. This should be of interest to anthropologists since kinship has been an important part of the study of primitive peoples. It remains an open question as to the extent of power relationships based on kinship in the most complex societies. It may be that bonds exist which, as was true of Costa Rica until recently, are obscured through the absence of formal rules of the inheritance of power. It is also possible that the power principles discussed here may operate in areas other than kinship.

Power relationships and the principles which guide their formation and maintenance were analytically derived. They are hidden, sometimes intentionally, since powerful persons often wish to avoid exposure to the public eye. Thus, the fieldworker and the public in general may be blithely ignorant of what is happening. Chapter VI presents a picture of the perceptions which many Costa Ricans have of their society. This picture varies in important respects from the picture of power represented in other chapters. There are many possible reasons for the discrepancies.

The point we wish to make, however, is that the values which these perceptions imply are values which inordinately benefit those in power. Many values, rules, and laws are phrased and perhaps understood in terms which do not discriminate among social categories and yet the impact of these values, rules, and laws may be highly discriminatory. For example, a rule which states that children must wear shoes in school would be discriminatory in a nation of impoverished, barefoot people. The discrimination inherent in values is often hidden. Chapter V presents the argument that perceptions and values in San José can be demonstrated to be consistent with the picture of power painted in the preceding chapters.

Rightly or wrongly, the chapters have been presented and the material selected in an order which seemed most conducive to explicate the major themes. The first four chapters are more closely related than is the fifth chapter to the preceding four. The work concludes with additional theoretical considerations.

NOTE

[1]Costa Rican social scientists, including anthropologists, are subject to significant social restraints relating to their sex, social status, and professional standing as well as the ideological constraints imposed by their nationality and the political tendencies of their discipline (e.g., sociologists tended to be radical, anti-U.S., Marxists).

CHAPTER I
POWER AND GEOGRAPHY: PRIMACY OF THE CAPITAL CITY

Centrality of Location and Size of Population

With a map of Costa Rica in hand, it would not be difficult to "guess" the location of the capital city. San José not only occupies a strategic central location within the nation, but the area which it occupies suggests a city many times greater in population than any other settlement in the country. These two features of centrality and size are closely related to the natural concentration of power, hence the correctness of the guess as to which Costa Rican settlement would likely be the capital city. Exceptions to the rule do not refute it; for every Washington there are likely to be several cities like Paris or Rome which combine centrality and size. In fact, considering the number of factors which may combine to influence the growth of any given city, we must take note of the importance of the two features mentioned above.

The relation between centrality and concentration of population has long been recognized and has perhaps received its most important formal expression in the so-called "Central-Place Theory" formulated on an economic "marketing principle" by Christaller (1933) and subsequently examined, tested, and modified in several directions by many others.[1]

Horace Miner (1967) suggested a similar relationship between differentiation of function in society, a hierarchy of power, and

the dominance of cities, and was the first, according to Wheatley (1972:630), to give formal expression to a notion of the "city as a centre of dominance." Recently, Trigger (1972) has elucidated this phenomenon through an analysis of the determinants of urban growth in preindustrial cities. Trigger enumerates four "premises" of urban growth, which are reproduced below because of their special relevance to San José, Costa Rica:

1. There is a tendency for human activities to be hierarchical in character and for this to be reflected in spatial organization.

   ...with increasing complexity, a hierarchy of locations may develop with respect to any one kind of activity, the higher or more specialized functions being performed from a smaller number of centres.

2. With increasing complexity there is a tendency for activities and social institutions to be more clearly defined and for their personnel to be more highly specialized....

3. Human activities tend to be focal in character in order to take advantage of scale economics.

   In order to increase efficiency, activities susceptible to varying degrees of interrelationship tend to be concentrated at a single point.... In accordance with these rules, locations which serve one kind of function frequently tend to serve another. In combination with the hierarchical premise outlined above, such tendencies give rise to a hierarchy of locations varying in terms of accessibility and the size of the area they serve and influence....

4. The size of communities tends to vary with the number of functions they perform [1972:578-579].

Without referring specifically to Central Place Theory and its spatio-economic relations, Trigger describes a "hierarchy of locations" which is parallel to the former theory without insisting upon either marketing function or precise symmetrical distribution. It is clear that Trigger

is speaking of "cities" and not simply "places." Important in his conception of a city are that (1) it "performs specialized functions in relationship to a broader hinterland" and (2) "the specialized functions of a city are not agricultural in nature" (Trigger 1972:577). He also asserts that the special relation of agriculture to land tends to concentrate similar specialties in one area while encouraging dispersal of agricultural production (1972:577). Thus the functions of urban and rural areas are to Trigger different in nature. If this is true, this major distinction in Costa Rica between rural and urban areas need not surprise us.

While the city tends to concentrate social and political functions within its ambit, such a concentration may be viewed as "economic" in the sense that efficiency encourages a concentration of specialized functions at a center just as efficiency demands a concentration of truly economic functions, such as markets, banks, and economic policy-making. In light of this, absentee landlordism appears quite natural--in order to maintain identification with an elite upper class, members of that group must maintain contact with the center of social activity, whether it be San José, Lima, or Paris. Because of the interrelatedness of social, political, and economic functions at these centers, a residence in town not only insures the maintenance of social prestige but also maintains vital political and economic networks.

While the efficient operation of specialized functions in a complex society leads inevitably to the growth of urban centers which concentrate political and economic power in the hands of a minority, we must also realize that the power thus acquired is commonly sustained

through the manipulation of the entire system by members of the elite acting in concert. To locate oneself close to the center of power in order to avail oneself of the benefits of power concentration entails the active participation in power networks with mutual benefit to network members, often to the detriment of those outside the network.[2] Thus, while more-or-less "natural" forces encourage urban growth and the concentration of powers, the individuals to be found in the upper echelons of the various hierarchies are rarely unwilling partners. If fate has thrown them together, they work to stay together.

San José, Capital City of Costa Rica

San José is more than simply the largest city of Costa Rica and it is more than just the capital of the country. In many respects San José is Costa Rica. While Costa Rica depends upon foreign markets and is in a very real sense subject to the whim of international politics without much of a voice for her own defense, the Costa Rica which lies beyond the limits of San José is even more dependent upon the city itself. San José is Costa Rica in two senses. First, it has a monopoly over every important national activity; second, the middle-class Josefino projects the image of the typical Costa Rican. There is virtually no field in which any other city of Costa Rica can compete successfully with San José, the only exception being religious ceremony and display, which remain the monopoly of Cartago, the colonial capital and the reputed center of religious and social conservatism. San José may be classed as a "primate" city, that is, its dominance in national affairs is so extensive that other Costa Rican cities seem by contrast to be dwarfed in their growth. Primate cities are common in Spanish

America, quite possibly due to the dependent status and limited size of many of these countries. Not only does one city control internal national activities, but it also becomes the locus for international exchange. All cities occupy relative power positions. The flow of national and international resources through a city can be established as an empirical fact. Where one city in a given country maintains a monopoly over this flow of resources, that city has an inordinate amount of power with respect to the surrounding country.

San José as National and International Representative of Costa Rica

To the world at large, Costa Rica is represented by San José. The typical Costa Rican is represented by a middle-class Josefino (the existence of a rural counterpart is also recognized), the climate which is represented as Costa Rican is that of San José, the racial stock of the Costa Rican is represented by that predominant in San José. An important point to remember is that this representation refers not only to the propaganda which is disseminated abroad (the analysis of any travel brochure from Costa Rica reveals a description of Costa Rica in terms of San José, unrelated to other areas of the country depicted in the photographs) but more importantly the image of San José is that which is presented to the Costa Rican people and consists of a shorthand version of Costa Rica, thus misrepresenting the nature of the country, the composition of its people, and its national problems.

Hand-in-hand with the economic and political power of San José is a monopolistic power over the presentation of the Costa Rican character; the residents of San José have the power to manage belief,

ideology, values, and law for the entire nation. The importance of San José and its dominance in Costa Rica can hardly be exaggerated. The city's Metropolitan Area contains 23 percent of the national population, 395,401 persons out of 1,710,083 nationally (Anuario Estadístico 1971:16-17). In a country where, in 1963, 49 percent of the work force was employed in agriculture and fishing (Denton 1971:14), this one city contains a majority of the urban population. If San José continues to grow at its present pace, it will soon incorporate, physically if not administratively, the three provincial capitals of Heredia, Cartago, and Alajuela into one urban spread which will include all secondary cities of the country with the exception of the port cities of Puntarenas and Limón. In very general terms, therefore, one can speak of a bipolarization of Costa Rica into Metropolitan San José and the agricultural hinterland.

As of 1972, San José had Costa Rica's only university (Heredia had a teacher's college and new universities and university extensions were projected). All important political agencies are located in the capital. All Costa Rican daily newspapers are published in San José. Two-thirds of all Costa Rican physicians practice in San José. More than two-thirds of Costa Rica's telephones are located in San José. It is the only city linked to both Atlantic and Pacific ports by railroad. The only international airport is located 15 miles from San José near Alajuela. It is virtually impossible to travel by land between two distant points in Costa Rica without passing through San José. The National Theater is in San José as are the National Library, the National Museum and the National Stadium. Needless to say, all

national and international commercial enterprises have their headquarters in San José (there are, of course, a few enterprises, such as the important banana industry, in which agricultural production and exportation take place outside of the Central Valley). In short, San José is the city, the national city, the Costa Rican city, the only city which can properly claim to represent Costa Rica.

Implications of Urban-Rural Power Relationship for Anthropology

If we regard power as control over resources (including human resources), San José, as a city, can be viewed as a manipulator of power. The study of power on a grand scale, i.e., as it has been practiced by great nation states, has, with rare exceptions (e.g., Adams 1970), been neglected by anthropologists. This is regrettable for a number of reasons. Anthropologists have been inclined to see power as an extraneous element in the cultures they study, impinging upon those cultures from without. They have tended to favor the isolation of the people they study from the policies of those who will ultimately govern them as emissaries of either economic imperialists or national governments. Anthropologists have shown a reluctance to value power positively and an inability to manipulate it to ends which they, as professionals, regard as ethical. This sort of attitude may not be particularly significant in general practical consequences--few people expect anthropologists to have a serious impact upon policy-making--but such an attitude does have an impact upon the results of anthropological investigation.

The insularity of the content of anthropological investigation has effectively obscured anthropological vision. Julian Steward (1956) pointed out that anthropologists involved in community studies had

cavalierly disregarded the importance of the nation in the life of the community. His point was well taken and led to at least one discussion (Manners 1958; Arensberg 1958) of the meaning of the community study in relation to the nation. While Steward emphasized, correctly, the need for understanding the influence of the nation upon the community studied, Aresnberg pointed out, also correctly, that all life is interrelated and that we must therefore place logical and reasonable limits to the field of empirical investigation. Robert Adams (1966) argues that city and countryside are interrelated and influence each other, although he stresses the superordinate position of the city in this relationship. San José undoubtedly exerts an important practical impact upon most local communities in Costa Rica. To describe a community in Costa Rica in vacuo, as was the anthropological custom in the 30's and 40's and often still followed today, would be to distort the "real" picture.

The problem raises a question often skirted by anthropologists: What is the city? While it may be possible for the anthropologist to discover a primitive community sufficiently isolated from a city as to warrant treatment apart from a larger context, the city ultimately depends upon the country for its sustenance. Whereas a small community may take its form and structure in large part from the interplay of environmental factors in the region and the organizational capacity of the society for exploiting natural resources, the growth of a city, the speed at which it grows, how and where it grows, and the many directions its growth may take, depend to a large degree upon the power position which it establishes with other communities related to it. While a city,

whatever definition we use, may also be a community under a number of definitions, commonly the community which we may call a city takes its form and its direction from the exploitative relationship which it establishes with other communities. Whereas Steward warned that we may misinterpret the local community by overlooking the pervasive influence of the national, i.e., urban, culture, the opposite admonition follows with equal force, namely, that the city may be fully understood only when we recognize its exploitative position with regard to the nation.

Anthropologists are accustomed to framing cultural context in terms of culture contact, diffusion, superordinate tradition, etc., that is, in essentially communicative terms, assuming, perhaps correctly, that valuable elements will spread through operating networks. However, force is not simply an instrument of conquest but a fundamental process of daily life. The city, especially when it has a monopoly over legitimate, which is to say authoritative-legal force, as in the case of the primate city, is in a position to concentrate wealth-producing enterprises within its boundaries. A common result is the situation in which the city appears to be flourishing quite by chance, while the countryside is suffering. The cases are numerous: the United States, Japan, Costa Rica. The bucolic idyll, the small farmer, the honest country life may be positively valued while the depressed economic situation of the peasant or small farmer is lamented by all even though no one seems to know who is responsible. There can be no solution to the "farm" problem as long as the needs of the city take precedence.

Town and Country in Costa Rica

The distinction between city and countryside is an important one in the history of Costa Rica. A major portion of the Costa Rican political ideology is symbolized in the notion that social differences during the colonial period were virtually nonexistent. This idea is pertinent to our major theme and will be summarized here, to be treated in greater detail in later chapters. Although it is difficult at the present time to substantiate history now well past, it is likely that the notion of colonial social equality derives from a picture distorted by present biases. It seems that one colonial governor in 1718 complained in a letter to the Crown that he had to work in the fields like any peasant (Fernández 1889:317). This datum is not insignificant, but it does not necessarily lead to the assumption, commonly cited by Costa Ricans, that the colonial governor was of equal social and economic status with the majority of his fellow Costa Ricans. Historians of Costa Rica have stressed isolation and poverty. Modern Costa Rican historians have suggested that the poverty of colonial Costa Rica created a situation in which social class was absent, leading ultimately to modern Costa Rican democracy. A few have noted that it was the propagation of coffee which led to distinctions of social class in Costa Rica in the late nineteenth century. This view distorts important historical developments. First of all, the apparent social equality reigning in Costa Rica at the time of Independence was in part due to the failure of cacao as a profitable crop. This enterprise of the well-to-do had suffered severely, primarily due to the depradations of Zambo-Mosquito pirates and raiders. Nevertheless, it was clear that despite the poverty of the colony there were always a small few who

could venture land and capital toward new endeavors. Shortly after Independence, Costa Rica was transformed into a prosperous coffee-growing and -exporting nation. The argument, which seems to be fairly well accepted in Costa Rica, that social class was practically non-existent at the end of the colonial era but became a divisive factor because of the coffee capitalists rests on shaky historical grounds. It is possible that the failure of cacao reduced the rich to relative poverty at the end of the colonial period so that differences of social class were not readily discernible. But colonial social equality cannot explain the subsequent emergence of hereditary wealth and political influence. Although the development of coffee as a profitable export did involve a few successful resident foreigners, in general the production of this new crop lay in the hands of the descendents of important colonial families. The coffee boom simply reinforced social differences of long standing (cf. Stone 1969).

Political ideology of present-day Costa Rica rests upon an uncertain foundation. Costa Ricans pride themselves on their stable antimilitary, democratic electoral system. Historians have attributed the Costa Rican democratic spirit to, among other things, the social and racial equality of the colonial era in Costa Rica. There is serious doubt as to whether social equality ever existed. Certainly the Spanish Crown showed little egalitarian spirit in the New World with reference to its own interests. Difference of social position existed in Costa Rica even where economic position seems not to have reinforced it. The study of Costa Rican genealogies leaves no doubt about the essentially endogamous creole class which incorporated important foreigners but disdained alliances

with Costa Ricans of humbler rank. The most convincing evidence of social distinction is the fact that the coffee-growers who first responded to an opening world market were landowners belonging to the allegedly impoverished families of illustrious career during the colonial era. Costa Rican historians have insisted that social class distinctions were introduced during the nineteenth century coffee boom. This position could be tenable had we evidence of opportunist entrepreneurs from this period, but the first great coffee-growers, except for a few Germans, were the descendents of the most important colonial families. It seems likely that the unforeseen coffee boom brought unanticipated wealth to Costa Rica. Nevertheless, the profits from this boom accrued only to important colonial families and a few foreigners. A select, exclusive Costa Rican national elite may be inferred from the following: (1) the first great coffee-growers were descendents of the colonial rulers, (2) while the coffee boom evidenced a few new loyalties, those who benefitted most from subsequent changes were invariably connected with important political families of the past (Stone 1971). Thus, social distinctions may have been heightened but there is no evidence that these distinctions were made between persons who had not previously been designated as privileged. The flavor of power may have changed with the shift of the capital from Cartago to San José but there was no corresponding change in family alliances.

Independence and coffee did have one important impact: San José became the most important city. One important consideration ought to be remembered in attempting to reconcile the supposed absence of social class with the sudden upsurge in colonial lineages following Independence.

The rural-urban contrast is not noted in the statements of colonial history. It is clear, nevertheless, that several cities were in existence, all of which must have demonstrated cultural features unlike those of the countryside. The contrast between rich and poor was elusive because it was not a contrast between co-existing and interacting subgroups of a single settlement. Rather, social class was marked by different residential patterns, i.e., those who lived in the city were of a different class from those who lived in the country. We sometimes fail to realize that rural-urban social distinctions often transcend cultural or racial distinctions. Josefinos today maintain an attitude of urban superiority; there is no reason to doubt the existence of similar sentiments in 1821.

Too often we view social class in terms of circumscribed areas so that urban classes and rural classes are studied within their own contexts. The significance of social class may in many cases depend upon the interrelation of geographically distinct groups, this being especially true of the rural-urban relationship in preindustrial societies. The Costa Rican economy is based upon agriculture. San José has a monopoly over every commercial activity with the exception of the essential one, production. San José has little claim to self-sufficiency. Unlike truly industrial cities, San José cannot claim to be productive in its own right. San José does not merely feed itself from rural products, it thrives by controlling those products and their distribution. We can argue from this that there is in Costa Rica an intimate relationship between city and country in which the city enjoys a privileged position by virtue of its superordinate status and the power it wields over the

position by virtue of its superordinate status and the power it wields over the country. It is possible to conceive of the colonial era as a period without distinctions of social class only if we separate the city and the country.

The relationship described here has been termed "internal colonialism" by Stavenhagen (1967). He sees the parasitic exploitation of the rural hinterland as a consequence of the dependent international status of Latin American nations wherein urban power holders sim the scant profits of agricultural production as representatives or brokers for international purchasers. There has been too little discussion of this phenomenon in the literature and we need further study and clarification of the dynamics of the relationships involved.

NOTES

[1]For an overview of both the history and recent developments of Central Place theory see Wheatley (1972:614-620). The theory deals with the efficient utilization of energy in space:

> Central-Place Theory postulates regular spatial patterns of the differential distribution of activities related to the production and distribution of goods and services. In theory activity loci are so distributed that energy expended in these activities is minimized. In practice it appears that energy output minimization need not be assumed as necessary for the appearance of spatial distribution predicted by the theory [Johnson 1972:783].

[2]This "detriment" may consist simply of unrealized gains, like tax shelters, which do not actually take anything away from the public but which reduce government revenues below what they would otherwise be. Bogantes (1971:11ff.) uses such an argument with regard to tariff exemptions in Costa Rica, in which he asserts that less than one percent of the possible import tariff revenues were realized because of exemptions.

The concerted action of the elite may also benefit the rest of society. It is possible that Japan's remarkable post-war recovery was in large part due to the reformation of the great industrial cartels, which were able to increase production and develop world markets.

CHAPTER II
IDEOLOGICAL POWER: COUNTERFEIT DEMOCRACY

Power and Idelogy are Mutually Supportive

While power in the natural world may be said to be strategic, based simply on accessibility and capability, power in society is subject to various forms of cultural elaboration which modify what we might consider to be "natural" power relationships. At the most obvious level, this consists of man's technological exploitation of resources, which allows him to utilize natural resources far beyond innate biological capabilities. More important for individual man, however, are the cultural elaborations which deal with social power. Man has developed an incredible number of social, economic and political institutions which provide organizational benefits comparable to the material benefits provided by his technological advances. This will be dealt with in later chapters. Here we will be concerned with ideological power, which might also be called moral, ethical, or psychological power. Within any society, the effectiveness of social institutions depends at some point upon the public trust and trust is based upon the acceptance of certain values. Values are elusive at best, but we occasionally find, especially in literate societies, statements of fundamental principles of the organization of a society. The cognitive structure to be gleaned from such statements corresponds to an ideology of society, a charter, a constitution from which may be derived an elaborate system of law and morality. It may well be that the cultural

manifestation of such an ideology among many preliterate peoples lies in the area of myth (cf. Malinowski 1955:96ff.). In the modern nation-state we are accustomed to look for this ideological basis of society within specific areas of the public law. Needless to say, the law rests upon certain ethical and social premises, the acceptance of which is largely a matter of faith. Faith in turn rests upon ineffable truths, alluded to in myths which sanctify the social structure. The dynamics of this process will be briefly discussed in the final chapter. For the moment we must concern ourselves with important ideological premises in Costa Rica and the myths which support them.

While ideology furnishes power to a primitive society by directing the will of the individual toward social goals in the collectivity, in highly-organized, literate society, ideology comes to be concentrated in the hands of a number of specialists, notably lawyers, priests, and teachers, adept at ideological management. From this point, ideology easily becomes an instrument of power through which such specialists and their patrons may manipulate values and beliefs to their advantage. We may anticipate that the ideology of society will embody the especial perspective of ideological specialists, which, if they have been sufficiently successful in manipulating ideology to their advantage, will describe a society in which they legitimately occupy positions of high status and exercise control over society and its institutions.[1]

Cityscape: Man at the Controls

The growth of San José to its present form has responded not simply to the imperatives of geography or natural resources but also to those of human history. The power held by the city is a product of the concerted

activities of generations of Josefinos. While the Josefino of today acts in such a way as to maintain the national dominance of his city, the power position was not his making but the result of the acts of prior generations. As a city-dweller, the Josefino is presented with an environment in which to live but which he had not part in creating, much the way that primitive man is presented with a "natural," i.e., non-human environment. The difference is that the city is a human creation; in fact, a striking feature of contemporary cities in many parts of the world is an almost total dominance of human, as opposed to non-human, elements. The difference is important since the city, being a human creation, is also a social creation. The nature of a specific city must ultimately have a decisive impact upon the nature of the society which is associated with it. The city does not present tapped and untapped natural resources which the native may exploit at his will. By and large it presents the physical locations for social institutions, and its use is governed by a vast array of social rules. Ethnographers ordinarily attempt some discussion of the ecology of the community studied. With primitive man and even with peasants, this discussion is likely to deal with the relationship between man and his environment in terms of natural resources and the technological means available for exploiting those resources. This approach continues even in urban anthropology, where anthropologists show a preference for studies of slums, which by virtue of their dependent social and power positions, frequently consist of individual residents who must commonly react to, adapt to and do their best to manipulate a hostile environment. When cities and complex societies are looked at from a macroscopic

perspective, however, it becomes evident that the human environment cannot be understood without studying power. Power over the natural environment allows the possibility of using natural resources to provide energy supplies to human beings. Ecological studies must inevitably deal with power. A special feature of human society, most evident in the modern city, is that human beings have demonstrated a very special capacity for discovering new energy sources. This capacity includes human resources; human beings exploit members of their own species, even those who share membership in their territorial group. While parallels might be drawn with certain other species, man appears to be unusual in his capacity for exploiting members of his own species. Although this may occur through physical coercion, exploitation of man, his fellow-man, occurs most frequently through social institutions; the more complex a given society is, the more likely are opportunities for exploitation through social institutions. When we reduce this exploitation to "real" people, i.e., who is exploiting whom, we are talking about power. In some sense exploitation is mutual--the person in a superior power position ordinarily must respond to those exploited with some favor or benefit. When personal relations are blatantly exploitative, the exploited can be expected to resent existing relationships. On the other hand, exploitation commonly operates through social institutions--one gains employment by acquiring the necessary credentials. Thus it may appear that a person's low position in society is merely a matter of misfortune and not personal exploitation. If exploitation is recognized, it is called "the establishment," "the oligarchy," "the power elite," or some such impersonal descriptive phrase since

exploitation is often indirect and impersonal. Even in such cases, however, some concession is normally made to the less fortunate. Absolute exploitation, or the total absence of reciprocity, must indeed be a rare occurrence in human societies.

The meaning of a city will escape us if we give no thought to power. Cities may owe their very existence to one of the most fundamental power relationships, exploitation of agricultural production through the centralization of commercial enterprises in urban clusters divorced from the rural centers of productions. While cities may originate in order to provide services, including administration, to the agricultural hinterland, centralization and specialization of services rapidly convert to a power base which is manipulated by the city-dwellers. Within the city itself there is differential access to this power. This may be inevitable but it is not accidental. Power provides energy which can be utilized to secure nearly anything a human being could desire. Those who have little power seek to have more; those who have great power attempt to keep it, for themselves and for their posterity. The growth of San José, the history and politics of Costa Rica make sense from this perspective.

Primacy of the Costa Rican Elite

Much of our discussion and description of power in San José is premised upon the existence of a ruling group which has today and which has had throughout Costa Rican history an inordinate degree of power when compared with the rest of the population. This ruling group occupies this special position by design, not by chance. Members of this group reap special rewards which are not simply greater than those

of the less fortunate but which are disproportionately greater, greater than their wealth or position would suggest.

There is considerable evidence for the existence of a Costa Rican ruling elite. Some of this evidence consists of genealogical data concerning families which have shown a marked capacity for maintaining wealth and political power from colonial times to the present (Stone 1969;1971). Such data will be used to suggest that the social and political history of Costa Rica could be simplified to the following proposition: The history of Costa Rica is the history of a few important historical events that can best be understood by examining the kinship relations existing among interested parties. There are two reasons for making this extreme statement. First, the overriding importance of kinship in Costa Rican history and politics is convincingly demonstrated by a simple correlation between genealogical data and wealth and power. This ought to be of special interest to anthropologists who have shown the importance of studying kinship in primitive societies without recognizing how important kinship may be in modern societies. Second, the elitist nature of Costa Rican politics is not generally recognized since Costa Rica enjoys an image which, in light of a realistic appraisal of Costa Rican politics, seems to be the result of successful management of ideology by the ruling elite. We will argue here that a realistic picture of Costa Rican politics reveals a situation which conforms well to the stereotype by which Costa Ricans represent politics in other Latin American countries, namely, national power concentrated in the hands of a few aristocratic families.

History as Myth

Written histories are always suspect since the writers must necessarily reduce history to selected examples. The historian quite naturally selects for presentation those data which suit his purposes. We are interested in two important aspects of Costa Rican history. We would naturally like to know some of the important historical occurrences which might be helpful in understanding why San José assumed the form and course of growth which resulted in the city of today, but we are also interested in history as myth. People's beliefs about history and people's interpretations of history reveal a great deal about the way they think about their society and their political values. This is difficult to investigate for several reasons. There is no objective truth to history. We are left with relatively few reliable statistics; objective "facts" are frequently less meaningful than the subjective motivations which are instrumental elements of human history. Historical myth is thus difficult to measure against what "really" happened. An individual may base his interpretation of history upon misrepresentations which he has little reason to question. An individual may be expected to assume the line of argument which arrives at a conclusion which he favors. As a result, we can have little confidence concerning the "sources" of historical folklore. If there were some sort of reality against which we could measure native beliefs, we would have valuable material since extreme distortions of the truth would require some explanation. Ultimately we must be content with the notion that myth is important in showing what people believe, regardless of whether or not the myth represents the truth.

We now arrive at an intriguing intellectual question which cannot be answered here but which ought to occupy the thoughts of some anthropologists. Conceptually we separate history and myth. In our society writers of fiction and writers of history are not to be confused. The author of the "historical novel," regardless of extensive historical research to provide authenticity, is rarely regarded as making a serious contribution to historical knowledge. In pre-literate societies such a distinction in trade is hardly possible. Since anthropologists customarily deal with oral traditions, the problems of measuring historical myth against historical fact rarely arise. For this reason the anthropologist rarely faces a problem we are now facing, namely, to what extent have Costa Rican historians and others who have reflected upon Costa Rican history distorted historical fact and created historical myth? The important corollary to this question would ask to what extent has distortion been a conscious manipulation of fact to represent history in such a way as to enhance the position of the history-tellers. (The corollary question is virtually impossible to answer with certainty unless we were to find the "rewritten" history text occasionally encountered with radical change of political regime. What is more likely than conscious manipulation is class bias--if the history-tellers all come from a special segment of the population, historical presentations will probably incorporate the historical "beliefs" of that segment.) The problem we face has been obscured in sociology and anthropology by notions like "collective representations," and other sociological concepts which suggest that the community expresses itself through myth or functional belief systems, ingeniously

avoiding the possibility that belief is a tool of power. Yet it is quite clear that belief is often coercively manipulated. A classic example of this would be excommunication for heresy.

Throughout the world, hundreds of millions of persons are constantly persuaded that their miserable conditions are the result of a fictional cause unrelated to the political and social structure in which they live. It is difficult to ascribe collective representation, folklore, value systems, and cultural beliefs to some sort of natural social development when our own society presents innumerable examples of belief management imposed by incumbents of power positions upon those with little power in order to preserve the existing power distribution. In literate societies historical chronicles may differ from our usual notion of "folklore" but nevertheless form an important part of the shared cultural legend of a society.

Democracy and the Myth of the Costa Rican Past

In Costa Rica, as in many countries of the world, the word "democracy" is rarely defined but thought to apply as a form of approval for the established local regime. An interesting facet to the Costa Rican situation consists in the explanation of Costa Rican democracy. Where some societies might have need of attributing positive values to the native type of democracy, let us say, where neighboring societies have similar political forms, Costa Rica arrives easily at a democratic self-evaluation since all other Central American countries have long histories of rule by military officials. Costa Ricans feel generally secure in the belief that theirs is a better form of government. Ideology, rather than concerning itself with self-justification, dwells at length

upon the reasons for the "uniqueness" of Costa Rican democracy. Those who have attempted to explain the existence of the relatively stable electoral system, have done so by asserting special facts of Costa Rican history. Costa Ricans believe that they have accidentally escaped an unfortunately common Latin pattern.[2]

The history of Costa Rica is relevant to our concerns because political and social ideology are explained in terms of historical interpretations. Costa Rican democracy is viewed as a fortuitous result of the Costa Rican national character which was forged by certain peculiarities of Costa Rican history. The argument is interesting since questionable inferences are drawn from questionable historical assertions in order to explain the existence of a condition which is never adequately demonstrated. This sort of argument may characterize effective management of ideology; the political status quo is affirmed without raising serious ideological questions because reference is made to events for which there are no living witnesses. In essence the argument runs "We are uniquely democratic because of the special circumstances of our historical situation." While the argument purports to be an intelligent analysis of cause and effect, it consists of reasoning by inference from unsubstantiated evidence.

The argument may be found in a number of respectable sources (Barahona Jiménez 1970; Cordero 1964; Rodríguez Vega 1953) as well as on the street corner. To emphasize the extent to which this mythology has penetrated, we will here discuss its presentation by a professor of Philosophy of Law at the University of Costa Rica in the first edition of one of Costa Rica's most respected scholarly journals,

the Revista de Ciencias Jurídicas. The article presenting this version of the political myth was entitled "Liberty, Law and Political Development: Three Reflections concerning the First Article of the Political Constitution of Costa Rica" (Gutiérrez G. 1963:71-132). The First Article of the Constitution states that "Costa Rica is a free, democratic and independent republic." Gutiérrez concentrates on the word "democratic." His argument for a democratic Costa Rica is not convincing but there would be little purpose served here by engaging in a criticism of it. The important point is that a strong inference of the high caliber of Costa Rican democracy is presented by way of historical myth. Several features of the Costa Rican past are presented, all of which are commonly argued in Costa Rica to explain why Costa Rica is unique in Latin America in having a stable democracy (like many Costa Ricans, Gutiérrez shows no reluctance in stereotyping the rest of Latin America). Four basic reasons are given for the flowering of democracy in Costa Rica. First, historical isolation: Costa Rica spent most of her history, from colonial conquest to recent times, free of external interference. Early colonists and conquistadores discovered that Costa Rica lacked gold and settled Indian communities of sufficient size to be exploitable. Costa Rica was of little strategic importance to Spain and was far from the administrative centers of Spanish Colonial America. Thus, Costa Rica was forced to survive on its own without assistance or interference from abroad. Second, racial homogeneity: Because there were relatively few Indians in Costa Rica at the arrival of the Spanish, Costa Rica failed to develop a class or caste system based upon racial distinction, as occurred in Latin American colonies where large Indian

populations were incorporated into the Spanish Empire. This argument is commonly heard in Costa Rica and is used to explain the absence of social classes and the absence of racial and social prejudice. Here ideological management operates as outlined above; instead of producing evidence of lack of social bias, it is inferred from questionable historical factors.

The Myth of Racial Homogenity

The racial homogeneity question in Costa Rica is an interesting one. First of all, Costa Ricans insist upon the high proportion of White blood among Costa Ricans. At present Costa Rica has a small Indian population scattered mostly through the undeveloped mountain region near the Panamanian border. All told, the Indian population probably does not number as much as 10,000 bodies, although precise figures are still difficult to obtain. Those classed as Indians are persons who, with only recent exceptions, have maintained many of the aspects of pre-Conquest culture, i.e., these persons who have traditionally avoided contact with white settlements and have not participated in the national life or culture of Costa Rica. Yet serious doubts must be raised concerning the racial purity of present-day Costa Ricans, many of whom frankly admit that there is Indian blood in every Costa Rican. To research the racial history of Costa Rica would be an enormous task beyond the needs of the present discussion. We may, nevertheless, make some inferences from historical censuses which cast serious doubt upon the conclusions drawn by Gutiérrez and accepted generally by Costa Ricans. Table I was tabulated by Stone (1971:107) from Thiel (1902), the latter source cited by Gutiérrez, whose figures did not include the category "Mestizo," an important omission.

TABLE I. EVOLUTION OF THE POPULATION OF COSTA RICA ACCORDING TO THE CENSUSES BETWEEN 1522 AND 1801

Year	Spanish	Indians	Negroes	Mestizos	Mulatos	Total
1522	---	27,200	---	---	---	27,200
1569	113	17,166	30	---	170	17,479
1611	330	14,908	25	25	250	15,538
1700	2,146	15,489	154	213	1,291	19,293
1720	3,059	13,269	168	748	2,193	19,437
1741	4,687	12,716	200	3,458	3,065	24,126
1751	7,807	10,109	62	3,057	2,987	24,022
1778	6,046	8,104	94	13,915	6,053	34,212
1801	4,942	8,281	30	30,413	8,925	52,591

Source: Stone (1971)

Several points may be drawn from Table I. First, the colonial census-makers distinguished several racial categories, as was done throughout Spanish America in the colonial period. Second, for the first two centuries of the colonial period, Indians outnumbered all other racial groups combined (we may assume that Indians living in less accessible regions of Costa Rica were either not reported or inaccurately reported, as is true today). Third, mixed-bloods, i.e., Mestizos and Mulatos, show a consistent increase in numbers while the pure-bloods, i.e., Indians, Spanish, and Negroes, show a steady decrease in numbers from a peak (1741-51 for Spanish/Negroes). Fourth, Spanish persons at no time represented more than one-third of the population. Certain inferences are warranted. First of all, census-takers seem not to have been aware of the racial homogeneity attributed to the period. While the number of Indians may seem small in comparison with certain other Spanish territories, there seems always to have been many more Indians

than Spanish. The statistics suggest that present-day racial homogeneity in Costa Rica is the result not of purity of blood nor the absence of Indians but, rather, was the result of centuries of interbreeding among Spanish, Indian, and Negro (this last contributing a relatively small genetic component) to the extent that a generalized population of mixed-bloods arose. Within this pattern, racial distinctions were no doubt preserved in some instances. Since the small group of descendants of the Spanish were in charge of most commercial and administrative functions, it is probable that most of those of this racial stock lived in or near the towns, especially Cartago, the colonial capital, while Indian blood predominated in the countryside. As we will see shortly, a small group of descendants of important Spanish colonials practised class endogamy and were concentrated in the cities of Cartago and San José. In addition to this group of Spanish ancestry, it has been asserted that a number of Spaniards migrated to Costa Rica with the sole purpose of becoming small farmers independent of feudal landlords (Chacón Trejos 1970). These persons were farmers and not adventurers, being well aware of the poverty and isolation of the colony. If such a migration did in fact take place, it could account for the rise of a general class of rural Mestizo peasants, even though the urban Spanish may have maintained a certain degree of genetic purity.

Even if the argument in favor of racial homogeneity could be accepted, e.g., we might acknowledge a homogeneous mestizo character in the contemporary Costa Rican population not true of the colonial period, we would still have difficulty relating this to "democracy." This so-called racial homogeneity has not made the Costa Rican free of social

and racial bias. The inhabitants of the Central Valley for a long time effectively excluded various types of undesirables from the Central Valley: "Immigration should consist of families of farmers, speakers of our own language insofar as possible, according to regulation by the law of 1906" (Sáenz Maroto 1970:868). The Costa Rican government for many years prohibited the Jamaican Blacks imported by United Fruit Company to build a railroad to Limón from settling in the Central Valley. Today Costa Ricans frequently make slighting remarks about Costa Rican Blacks. The natives of the Province of Guanacaste who are generally much darker than the residents of the Central Valley, are considered racially inferior, "like the Nicaraguans."

The argument that Costa Rica is more democratic than other Latin American countries because of the absence of Indians does not bear careful scrutiny. Costa Rica does indeed present a contrast with Guatemala, where a majority of the residents are classed as Indians, but no other country in Central America records an Indian population constituting more than ten percent of the total population (Kalijarvi 1962:27). Costa Ricans frequently refer to large numbers of Indians in these countries without justification. Many other Central Americans regard Costa Ricans as "racist."

The Myth of Egalitarian Society during the Colonial Period

Gutiérrez gives as a third factor in the growth of Costa Rican democracy the "poverty" of the colonial period. Visitors to the colony and reports of the Spanish administrators suggest that Costa Rica was one of the poorest of all the Spanish colonies. It does not necessarily follow, however, that, "here there was neither an aristocracy nor any

difference in classes" (Gutiérrez G. 1963:93).[3] That Costa Rica was poor there is little doubt. Unfortunately, that picture seems to be exaggerated because much of our information concerning the colony deals with the final period when the cultivation of cacao on the Caribbean had become unprofitable, reducing the wealth of the agricultural capitalists of Cartago. While some authors, including Gutiérrez, have argued for social equality during the colonial period and for the gradual growth of social inequality with the coffee boom of the nineteenth century, Stone (1971) argues that the colonial period closed at a time when differences in wealth had diminished to an unusual degree. He argues that those who grew rich from coffee belonged to the families which had always held wealth and power. Toward the end of the colonial period, the erosion of wealth brought social classes much closer together. Economic leveling seems to have increased communication even though class membership was maintained. It may well be that this happening gave rise to much of the democratic legend. It lends authority to the legend. Finally, we must also keep in mind that to dispute democratic mythology does not necessarily mean that Costa Rica is less democratic than other nations.

The Myth of Equal Distribution of Land

The fourth and final historical factor given as an important element in the growth of Costa Rican democracy is the alleged equal distribution of property.

> Thus it was that the system of landownership in the Plateau, fragmented, family plots cultivated by the owner's own efforts, came to have a decisive influence in the formation of the Costa Rican national character and, therefore, in Costa Rican political institutions [Gutiérrez G. 1963:94].

Perhaps the vast majority of Costa Ricans during her history have been small farmers dedicated to providing the essential requirements of their families. Nevertheless, there have always been some who have attempted to prosper through the exploitation of commercially profitable agricultural products, especially cacao, tobacco, and coffee. These were enterprises which required capital which the small farmers did not have and which were subject to strict government regulation. The image of Costa Rica as a country of small, independent farmers has been widely accepted. Busey (1962) accepts the myth of equal distribution of land even though the statistical evidence he presents clearly shows a very inequitable pattern of land distribution. What Busey fails to realize is that minifundismo, the situation in which land is divided into numerous parcels of insufficient size to support a family, contributes to peonage and latifundismo, or large landed estates. Busey demonstrates the same blind faith in the historical myths discussed here and the same untenable assertion of Costa Rican democracy that we have seen presented by Gutiérrez. Busey provides an excellent example of the management of ideology. Any foreign scholar visiting Costa Rica is duly instructed in the sources of Costa Rican democracy.[4]

The myth of the Costa Rican past has a number of corollaries, such as the great Costa Rican middle class; the anti-military sentiment of the Costa Ricans; the simple happy, honest, hardworking peasant; free, peaceful elections; etc. Each theme has some ring of truth to it, yet each theme carefully disguises the simple truth that Costa Rica is a country full of poor people who are controlled by a small group of wealthy and powerful people. A few recent observers have been astute

enough to see this. Martz, for example, has written:

> Costa Rica speaks of its peaceful, democratic existence. Yet a major revolution within the last decade was bloodier than the colonial battles of earlier centuries. At least three times in the last fifteen years the government has been undemocratic and unrepresentative to the point of dictatorship. Another contradiction is the widely circulated boast that Costa Rica has no army, and fewer soldiers than school teachers. While the army was abolished in 1950, there is a police force of some 1,250 plus 700 coast guardmen. Panama also has no army, but its police force more than serves the purpose. Nicaragua and Honduras can also boast of having more school teachers than soldiers....Contrary to declarations of bucolically peaceful, constructive living, marauding bands roamed the northern province of Guanacaste until very recently [Martz 1959:210-211].[5]

Perhaps the most interesting aspect of this ideological management is that it is based upon a stereotype of the malignant Latin American country, the common case to which Costa Rica is the alleged exception. Costa Rica in fact fits rather well the stereotype in many ways, which may be the reason why the stereotype is so believable for the Costa Ricans. On the other hand, it is not easy to understand how the Costa Rican people accept the uniqueness of Costa Rica. To some extent acceptance may be resignation. Since the public word is transmitted only through media controlled by the ruling elite, the voice of dissent is rarely heard. The control of the ruling elite has never been broken, never seriously challenged, as the evidence cited in the following chapter attempts to demonstrate.

Ideology and the Common Man

It may well be that the man-in-the-street must inevitably accept a model of his society which does not correspond to the behavior he observes. Every model ultimately simplifies reality. It seems reasonable to expect that most people would willingly choose a model of society that minimizes

indecision and frustration and maximizes expectations. The requisite for faith in such a model is that experience, even if it cannot wholly confirm the model, meet as few contradictions (to the model) as possible. Thus, for instance, the Costa Rican may readily accept the "Switzerland of Central America" characterization because his incomplete knowledge of Switzerland furnishes no contradictions. Similarly, historical myths are not demonstrably false on the basis of personal experience. Experience undoubtedly teaches that more may be accomplished with cooperation than in its absence, and cooperation requires some minimum of shared values.

We will see in the next chapter the extent to which concentrated and enduring cooperation can enhance the power of a group. To the extent to which the ordinary Costa Rican recognizes this principle of power, he will be induced to meet and cooperate with potential benefactors. Since the common pattern of personalistic patronage rewards such behavior, individuals seek this avenue of advancement. And the beneficiaries of the social structure support a status quo ideology. Despite all this, there are numerous ways in which ideology and the rules pertaining to it may come into serious question. What is remarkable about Costa Rica is that the discrepancy between myth and reality has revealed so little evidence of consternation.

NOTES

[1]Bohannon (1965) has made the cogent observation that legal institutions differ from other social institutions in that they may legitimately interfere in the operations of other institutions. While Bohannon emphasizes the role of legal institutions in resolving conflict and disorder in other institutions (and this is probably the area in which legal institutions exercise their legitimate authority), it is clear that the superior position of legal institutions implies a power position which permits dictatorial interference in other institutions.

[2]It is difficult to say precisely to what degree Costa Ricans see their present condition as fortuitous but such would seem to be the case in light of the explanations which are offered for Costa Rica's unique position. It is worth considering, nevertheless, that a fatalistic view of the political system is probably more compatible to a Latin, as opposed to an Anglo-American society. Perhaps because of their economic and political preeminence in modern times, England and the United States have given birth to many doctrines of racial and social superiority which purport to explain the superiority of their political systems, that is, success justifies a favorable representation of the political system. For nations enjoying less success in international competition, comparisons of political systems are not encouraged, nor can they be considered masters of their own destinies.

[3]An interesting bit of evidence has been collected by Estrada Molina (1965) who investigated documented descriptions of clothing of the final years of the colonial period. She concluded that the luxury of the clothing described is not consistent with the picture of poverty for the period. She also presents evidence of important distinctions in clothing between rich and poor.

[4]The myth of even distribution of land was recently challenged by comparative studies of the Central American Republics:

> The concentration of land [latifundismo] is a phenomenon quite similar in all the countries of Central America, including Costa Rica, a country generally considered to have a different situation in this regard [Instituto Universitario Centroamericano 1963:3].

[5]Martz neglects to mention several private armies formed in the last twenty-five years. While these are generally shrouded in mystery, they represent unique threats to politicians whose goals challenge the interests or ideologies of the leaders of the private armies.

CHAPTER III
POLITICAL AND SOCIAL POWER: AN ENDOGAMOUS "POLITICAL CLASS"

The Nexus between the Natural and Social Orders

Power is at once social and natural. The control over resources which power implies can refer to both human and non-human resources. The channels by which power may be exercised can be social or natural. Control of natural resources is commonly employed to exert pressure upon human beings just as social institutions are employed to exploit natural resources. And, of course, man is a biological as well as a social creature. It is fitting, then, to consider the relationship between natural and social orders. Power must involve relationships, of resources to whatever or whoever controls them. The economics of the maintenance and use of power may be a culturally-specific economics or an economics whose prime motivating forces are external to a culture. The particular model of power presented here describes a society in which power is distributed unevenly to the extent that we may assert that a small group of interrelated persons dominate the rest of the society. The uneven distribution of human populations over the landscape bears an important relation to the uneven distribution of power, or so it would seem from the material about to be presented concerning Costa Rica. We will attempt here to bridge the conceptual gap between economic causes for concentration of population and the political consequences of that concentration. Implicit in our discussion of the course of history in Costa Rica is the notion that man seeks to exploit the resources available

to him. This he may do unconsciously, as evolutionary processes enhance natural advantages, or consciously, as in the political calculations which one man uses to advance his cause above others.

Relative size, concentration of population, and power are related in nature and in society. Sexual reproduction requires some degree of proximity for procreation, and the social behavior which has enabled many species to make extraordinary adaptations to their surroundings has encouraged population concentration in most instances. Socially organized animals can accomplish feats impossible for the same number of individuals working without that organization. In fact, concentrated and organized atoms, i.e., molecules, appear to be qualitatively distinct from the same atoms dispersed and unorganized. It should not be surprising that human social organization should demonstrate a tendency toward ever greater size and concentration wherever natural resources permit. What we must note carefully, however, is that human societies not only take advantage of the concentrations of natural resources (often as a result concentrating human populations in order to exploit those resources), but there seems also a distinct tendency within human societies to take advantage of their own concentrated populations once formed. It is as if the social organism increases from its own internal energy. This, of course, is not so. Growing populations have in the past demonstrated an ability to better utilize natural energy sources and to discover new energy sources. Man's increased power comes at the expense of other elements of the environment.

The Costa Ricans of today have more resources, greater and more heavily populated settlements, and more power derived from both than at

any time in history. The present chapter attempts to examine these relationships. We have already described the geography of power in the relationship between San José and the rest of the country. Here we deal with power in its social and political aspects. The distinction is made for descriptive and analytical purposes only; natural and social forces are interdependent.

Consonant with what has just been stated, the analogy between natural and social orders may be represented schematically in a new form. We are accustomed, in academic as well as popular circles, to view society and its institutions in a generally linear form which takes a vertical dimension connoting superordinate-subordinate relations of social, political, and even moral, orders. Even when we graphically describe evolutionary developments, whether sociocultural or biological, our vertical drawings unconsciously suggest a superiority of man and civilization. The graphic organization of space is subject to considerable cultural variation. Structures and processes may be diagrammed in a variety of ways. Before proceeding, let us consider social organization in a form appropriate to our discussion. While this may appear at first an unnecessary diversion, it should help ultimately in freeing us from the value judgment inherent in our own jargon. For example, the term "upper class" will be encountered occasionally in the following pages, yet it will be noted that the directional image created by the word "upper" belongs to the traditional diagram and not that offered here. It is contended here that, given our cultural biases regarding space, the traditional graphic representations distort the Costa Rican situation, suggesting (1) Costa Rican classes and cities are individually united



a. Traditional Three-Class Vertical Diagram



b. Population of Urban Centers (Upper Class in Black)



c. Core and Periphery Power Classes



d. Urban Centers with Elite Cores

Figure 1

Schematic Diagrams of Population and Social Class



Figure 2

Centrality and Relative Power Positions of Costa Rican Cities

but collectively separable, and (2) Costa Rican classes are vertically, which is to say, morally, ordered. This scheme is not far from the perceptual categories with which many Josefinos classify their country and her society. Nonetheless, we will soon note a unity and centrality of the Costa Rican elite, providing a power position having little relation to head counts. Similarly, San José occupies a central position with regard to other Costa Rican cities which cannot be represented in a linear diagram.

The two-dimensional diagram may combine easily the distribution of population and social class (figure 1), a feat that is awkward at best for the vertical diagram. Figure 2 describes graphically how the urban elite of San José occupies the key position in the total national network.

Historical Research in Costa Rica

In addition to ideological representations of Costa Rican history, such as that already discussed, there have been a number of interpretive histories, more descriptive and less philosophical and ideological. In general Costa Rican histories have concentrated upon colonial history and the "National Campaign," the latter referring to Costa Rica's successful fight against William Walker and a band of international adventurers called the "Filibusterers." Costa Rica has generally been fortunate in escaping foreign and domestic wars, the National Campaign of the 1850's providing the only source of patriotic military history. Costa Rican historians have also spent a great deal of effort discussing Independence, i.e., the events of 1821 and the founding of the Republic.

More recent history has not been adequately reported. Monge Alfaro's (1966) brief account of Costa Rican history is one of the few works which

covers most of the period since Independence and it is only a brief sketch. There is no study of the modern period approaching Fernández Guardia's extensive coverage of the colonial period. Modern Costa Rican history is generally treated in terms of political personalities. There have been a number of monographs dealing with Costa Rican Presidents, which tend toward romantic biographies rather than thoughtful histories. Thus there is very little of what we might call "social" or "cultural" history, one of the reasons why it has been possible to sell ideological history unsupported by historical research.

While the definitive history of Costa Rica remains to be written, in the past decade several works have been published which demonstrate a tendency away from prior biographical studies toward social and political analysis (Cordero 1964: Cerdas Cruz 1967, Garro 1971, Gamboa Guzmán 1971). Significantly, all of these authors, excepting Cordero, employ a Marxist viewpoint. Needless to say, none of the new histories are printed by the large Costa Rican publishing houses. We may note that none of these authors are to be found in the genealogies of illustrious families which will be examined shortly, although older historians, e.g. Manuel Argüello Mora, Hernán Peralta, Cleto González Víquez, and Manuel de Jesús Jiménez belong to such families. Two of Costa Rica's most important historians, León Fernández Bonilla and his son Ricardo Fernández Guardia held impressive pedigrees, married into important political families (León married the sister of President Tomás Guardia, Ricardo married into the prominent Peralta family), and both held many important posts in the government. In addition to his important historical writings, León Fernández was the first man to establish and

head the National Archives, a position later held by his son Ricardo Fernández. These were important jobs since the person in charge has access to the most important historical documents as well as being able to control the direction of government-sponsored historical research. It can be noted, for instance, that the Revista de los Archivos Nacionales for years published many articles by Ricardo Fernández Guardia and still publishes the work of his two sons. We do not mean to impugn the integrity of these historians nor deny the importance of their contribution to our knowledge of Costa Rican history. We must recognize, nevertheless, that their interests, perspectives, and understanding of history were the product of the special place they occupied in Costa Rican society.

Samuel Stone's Studies of the Costa Rican Elite

Two recent studies by Samuel Stone (1969, 1971) shed considerable light upon the dynamics of Costa Rican political history and the forces which still shape Costa Rican policy. As part of a general study of the great Costa Rican coffee-growers of the nineteenth century, Stone examined relevant genealogical materials in order to better understand interrelationships between the prominent figures of the period. As a result of intensive genealogical research, Stone discovered that national politics in Costa Rica from the time of Independence up to the present has been dominated by the descendents of a few important colonial families. To Stone the hereditary influence in Costa Rican politics appeared so strong that he decided to refer to this group as a "political class." His study of the first great coffee-growers (1969) yielded several important conclusions: The first great coffee-growers (1) intermarried; (2) held important political posts both before and after coffee became profitable;

(3) were more often than not the direct descendents of a few important colonial families; (4) had begun to acquire property and plant coffee before a market had been established; (5) acquired their property primarily through related coffee-growers; and (6) employed political influence to advance the interests of the group. These conclusions suggest others. First of all, there was an intimate connection between wealth and political power. Stone argues that political power was instrumental for the acquisition of wealth rather than the reverse. Since political power is closely correlated with kinship networks in Costa Rica, we arrive at the inescapable conclusion that the endogamous practices of historically elite families operated to restrict power to the group and limit opportunities for the acquisition of wealth to the group.

A second important point to be drawn from Stone's conclusions concerns the "degree" of control exercised by the group under discussion. Stone's discovery that members of the group were acquiring property to plant coffee even before the foreign markets were developed suggests that control was very great. Stone feels that the elite had suffered economic disaster with the failure of cacao and was trying desperately to regain the wealth lost. Yet the switch to coffee would seem to have been an unreasonable gamble. In the first place, the acquisition of property was necessary because the property already owned by this group was cacao land in the Caribbean lowlands, unsuitable for coffee, necessitating the purchase of land in the Central Valley. This would seem to involve unreasonable risk in light of the fact that there was no established market for Costa Rican coffee nor was it possible to measure potential profits. Such a gamble was warranted because political control was so great that all of the national resources could be utilized to aid

in the advancement of coffee. In short, the coffee-growers were not subject to the competitive dangers of free enterprise. In fact, under such a system it was better to operate in this way since the coffee-growers were able to purchase land in the Central Valley before profits from coffee forced land values up. Thus, this group effectively prevented many others from cashing in on the coffee boom since by the time the boom came little land was available, what was available was expensive, and the early growers had already established producing trees, controlled processing, and had access to the best markets. All this could be accomplished if the group was related intimately enough to take concerted action for the benefit of each member and the group had enough political influence to minimize any risks and maximize any profits.[1]

That this group actually had the political power necessary to accomplish their ends can be amply demonstrated by subsequent events. As it turned out, coffee became immensely profitable in the second half of the nineteenth century, and, of course, was most profitable to those who had early gone into the crop on a large scale. Stone (1971:Sup. 11-13) furnishes us with a "Partial list of the first great coffee-growers of Costa Rica," containing 102 individuals (Table II). Included in the list are the following men: Manuel Mora Fernández, brother to Juan Mora Fernández, first Chief of State of Costa Rica (served two consecutive terms, 1826 to 1833); José Rafael Gallegos Alvarado, Chief of State 1833-35, Braulio Carrillo Colina, Chief of State, 1835 to 1842, except for a brief period in 1837-38 when another coffee-grower, Manuel Aguilar Chacón served as Chief of State; Francisco María Oreamuno Bonilla, elected Chief of State by popular vote in 1844, resigning one month later; José

TABLE II. PARTIAL LIST OF THE FIRST GREAT COFFEE-GROWERS OF COSTA RICA

Acosta Lara, Calixto
Aguilar Chacón, Manuel
Aguilar Cubero, Vicente
Alvarado, Francisco
Argüello, Toribio
Arias, Felipe
Barroeta Baca, Rafael
Blanco, Julian
Bolandi Ulloa, Miguel
Bonilla Salmón-Pacheco, Félix José
Bonilla Nava, Juan B.
Borbón, Manuel
Calvo, Francisco
Cañas, José María
Carazo Bonilla, Manuel
Carranza Fernández, Miguel
Carranza Ramírez, Domingo
Carrillo Colina, Braulio
Carrillo Morales, Rafaela
Casal, Luis
Castella, Víctor
Castro Madriz, José María
Castro Ramírez, Vicente
Castro Ramírez, Ramón
Castro Hidalgo, Bartolo
Chacón, Gil
Chamorro Gutiérrez, José
Crespín, Julio
Delgado, Justo
de Vars de Martray, Léonce
Echandi, Espiritosanto
Escalante Nava, Alejandro
Escalante Nava, Juan Vicente
Escalante Nava, Gregorio
Espinach Gual, Buenaventura
Esquivel Salazar, Narciso
Esquivel, Manuel
Fábrega Arroche, Vicente
Fernández Hidalgo, Pío J.
Fernández Hidalgo, Santiago
Fernández Ramírez, Aureliano
Fernández Ramírez, Gordiano
Fernández Chacón, Manuel
Fernández Salazar, Juan F.
Gallegos Alvarado, José Rafael
Gallegos, Juan de Dios
Gutiérrez Peñamonje, Manuel
Gutiérrez Peñamonje, Francisco de Paula
Gutiérrez Peñamonje, María
Gutiérrez Peñamonje, Isabel
Gutiérrez Peñamonje, Trinidad

TABLE II - CONTINUED

Jiménez Carranza, José M.
Jiménez Zamora, José M.
Jiménez Zamora, Agapito
Jiménez, Bernardo
Lara Arias, Juan José
Lombardo Alvarado, José Santos
López, Manuel
Madrigal, Sebastián
Medina, Crisanto
Millet, Santiago
Molina, Felipe
Montealegre Bustamante, Mariano
Montealegre Fernández, Francisco
Montealegre Fernández, José María
Montealegre Fernández, Mariano
Mora Fernández, Manuel
Mora Porras, Juan Rafael
Mora Porras, Miguel
Mora Porras, José Joaquín
Mora Ramírez, Félix
Mora, José María
Moya Murillo, Rafael
Otoya, Francisco
Oreamuno Bonilla, Francisco M.
Pacheco, Marcelino
Peralta López del Corral, José Francisco
Quesada Arias, Cecilio
Quirós, José Joaquín
Quirós, Ramón
Ramírez Hidalgo, Rafael
Rodríguez Castro, Eusebio
Rodríguez Mora, Sebastián
Rojas, Jerónimo
Rojas, Joaquín
Sáenz Ulloa, Nicolás
Sáenz, Feliciano
Sancho Alvarado, Félix
Salazar Aguado, Juan
Salazar Aguado, Antonio
Steipel, Jorge
Tinoco López, Saturnino
Toledo Murga, Nazario
Ulloa, Nicolás
Umaña Fallas, Cecilio
Valverde Porras, José León
Wallerstein, Eduardo
Young, John
Zeledón Mora, Pedro
Zeledón Mora, Celedonio
Zeledón Mora, Florentino
Zeledón Masís, Hilario

Source: Stone (1971:Sup.11-13)

María Castro Madriz, Chief of State 1847 to 1849; Juan Rafael Mora Porras, President of Costa Rica from 1849 to 1859; José María Montealegre Fernández, President from 1859 to 1863; José Manuel and Agapito Jiménez Zamora, brothers of Jesús Jiménez Zamora, President from 1863 to 1866; Domingo Carranza Ramírez, brother of Bruno Carranza Ramírez, President briefly in 1868. During the first forty years of the Republic, ten out of twelve chiefs of state were either great coffee-growers or the brothers of great coffee-growers.[2]

Stone notes that all of these men had occupied political posts before the arrival of coffee, suggesting that it was not wealth in coffee which granted political power. Neither should it be thought that the coffee-growers formed a special interest group which conspired to assume political control after independence.[3] The chiefs of state named above overthrew each other, exiled each other and even executed each other. Many were involved in personal and family feuds with the others. This was certainly not a politically cohesive group; their policies and their political tactics took quite different forms with but one consistent policy: the advancement of coffee. They had one other feature in common--they were all affinal kin. President Bruno Carranza was the brother-in-law of Braulio Carrillo Colina and José María Montealegre Fernández, the latter being also a brother-in-law of Juan Rafael Mora Porras, who was the son-in-law of Manuel Aguilar Chacón.

Elite Endogamy

The important element uniting the group was kinship. Examination of genealogical materials reveals that, although coffee-growers and their descendants occupied the important posts in the government, affinal

ties were of utmost importance. Those important coffee-growers who did not establish close affinal ties with certain key families were destined for political obscurity. Table III is a list of some of these key families--Montealegre Fernández, Mora Porras, Fernández, Gutiérrez Peñamonje, and Salazar Aguado.[4] A cursory examination of these lists shows (1) All the families were intermarried; (2) Each family established several ties through marriage to different coffee-growing families. Even with the few names on the list, we note that six became presidents of Costa Rica (José María Montealegre Fernández, Juan Rafael Mora Porras, Bruno Carranza Ramírez, Manuel Aguilar Chacón, Rafael Gallegos Alvarado, José María Oreamuno Bonilla). Table III demonstrates the close kin relations between many of the first great coffee-growers. More than a third of the 102 names listed by Stone (Table II) may be located in Table III. Since tables II and III do not have generational depth, the extent of blood relationships is not shown.

Recruitment of Foreigners into the Elite

The families in Table III require some explanation. While Stone makes a strong argument for an hereditary political class, he generally disregards the influence of elite recruitment. He calls the elite group "endogamous," arguing that there are few marriages outside of this class. This statement needs elaboration. Two of the families in Table III were newcomers to Costa Rica. Mariano Montealegre Bustamante and Juan Salazar y Lacayo arrived from Nicaragua shortly after the beginning of the nineteenth century and appear to have been friends in Nicaragua (Hack-Prestinary 1965:31). Mariano Montealegre married into the

TABLE III. AFFINAL RELATIONSHIPS AMONG KEY FAMILIES OF THE FIRST GREAT COFFEE-GROWERS

Family Individual	Coffee-Growers among Affinal Kin
Mora Porras	
Juan Rafael	Aguilar Chacón, Manuel (WiFa)
José Joaquín	Gutiérrez Peñamonje: Manuel (WiBr), Francisco de Paula (WiBr), María J. (WiSi), Isabel (WiSi), Trinidad (WiSi)
Rosa	Gutiérrez Peñamonje: Francisco de Paula (HuBr), Manuel (HuBr), María J. (HuSi), Isabel (HuSi), Trinidad (HuSi)
María Rosa de Jesús (may be same as above, second husband)	Salazar Aguado: Juan (HuBr), Antonio (HuBr)
Ana María	Montealegre Bustamante, Mariano (HuFa) Montealegre Fernández: Mariano (HuBr), Francisco (HuBr), José María (Hu)
Mercedes	Argüello, Toribio (Hu)
Guadalupe	Cañas, José María (Hu)
Juana	Chamorro Gutiérrez, José (Hu)
Montealegre Fernández	
José María	Mora Porras: Juan Rafael (WiBr), Miguel (WiBr), José Joaquín (WiBr)
Mariano	Gallegos Alvarado, Rafael (WiFa)
Francisco	Gallegos Alvarado, Rafael (WiFa)
Jerónima	Carranza Fernández, Miguel (HuFa)
Gutiérrez Peñamonje	
Manuel	Mora Porras: Juan Rafael (WiBr), Miguel (WiBr), José Joaquín (WiBr)
María Josefa	Chamorro Gutiérrez, José (HuFa)
Trinidad	Barroeta Baca, Rafael (Hu)
Agustina	Oreamuno Bonilla, José María (Hu)
Salvadora	Bonilla Nava, Juan Bautista (Hu) Bonilla Salmón-Pacheco, Félix José (HuFa)
Dolores	Mora Porras: José Joaquín (Hu), Miguel (HuBr), Juan Rafael (HuBr)
Fernández Ramírez*	
Gordiano	Fernández Hidalgo: Pío J. (WiBr), Santiago (WiBr)
Juana	Jiménez Carranza, José María (Hu)
Práxedes	Jiménez Carranza, José María (Hu)

TABLE III - CONTINUED

Family Individual	Coffee-Growers among Affinal Kin
Fernández Hidalgo*	
Pío J.	Salazar Aguado: Juan (WiBr), Antonio (WiBr)
Santiago	Salazar Aguado: Juan (WiBr), Antonio (WiBr)
Rosa	Fernández Ramírez: Gordiano (Hu), Aureliano (HuBr)
Ana	Borbón, Manuel (Hu)
Fernández Chacón*	
Jerónima	Montealegre Bustamante, Mariano (Hu)
Salazar Aguado	
Antonio	Gallegos Alvarado, Rafael (WiFa)
Dolores	Aguilar Cubero, Vicente (Hu)
Carmen	Fernández Hidalgo: Pío J. (Hu), Santiago (HuBr)
Guadalupe	Fernández Hidalgo: Santiago (Hu), Pío J. (HuBr)
Francisco	Mora Porras: Juan Rafael, (WiBr), Miguel (WiBr) José Joaquín (WiBr)

*The Fernández Hidalgo and Fernández Chacón are half siblings, children of Félix Fernández Tenorio by two wives. Both families are first cousins to the Fernández Ramírez

Fernández (-Val) family, which was the most powerful branch of the families descended from Antonio de Acosta Arévalo (Montealgre's wife Jerónima Fernández Chacón was the fourth generation from Acosta). Mariano's children married Gallegos Sáenz and Mora Porras, direct descendants of Conquistador Juan Vázquez de Coronado, whose descendants have always been the core of the ruling elite. The Salazar Aguado siblings married into the same three families. Thus, while later generations shared the blood of the traditional colonial elite, both Salazar and Montealegre were new to Costa Rica. This is consonant with a pattern one notices clearly when researching the genealogies--the old families are exclusive with regard to other Costa Rican families but commonly recruit foreigners. This is not to say that all classes of foreigners are suitable. In fact, the pattern involves a basic pattern of Creole-Spanish marriage in which representatives of the Crown sent to Costa Rica as administrators commonly married into the upper class. Thus the newcomers simply represented the latest generation of that class of Spaniard which had originally formed the Costa Rican elite. In addition, many of these foreigners arrived to assume government posts. For instance, Mariano Montealegre went to Costa Rica to assume management of the Tobacco Factory, an important position, considering that, at the time, tobacco was the only profitable cash crop in Costa Rica. It is interesting that, despite his position with regard to tobacco, Montealegre early went into coffee and eventually became one of the most important coffee-growers in Costa Rica.

Other notable families arrived in Costa Rica during the few decades before Independence and married into the local elite, such as the Guardia,

Peralta, and Salazar families. Almost invariably these families were important in other areas of Central America or in Spain. After Independence the pattern changed because few new elite families were arriving from Spain or the Latin countries. Instead, we observe a marked tendency in elite marriages toward incorporating English, German, and American families into the elite. Several German families were among the first to establish large coffee plantations, and Germany was for a long time one of the largest purchasers of Costa Rican coffee. The English in general came as merchants; it was an English merchant ship which first arranged to ship coffee abroad arranged by Santiago Fernández Hidalgo (Quijano 1939:455-456). The marriages with Americans are also revealing. Although a number of names appear for which no data are readily available, we must note that the most successful, the bankers, Field and Bennett, and United Fruit Company founder, Minor Keith, all married into the ruling elite (for Keith marriage, see Stewart 1964: 50-51). We must note, however, that very few of the Americans, English, and Germans occupied political positions, nor did their descendants. Despite this fact, Keith was one of the most powerful figures in Costa Rica (Stewart 1964).

Marriage Strategies and Family Alliances

With the exception of such recruitment, the ruling elite proved to be highly endogamous and tightly controlled. While extensive intermarriage could be explained by mutual association and a commonality of interest, many marriages operated as excellent strategies for concentrating wealth and political power.

Material has already been presented which showed the intimate relations among the first great coffee-growers. We have seen as well

that wealth in coffee was closely correlated with political power. The families chosen for Table III[5] were picked as "key" families in that most of the siblings from these families married with persons rich in coffee and political power. No key family lacked wealth and power itself, that is to say, it does not appear that advantageous marriage strategies were possible for a family which did not itself occupy a favorable position. Notice, for instance, that only a very special branch of the prolific Fernández family is at the heart of the intermarrying coffee-growers. This seems to indicate that a good blood line in itself does not insure a good position in the ruling elite.

Two practices suggest that marriage alliances served to concentrate power. It has been common until very recently for well-to-do Costa Ricans to have large families.[6] While it is difficult to call this a conscious strategy, it is clear that such a pattern is likely to increase the power of a family in terms of numbers and possible marriage alliances although it may also reduce the power position of an individual since his share is proportionately less. The reduction of power in this way is offset to a large extent through the management of the family estate by a son chosen for this purpose. Thus, the coffee plantations were commonly run for the benefit of the entire family; the son in charge was responsible for establishing his brothers in their own enterprises. This appears to be responsible for the fact that most families had conservative and progressive factions, the conservative element attached to the farms and the progressive element in San José in business or the professions. In politics, however, family and personality commonly overrode ideological principles, to some extent

explaining the inconsistency between theory and practice in Costa Rican politics.[7]

Power was concentrated through marriage in two ways. First, there was a common practice for siblings to marry siblings.[8] In general the pattern is for two brothers of one family to marry two sisters of another family, although there are other variations. This scheme involves the marriage of two members of one line with two members of another line. A complete analysis of all the elite families would without question furnish many cases of intermarriage between kindreds. This simply reflects what has already been asserted--the upper class was relatively small and endogamous. In those cases, which we will discuss shortly, where two or three families demonstrate a definite tendency to intermarry over a period of several generations, we may speak of an "alliance," especially since similar frequencies are not to be found among other families known to belong to the same intermarrying group. On the other hand, what we will call "sibling exchange" would appear to be a conscious strategy in forming alliances between families. It is difficult to determine exactly how such alliances were planned, but we do know that parents, specifically fathers, were responsible for making marriage decisions until recently. A few persons claim that this pattern is still true for the Costa Rican upper class, i.e., the family decides upon marriage partners when the children are still young. It would be difficult to determine to what extent this pattern is generalized. Suffice it to say that romantic love has made important inroads and marriage decisions in Costa Rica are usually made by the marrying partners.[9]

The decision to marry two or three of one's children to another family must indicate a closeness of relationship or a desire to reinforce or establish a strong family relationship to an extent that it is difficult to doubt a conscious strategy.[10] If we look, for instance, at the marriages within the group designated "first great coffee-growers," we see the following families involved in sibling exchange: Montealegre--Gallegos, Fernández Hidalgo--Salazar Aguado (Table III). These families demonstrate in their histories a consistent ability to make marriages with powerful persons.[11] It is significant that sibling exchange to occur usually near a locus of power. The similarity between "sibling exchange" and "brother-sister exchange" is not accidental. The latter type of marriage exchange has been suggested by Lévi-Strauss (1969) as a model from which we can derive prescriptive cousin marriage in unilineal kinship systems. It is clear, at any rate, that an alliance formed through brother-sister exchange (where two men marry each other's sisters) may be continued in subsequent generations with the marriage of cousins. While the model does not apply to Costa Rica, which follows a bilateral kinship system, affinal alliances could occur in any kinship system. Just as prescriptive cousin marriage may operate to preserve traditional ties of kinship within a unilineal system, multiple marriages between bilateral families operate to form alliances which concentrate power, having more force than those which ordinarily occur. Not only does such sibling exchange create double obligation between two families, it also concentrates family power in the sense that it constitutes a refusal to extend relations to additional families. It is difficult to say whether this type of marriage is common or uncommon

since there is no ready standard against which to measure whether its frequency is more or less than what ought to be anticipated. There need not be any such marriages, nor is there any particular reason why they should not occur. In the final analysis, we can only say that such a marriage distinctly favors a specific affinal alliance and reduces the opportunity for extension that previously existed.

This type of marriage dates back to colonial times. In fact, it seems to have been more common then than now which suggests that there were fewer marriage partners to choose from. This could only have been true, however, if there had been a small, endogamous group, since, from the population figures provided above (Table I), there seem to have been sufficient numbers of Mestizos and Indians to marry. In sampling the marriages in the genealogies, we find that the descendants of Antonio de Acosta Arévalo (Table IV, see also Appendices A and B) show a marked tendency for this type of marriage.

A number of additional instances in other families could be listed here; however, even exhaustive research of all the important genealogies available would not demonstrate that this occurs except in a minority of cases. A similar phenomenon, though rarer, is the "sororate," that is, the marriage of a widower to his deceased wife's sister. Although only three instances were collected in the process of genealogical study, all three are interesting. Two of the cases are closely related -- José María Jiménez Carranza married, successively Juana and Práxedes Fernández Ramírez; his son, José María Jiménez Fernández, did likewise, marrying successively Josefa and Teresa Rucavado Bonilla (cf. Revollo Acosta 1960). This should be of some interest to us since the

TABLE IV. INSTANCES OF SIBLING EXCHANGE IN THE DESCENT OF ANTONIO DE ACOSTA AREVALO

Generation	Acosta Descendant	Spouse
I	de Acosta Aguilar, Antonia	Alvarado Azofeifa, Agustín
	de Acosta Aguilar, Francisca Lorenza	Alvarado Azofeifa, Gregorio
III	Fernández Umaña, Manuel	de Alvarado Valverde, Agueda
	Fernández Umaña, Juan Felipe	de Alvarado Valverde, Benita
	Fernández Umaña, María	de Alvarado Valverde, Felipe
IV	Fernández Hidalgo, Joaquín	Salazar Aguado, Carmen
	Fernández Hidalgo, Santiago	Salazar Aguado, Guadalupe
V	Montealegre Fernández, Mariano	Gallegos Sáenz, Guadalupe
	Montealegre Fernández, Francisco	Gallegos Sáenz, Victoria
V	Sáenz Ulloa, José Nicolás	Carazo Bonilla, Domitila
	Sáenz Ulloa, Diego	Carazo Bonilla, Micaela

Jiménez-Fernández marriage involved important coffee families as well as links to the important politicians already named. More interestingly, if perhaps a coincidence, is that the grandson of the Jiménez-Rucavado marriages was none other than Mario Echandi Jiménez, President of Costa Rica 1958-1962. The third "sororate" involved President (1901-1906) Ascensión Esquivel Ibarra, who married, successively, Adela and Cristina Salazar Guardia. This should interest us since the two sisters were the daughters of Jesús Salazar Aguado, and thus linked with the important coffee-growers and politicians already mentioned (Tables II and III). They were also daughters of Adela Guardia Bonilla, first cousin (FaBrDa)

to President Tomás and General Víctor Guardia, as well as the niece (SiDa) of Juan Bautista Bonilla Nava, another great coffee-grower.

Family Alliances and the Nature of Power

We are faced with an intriguing question: Why do these special cases continually lead us back to the same families? The number of cases of the "sororate" are statistically insignificant as are the cases of "sibling exchange." It would seem highly significant, however, that these cases so frequently involve persons at what we might call "nodes of power." Where significant power is concentrated, an effort will be made to restrict its extension beyond those who are responsible for that power. For example, if a father marries most of his children to the most powerful families of the country, the point may come when extension of his network only detracts from his power position, that is, he does not wish either to diminish the strength of existing relationships by adding an additional set of relations, nor does he wish to increase his obligations.[12] The relationship between centralization, concentration, and power maintenance is clear. If we view power as emanating from a central core rather than from a vertical hierarchy, we can better visualize the importance of marriage strategies. Power is like a turntable, which, when it moves, casts off those on its periphery; the closer one is to the core the easier it is to stay on. Energy which is not concentrated is wasted or dissipated. Any alliance, whether through marriage or otherwise, may serve to concentrate, that is, reaffirm and strengthen, an existing alliance (an additional marriage within an already related family); it may strengthen an alliance network (a marriage to a family linked to previously allied families); it may expand an alliance network

(marriage to a family within the elite with common interests but not heretofore closely related); it may constitute a loss of energy (a marriage with a family of no consequence); and, finally, it may be a dangerous liability (a marriage with a powerful family whose interests diverge from the interests of the existing network).

We must remember that, although the members of the elite may be said to have generalized common interests, each individual and each sub-group, whether family, social network, or economic or political interest group, can be expected to attempt to improve its relative position and this is done primarily by aiming at the central core of power. Any error of judgment, an inopportune investment, a political blunder, a "wasted" marriage, can seriously weaken one's relative position, making one less desirable as an ally. We encounter in the genealogical data families which marry all their children to foreigners or persons with inconsequential surnames and the family simply disappears from the genealogical record (genealogists find no reason to trace the line further since, with the exception of Sanabria, the genealogies have been collected in order to trace either the genealogist or his client to the bluebloods).

Preferential Marriage within Endogamy: Inbreeding

The second means by which the family network may be restricted rather than extended is through inbreeding. The term "inbreeding" is used to refer to a situation in which selectively preferential marriage takes place within an endogamous group. Thus, while the members of an endogamous group can be said generally to share the same set of genes, there are some sub-groups whose genetic make-up is highly selective. To arrive at this state of affairs requires selective intermarriage between

restricted subgroups over several generations. This process achieves a genetic "concentration," perhaps a concentration of genetic power, which, of course, is translated into social and cultural concentration. The social and political consequences of inbreeding are similar to the biological consequences: When inbreeding is carried too far, the resultant strain may be weakened by unfavorable genes, destroyed by lethal mutations, or destroyed by specially adapted diseases or predators. While this genetic strategy may prove highly adaptive to one environment, overspecialization may prove maladaptive once that environment changes.

Beyond being generally endogamous, the ruling elite often shows a tendency toward forming small family cliques. This occurs when two or three families intermarry as has been shown above, but this intermarriage often repeats itself over several generations. Again, this appears to be a strategy of family alliance, but unlike the sibling exchanges just discussed, such alliances are for maintenance of power rather than its creation. For example, the first Costa Rican generations of the Guardia (Fernández Peralta 1958), Montealegre (Table III), Salazar (Table III), and Peralta (Fernández Peralta 1964) families are married to a number of important local families. In order to exhaust all possible connections with the ruling elite, subsequent generations ought to have extended marriage ties to the remaining important families. This did not happen. Several reasons can be given. Logically, as argued earlier, once power is maximized through marriage, additional increments through extension are likely to weaken established relations. It is equally likely that personal networks can only expand within certain limits before they become inefficient or unmanageable. Specifically, problems are reached in a

complex system of obligations since any increase in the network increases the chance that newly created obligations will conflict with established obligations. To clarify, let us suppose that the Sancho family is closely related to ten other families. Any new addition is likely to present a conflict with an established alliance, and, as the number of families increases, the likelihood of conflict increases for any new extension. This is most easily seen in relation to politics and power. If two families each enjoy high positions within the power structure, a marriage between the two puts both of them into an even better position. Nevertheless, the point must come when a family, because of the power it holds plus the amount of power which is held by families under obligation to it, cannot make a marriage which will advance that family's power position, i.e., the families with which it is not connected are either so low in the power structure that a marriage would incur more obligations than it would accrue benefits, or the other family might be so powerful that the alliance would advance its position of that family beyond the original family.[13] In Costa Rican politics, for example, lines are often drawn between powerful families, the most notable example being that of the conflict between the Mora and Montealegre families in the nineteenth century. One might suppose than an excellent strategy in such a situation would be for the Montealegre to marry into families supporting the Mora, thus neutralizing some of the Mora support. The problem, however, is that the lines have been drawn for very important reasons, and any attempt to recruit within the Mora ranks is very likely to cause a conflict with established allies. Thus, Vicente Aguilar and Manuel José Carazo, who support Montealegre, would be distressed to find

the Montealegre family making peace with the families of the opposition by marrying into them.

If a particular power matrix arrives at the situation in which marrying out of the alliance is threatening to other members or increases the likelihood of power loss, inbreeding will occur.[14] Unfortunately, inbreeding is difficult to measure since it may appear superficially to be endogamy, i.e., individuals tend to marry within a specific group, but the term asserts that the marrying partners stand in a closer blood relationship than they do to other marriageable persons. Since it is argued here that this inbreeding takes place for reasons of power, the marriages of closely related persons, such as first cousins, are not preferred nor prescribed marriages as part of a generalized pattern of the society, or even of the "class," but occur when circumstances favor them. Thus, like the sibling exchanges, they are statistically infrequent and cannot be assimilated to kinship models of a given society. As we found sibling exchange taking place within nodal families in the network of persons involved in politics and coffee plantations, we would anticipate that inbreeding could be correlated to power requirements. To continue within the context already presented, we find family alliances and continued intermarriage extended to the point that the term "inbreeding" becomes appropriate and can be correlated to political events now part of the historical record.

In the years following Independence, a rivalry grew up between the Mora and the Montealegre. Once the Montealegre had overthrown and exiled ex-President Mora Porras, dissension began within the ranks of those who had stood against Mora. Ultimately Tomás Guardia took power and

established a different line of succession. Some lines of kinship relations are clear and direct. Guardia was succeeded as president by his son-in-law, General Próspero Fernández Oreamuno, who was in turn succeeded by his own son-in-law, General Bernardo Soto Alfaro. Kin relations, however, run much deeper than this; they are, unfortunately, often difficult to discover. Since affinal ties are important, a dissimilarity of surnames frequently disguises close relationships. Costa Rican historians rarely mention the kinship ties between allied political figures. We must try briefly to reconstruct some of these alliance to emphasize the importance of kinship to political power.

Previously we mentioned the close relation between wealth in coffee, political power, and kinship, showing that political control was exercised within this group during the middle of the nineteenth century. Virtually all political posts were held by members of this group and their relatives by blood and marriage, i.e., power belonged to them exclusively. Within the group, relations were not always amicable; schisms developed and sides were taken. As a general rule sides were taken in accordance with kin alliances and subsequent marriages were arranged within the competing cliques. Not all families took sides, e.g., the Jiménez and Oreamuno families of Cartago, who married each other, continued to marry members of competing groups and so operated as arbiters between groups, preserving the group as a whole. This seems to be the reason that Francisco Montealegre suggested Jesús Jiménez as a presidential candidate to Manuel Argüello (brother-in-law to Mora Porras and leading survivor of the Morist faction) as a compromise candidate to end the bitter factionalism (Argüello Mora 1963:95). While the Jiménez managed to obtain two

presidencies, their political success can be measured in Congress, where five generations of the Jiménez family dominated in numbers and influence (Stone 1971:Sup.). Other families appear to have concentrated on the presidency, but the Jiménez controlled Congress. Both Jiménez presidents were known as conciliators, although they had enemies as well. Ricardo Jiménez proved to be the most important political figure of the twentieth century.

Intermarriage and inbreeding took place along lines which can be demonstrated to follow political schisms. By inbreeding here is not meant simply individual instances of, let us say, first cousin marriage, although these occur with some frequency; third, fourth, and fifth cousin marriages are equally important since these also represent reinforcement of the intermarrying group and the failure to use opportunities to extend kin relations beyond the group. It is possible, then, to indicate the degree of inbreeding and certainly intermarriage by studying the statistical frequencies of surnames. To stress the point that these are not chance occurrences, we will follow a particular family, showing how its branches are interrelated. Although some Costa Rican surnames, e.g., Fernández, Jiménez, do not all come from the same stock, during the period in question, namely the nineteenth century, names such as Montealegre, Salazar, Sáenz, Ulloa, Carazo, Esquivel, Peralta, and Echavarría each represent one stock. The custom of using both paternal and maternal surnames in Costa Rica helps us to recognize siblings, i.e., we can expect that Manuel José Carazo Bonilla and Dolores Carazo Bonilla were brother and sister. This would most certainly be true were it not for extensive intermarriage. For example, two brothers Jiménez Zamora married Oreamuno

women, producing a host of Jiménez Oreamuno children, eight of whom were legislators (recall the statement above concerning the legislative dominance of the Jiménez family). For our purposes, it does not really matter that these legislators were first cousins rather than all brothers; the important point is that intermarriage seems to have resulted in considerable political influence.

The Echavarría Alvarado: A Nodal Family (Appendix C)

To demonstrate the existence of inbreeding and its relation to politics, we start with the Montealegre family. We have already noted that this family rose to political dominance within one generation after arriving in Costa Rica. We also noted that the marriages of the children created important alliances, which were later crossed by schisms, notably with the Mora family. Manuel Argüello Mora (1963:86-89), at one time an arch enemy of the Montealegre, notes the three most important Montealegre supporters: Vicente Aguilar Cubero, Manuel José Carazo Bonilla, and Aniceto Esquivel Sáenz. Let us examine the relationships between these individuals. Vicente Aguilar, a great coffee-grower, was married to Dolores Salazar Aguado (recall that the Montealegre and Salazar were friends from Nicaragua). Two Salazar Aguado sisters were married to two Fernández Hidalgo brothers (half brothers to founder Montealegre's wife), important coffee-growers. Aguilar's daughter, Juana Aguilar Salazar, and her first cousin (MoSiSo) Santiago Fernández Salazar married two siblings, Francisco and María Echavarría Alvarado. There were eight Echavarría Alvarado children, several of whom are of interest to us because, like the two mentioned above, they married the families we are about to trace. We occasionally find instances of this sort, i.e., several intermarrying families that are connected directly to the children of one family in one

generation. María Joaquina Echavarría Alvarado married Joaquín Oreamuno Carazo, son of Lucia Carazo Peralta. Carlos Echavarría Alvarado married Natalia Carazo Peralta, daughter of Manuel José Carazo Bonilla (mentioned above as one of the important supporters of Montealegre), and María Toribia Peralta Echavarría--Natalia was third cousin[15] (FaMoBrDaDa) to Carlos. Brígida Echavarría Alvarado married Luis Diego Sáenz Carazo, son of Nicolás Sáenz Ulloa, of whom we shall learn more later, and Domitila Carazo Bonilla, sister of Manuel José, so that Brígida married the first cousin of her brother's wife (Carlos is not only brother to Brígida, but also is her HuMoBrDaHu), while Luis Diego Sáenz Carazo and Natalia Carazo Peralta are not only first cousins, being the children of sisters, but are also cunćuños, an affinal relation denoting either spouse's sibling's spouse or sibling's spouse's sibling.

Marta Echavarría Alvarado married Bernardino Peralta Alvarado, the uncle (FaBr) of María Toribia Perlata, hence the granduncle (MoFaBr) of Natalia Carazo, who was married to Bernardino's brother-in-law (WiBr), Carlos. Remembering the complex interrelation is not important if we recognize that several families are constantly involved. The persons named are shown in Appendix C.

We are most interested in the names which are repeated here, since we will see them again with the Sáenz and Esquivel families. The name Carazo is here the most frequent, with Peralta and Alvarado of somewhat less importance. If we return to the three men named as important supporters of the Montealegre family, we notice that two, Vicente Aguilar and Manuel José Carazo are to be found in the preceding discussion. The third, Aniceto Esquivel Sáenz was married to Isaura Carazo Peralta. If

we investigate this relationship further, we will understand how it was that this group of individuals came to be related to the Montealegre.

The Sáenz Ulloa: A Pattern of Inbreeding (Appendix B)

In the Echavarría family we included Luis Diego Sáenz Carazo, the son of Diego Sáenz Ulloa and Micaela Carazo Bonilla. The Sáenz Ulloa family and their descendants describe a pattern of intermarriage and inbreeding, incorporating the families with which we are here concerned. Manuel Sáenz Alvarado and María Cayetana Ulloa Guzmán had six children (Sáenz Ulloa) of interest to us because of their marriages and descendants. In the first generation there was one "sibling exchange." Diego married Micaela Carazo Bonilla and José Nicolás married Domitila Carazo Bonilla. Another child, María Ignacia married the coffee-grower (later President) Rafael Gallegos Alvarado. Three of their children (Gallego Sáenz) married Montealegre: the brothers Francisco and Mariano Montealegre Fernández married Victoria and Guadalupe Gallegos Sáenz; a third brother, (President) José María Montealegre was the father-in-law of Guadalupe and Victoria's brother Rafael Gallegos Sáenz. A fourth Sáenz Ulloa, María Ursula, married the coffee-grower Narciso Esquivel Salazar, producing several Esquivel Sáenz children, including aforementioned President Aniceto Esquivel Sáenz. Aniceto married Isaura Carazo Peralta, his first cousin (MoBrDa). Two of Aniceto's brothers, Camilo and José Antonio Esquivel Sáenz also married their first cousins (MoBrDa), namely, Pacífica and Salomé Sáenz Carazo. Another of Aniceto's brothers, Miguel Narciso Esquivel Sáenz, married the daughter of another first cousin (MoBrSoDa), Rosa Sáenz Sandoval, which brings us to the last Sáenz Ulloa, Francisco. Rosa was Francisco's granddaughter through his son, Andrés Sáenz Llorente

and Mercedes Sandoval Pérez. Manuel de Jesús Esquivel Sáenz married his son, Maximino Esquivel Echandi, to Andres' other daughter, Julia Sáenz Sandoval, i.e., Maximino married his FaMoBrSoDa. Thus in the second generation from the Sáenz Ulloa match, ten descendants are directly linked in cousin marriage (Table V) and another three have married into the Montealegre family. The situation becomes even more complex in the following generations.

TABLE V. MARRIAGES BETWEEN CONSANGUINAL KIN AMONG THE DESCENDANTS OF MANUEL SAENZ ALVARADO AND MARIA CAYETANA ULLOA GUZMAN

Male Descendant	Female Descendant	Relationship (from Male Ego)
Esquivel Sáenz, Aniceto	Carazo Peralta, Isaura	MoBrDa
Esquivel Sáenz, Camilo	Sáenz Carazo, Pacífica	MoBrDa
Esquivel Sáenz, José Antonio	Sáenz Carazo, Salomé	MoBrDa
Esquivel Sáenz, Miguel Narciso	Sáenz Sandoval, Rosa	MoBrSoDa
Esquivel Echandi, Maximino	Sáenz Sandoval, Julia	FaMoBrSoDa
Esquivel Carrillo, Joaquín	Esquivel Sáenz, Oliva	BrDa*
Peralta Esquivel, José Joaquín	Esquivel Bonilla, Adela	MoFaDa

*Half brother--same father, different mother

Maximino Esquivel Echandi and Julia Sáenz Sandoval married their daughter, Oliva Esquivel Sáenz to José Joaquín Esquivel Carrillot, Maximino's half brother (FaSo by another wife). Finally, Aniceto Esquivel Sáenz' granddaughter (SoDa), Adela Esquivel Bonilla, married his (Aniceto) brother's great grandson (BrSoDaSo), José Joaquín Peralta Esquivel. This last marriage could be related by blood through Carazo,

Peralta and Echavarría as well, as could the marriage between Angela Esquivel Fábrega and Carlos Peralta Echavarría (see Appendix B).

The discussion above need be only superficially grasped to recognize that the descendants of Nicolás Sáenz, himself an important political figure and a large coffee-grower, took great pains to avoid extending kinship ties beyond a few families. We have seen that the Sáenz-Esquivel-Gallegos-Carazo marriages were peripherally related to the Montealegre family. In relation to what has been said concerning the relation between kinship and power, it would seem that the Montealegre may have been less powerful than the families with which they married. Mariano Montealegre Bustamante, the founder of the Costa Rican family, married Jerónima Fernández Chacón. Jerónima's brother, Manuel Fernández Chacón was a President of Costa Rica, as was his son, Próspero Fernández Oreamuno, who married the sister of dictator Tomás Guardia, this last responsible for the ultimate blow to Montealegre power. The Montealegre chose the side that had the greatest solidarity but which proved the weaker in the end.

The relationships between marriage partners in the Sáenz Ulloa family (Table V) suggest a mother's brother--sister's son relationship to be significant. The Quirós data (see Appendix F) suggest that father's brother may be equally important (the three Quirós males are first cousins, sons of three Quirós Jiménez brothers). Without further extensive research, it would be rash to assert that males acquire wives through their parent's brothers, although this is a possibility. What is most important, however, is a common tendency to superimpose affinal relations upon consanguinal relations. Costa Rican Spanish kin terminology recognizes

an affinal sibling relationship extending through two marriages called concuño. We note that in sibling exchange (Table IV) siblings also stand in the concuño relationship. Appendix C also demonstrates the concuño relation between close kinsmen, and Table VIII reveals first cousins who are cuncuños. In these instances, the opportunity to extend personal networks by way of affinity has been declined.

As a final note concerning endogamy and inbreeding, in view of what has been said thus far, we arrive at a functional explanation of marriages with foreigners. In terms of power, marriage to a foreigner is a logical step under certain circumstances. When the individual concerned has skills, wealth or foreign influence which can be useful to a Costa Rican family, a marriage may enhance the family's power and wealth without creating serious obligations. This is so because most foreigners, especially Americans, do not bring their kindreds with them, that is to say, the kin obligations rarely go beyond the individual involved. In addition, the marriage is on Costa Rican ground, so that kin relations are based on Costa Rican rules. But most important is the fact that the newcomer does not have any other Costa Rican kin obligations, nor enmities, so that he does not threaten established alliances nor unduly extend obligations through marriage.

Historical Roots of a "Political Class

Samuel Stone (1971) traced the descendants of Juan Vázquez de Coronado, Conquistador and first Adelantado of Costa Rica, recording those branches of the family which numbered presidents or legislators among their descendants in order to discover some measure of the political importance of the family. The results are startling. Among the direct descendants and

their spouses, we find 29 out of 44 Costa Rican heads of state and 230 of Costa Rica's 1300 legislators during 150 years of republican government. If we add to this the descendants of colonial officials, Antonio de Acosta Arévalo, Jorge de Alvarado, and Nicolás de González y Oviedo, we have 33 out of 44 heads of state and approximately half of Costa Rica's legislators (cf. Stone 1971:114). The importance of these families has been even greater than what is suggested by the figures above since the legislators belonging to these families usually represented the Provinces of San José and Cartago. Far from the geographical and political core of power, legislators from other provinces had influence only within their provinces and were never able, if indeed they were interested, to combine against the important families of San José and Cartago (Stone 1971:112).

It must be emphasized that the relationships between those occupying important political posts were not simply relatives, but close relatives. Appendix G presents graphically the closeness of these relationships between thirteen heads of state. Sixteen heads of state were related as follows: President Juan Mora Porras was the son-in-law of President Manuel Aguilar Chacón and the brother-in-law (WiBr) of President José María Montealegre Fernández, who was the brother-in-law (WiBr) of President Bruno Carranza Ramírez, the latter also being a brother-in-law (WiBr) of President Braulio Carrillo Colina. The son of the aforementioned José María Montealegre was a brother-in-law (SiHu) of President Rafael Iglesias Castro, who was the son of President Demetrio Iglesias Llorente, great uncle (MoMoBr) of President Federico Tinoco Granados and son-in-law of President José María Castro Madriz, whose brother-in-law (WiBr), President Próspero Fernández Oreamuno, was also brother-in-law (WiBr) to President

Tomás Guardia Gutiérrez, father-in-law to President Bernardo Soto Alfaro, and the son of President Manuel Fernández Chacón, whose wife was the first cousin (FaBrDa) of President Francisco María Oreamuno Bonilla, whose son-in-law, President Jesús Jiménez Zamora, was the father of Ricardo Jiménez Oreamuno.[16] As the repetition of surnames, e.g., Oreamuno, Fernández, Chacón, suggests, many of those related by marriage were more distantly related by blood. The presidency of Costa Rica was occupied by those named above for a total of 83 years during the 101-year period from 1835 to 1936. If Stone's figures are correct, 17 additional heads of state were more distantly related to those named here.

Stone points out that recent history reveals ideological splits within the "political class." This seems hardly a new development (cf. Vega Carballo 1971:377-379), except perhaps that schisms in the past were more personal than ideological, but, as we have seen, the ideology of contending factions may be more important in words than actions. One must wonder how important ideology is when power and social structures remain the same, with the country run by a small aristocratic, endogamous, political class. The following citation from Stone indicates the extent to which the "political class" retains its power today:

> Since 1948, Costa Rica has witnessed two preponderant political tendencies. One has been the National Liberation Party, with a liberal ideological tendency, and closely linked with the name of the current President, José Figueres Ferrer, who, being of Spanish parentage, has few close kin relations with the political class. Nevertheless, he counts on the support of many of its members. The other current, that of the Republican Party, is less liberal and is organized around the person of Rafael Angel Calderón Guardia. There have been other important parties with a conservative orientation, one directed by ex-president Otilio Ulate Blanco and the other by ex-president Mario Echandi Jiménez. In the last decade a coalition has been formed (the National Unification Party) among all of the more or less conservative forces for the

> purpose of presenting a united front against the National Liberation Party. All this can be reduced to the two important political tendencies in question, one of which we may call liberal (liberacionista) and the other more conservative (unificacionista).
>
> Thus, for example, in the twelfth generation [from Vázquez de Coronado] appears the name of Mario Echandi Jiménez (today unificacionista), who was elected President in 1958 against the liberacionista Francisco Orlich Bolmarcich, of the sixteenth generation. In the table we see groups which ideologically support or supported (since some are dead) these two candidates, whether or not they were candidates for the National Assembly at the time. We have José Joaquín Perlata Esquivel, Cristián Tattenbach Yglesias, and Ricardo Castro Beeche, all unificacionistas. On the other side we have Alberto Cañas Escalante, Alfonso Carro Zúñiga, Daniel Oduber Quirós, and Fernando Volio Jiménez, liberacionistas. We also have followers of ex-President Otilio Ulate Blanco, for example, Alberto Oreamuno Flores, his vice-president. We also have Francisco José Marshall Jiménez and Ramiro Brenes Gutiérrez, who are "co-"brother-in-laws (concuños), and have organized their own party. We can even note the name of Carlos Luis Fallas Sibaja, who was the director of the Communist Party [Stone 1971:124-125].

Stone describes the change from the nineteenth to the twentieth century as a change from ownership of power to leadership of power, he does not, however, see any united opposition to the leadership of the political class (1971:128).

Statistical Analysis of Kinship Relations in the "Political Class"

In tracing the Vázquez de Coronado descendants only to presidents and legislators, Stone has provided us the means to measure the statistical frequency of important Costa Rican surnames, i.e., since he does not trace a family line farther than the last legislator, unproductive lines are terminated with but few listings while the productive lines are represented by many branches and names. In order to determine the most important political families, Stone's listings were relisted by marriages, i.e., rather than listing by individuals' surnames, such as Ricardo Jiménez Oreamuno, a list was made of the 302 marriages shown, e.g.,

Jiménez Zamora was one listing representing the marriage of Ricardo Jiménez Oreamuno and Beatriz Zamora. The purpose of this was to avoid multiplication of surnames where several children of two parents are found in the genealogies. For instance, in one generation are to be found ten Jiménez Oreamuno from two families, being either siblings or first cousins. There were, in fact, but two marriages here between Jiménez and Oreamuno and not ten. By limiting the listings to the marriages, we can determine not only "productivity," i.e., how often a surname appears, but also its strategic importance by how desirable it is to contract marriage with that family. This is best clarified by furnishing some statistics. Since there were 302 marriages there were 604 surnames listed, or, if no surname had been repeated we would have found 604 different surnames. In fact, only 138 different surnames were to be found among the 604 listed. Of these, 60 surnames appeared only once; and have been classed as unproductive surnames. Another 26 appeared twice; these also may be considered unproductive. Translated into productive surnames we will find the following statistics: 52 different surnames or 38 percent of the surnames (52 of 138), account for 82 percent of the 604 names listed. 15 different surnames or 11 percent of the 138 different surnames, account for 51 percent of the listings. Finally, four surnames, Jiménez, Oreamuno, Quirós, and Echavarría account for 22 percent of the listings. The frequency with which surnames are repeated bears no relation to the frequency of occurrence of the surnames in the general population, confirming the assertion of an endogamous ruling elite. A glance at Table VI, comparing the number of listings in Stone's genealogical list and the number of listings in the 1972 Costa Rica

Telephone Directory, indicated the discrepancy between politically important surnames and those which are not politically significant.

TABLE VI. FREQUENCY OF OCCURRENCE OF COSTA RICAN SURNAMES

Surname	No. Marriages within Political Class*	No. Listed in Telephone Directory**
Castro	17	391
Chavarría	28	166
Esquivel	21	126
Fernández	16	294
Iglesias (Yglesias)	13	33
Jiménez	48	406
Oreamuno	32	42
Montealegre	14	37
Mora	15	339
Peralta	14	36
Quirós	25	191
Sáenz	19	130
Volio	11	23
García	5	178
Gómez	1	169
González	2	365
López	1	161
Ramírez	2	273
Rojas	2	369
Soto	3	231
Vargas	1	502
Rodríguez	1	554

*from Stone (1971:Sup.)
**Costa Rica Telephone Directory (Directorio Telefónico) 1971-1972

Since telephones are ordinarily owned by the well-to-do in Costa Rica, the discrepancy between the figures in the two columns is even more significant than appears at first glance. Some of the commonest Costa Rican surnames, such as Rodríguez, Vargas, and González would be classed as "unproductive" in political terms. Important political names, such as

Oreamuno, Volio, and Peralta, are uncommon in the general population. Some names which are common in Costa Rica, such as Arce, Hernández, and Arias, are not to be found in the marriages among the descendants of Vázquez de Coronado.

The extent of inbreeding and endogamy can also be examined by studying the marriages of the political class, using the descendants of Vázquez de Coronado. Table VII presents marriage statistics concerning the 13 most frequently occurring surnames in the Vázquez de Coronado genealogy. Many of these surnames should already be familiar--Montealegre, Peralta, Jiménez, Oreamuno--since they have been mentioned numerous times in our discussion. In accordance with what has already been said here, we would expect these surnames to represent not only the most commonly occuring names but also to show a distinct tendency toward mutual association. While the figures show this tendency, they also confirm another assertation made earlier in this chapter, namely, that there are groups of allying families.

We can derive a concept of nodal families or nodal individuals from the figures. Since the genealogies were reported by reference to political position, i.e., lines were traced only as far as the last legislator or president, repetition of family names in the genealogy reveals the most productive political families. Nevertheless, since this is a bilateral kinship system, we must consider the possible inheritance of political power through females. Thus a surname may disappear from the genealogies without signifying that direct descendants are no longer included. This is best seen in the two important families of Juan Vázquez de Coronado and Antonio de Acosta Arévalo. In both instances the first generations were more productive of females than of males so that the

surnames Vázquez and Acosta were practically lost after the first few generations and are not represented among the important political figures who were descended from these two important founders. It should be noted that the relations between important politicians, as evidenced by the list of presidents above, are often affinal (see Appendix G).

In tabulating the figures in Table VII, both surnames were used, so that there appear to be more marriages with, let us say, Castro than with a list using the first surnames of a marriage, i.e., the García-Vargas marriage would not have been counted among the thirteen families in the marriage statistics heretofore, but if the marriage were between José García Castro and María Vargas Fernández, it would also be recorded here under both Castro and Fernández as a marriage between the two families.

The occurrences of the thirteen surnames varies from 12 persons named Volio to 73 named Jiménez. Percentages on endogamous (within the 13 families) marriages vary from 32 percent for Iglesias to 74 percent for Peralta. Among the thirteen families, 45 percent of the marriages involved two persons, each with at least one of the thirteen surnames, indicating a high degree of endogamy. It is assumed that all those bearing the same surname are related by blood. While there may be exceptions to this, none came to our attention. The Fernández and Jiménez surnames are common Costa Rican and Latin surnames and would be the surnames most likely to include unrelated members. However, the large number of persons with these two surnames is accounted for by the marriages into the Vázquez de Coronado line early in the colonial period; and the relationships within the two families are well recorded, so that it is unlikely that those represented here are unrelated (because of these ancient marriages,

TABLE VII. FREQUENCY OF ELITE INTERMARRIAGE

Surname:	Total Occurrences	Castro	Chavarría	Esquivel	Fernández	Iglesias	Jiménez	Montealegre	Mora	Oreamuno	Peralta	Quirós	Sáenz	Volio	Total Marriages within Group	
Castro	29	1	1	0	2	1	3	2	1	1	0	3	0	0	15	52%
Chavarría	41	1	1	0	1	0	5	2	4	1	2	1	1	1	20	49%
Esquivel	22	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	1	0	3	0	7	0	13	60%
Fernández	39	2	1	0	1	1	3	1	1	3	0	2	5	0	20	51%
Iglesias	25	1	0	0	1	0	2	1	2	1	0	0	0	0	8	32%
Jiménez	73	3	5	1	3	2	2	2	0	8	3	1	1	3	34	45%
Montealegre	19	2	2	0	0	1	3	0	1	0	1	0	3	1	13	68%
Mora	30	1	4	1	1	2	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	11	37%
Oreamuno	52	1	1	0	3	1	8	0	0	1	2	0	0	1	18	35%
Peralta	19	0	2	3	0	0	3	1	0	2	2	1	1	0	14	74%
Quirós	27	3	1	0	2	0	1	0	0	0	1	4	0	0	12	44%
Sáenz	40	0	0	7	5	0	1	3	1	0	1	0	4	0	22	57%
Volio	12	0	1	0	0	0	3	0	0	1	0	0	1	1	6	50%

the two families are represented in the genealogy of Vázquez de Coronado from their beginnings and the individuals with these surnames are nearly all direct descendants and not persons marrying into the line). Most of the other names, such as Montealegre, Volio, Oreamuno, and Esquivel, are smaller families, most of whose descendants are directly related to the ruling elite.[17]

While all except three of the surnames are found to have at least one marriage in which both partners share a surname, only Quirós and Sáenz have four such marriages, suggesting a tendency toward inbreeding. For Quirós this figure accounts for 15 percent of the marriages recorded (see Appendix F). Among the Sáenz, because of a greater number of total marriages, only 10 percent had the same surname (see Table V and Appendix B).

Table VII presents some interesting differences between families. Some families have intermarried with a wide range of the other families.[18] The Jiménez surname is associated with all but one (Mora) other family, Chavarría with all but two, and Fernández with all but three. On the other hand, Volio, Esquivel, and Quirós have intermarried with fewer than half of the other families. These three appear to have been exclusive and probably peripheral to the political group. For instance, the Quirós, besides marrying Quirós, only married three times outside of the Castro and Fernández families (10 percent); Volios married only twice outside of the Jiménez family (17 percent); Esquivels married three times (15 percent) outside of the Peralta and Sáenz families. These three families appear to be poorly involved in the political network, dependent upon their alliances with one or two families (Volio-Jiménez; Quirós-Castro;

Esquivel-Sáenz, -Peralta). The Iglesias family also seems peripheral to the political alliances (the Iglesias family in general was indirectly related to the others by way of the Tinoco and Llorente marriages).

Certain family alliances stand out by their frequency of occurrence--Jiménez-Oreamuno, Jiménez-Chavarría, Sáenz-Esquivel, and Sáenz-Fernández. The two key families here, Jiménez and Sáenz, produced many political figures. The six generations following José Antonio Jiménez Bonilla produced more than 60 legislators as direct descendants or husbands of direct descendants (Stone 1971:Sup). The five generations following Manuel José Mercedes Sáenz Alvarado produced 33 legislators (many named Esquivel). The other families which produced many legislators were Fernández, Echavarría, and Castro. Each produced several generations of politicians and each tended to intermarry with all the other families (always with two or three exceptions). Thus, three strategies seem to have been effective. (1) Families would attempt to marry into as many of the other important families as was economically feasible. This strategy was commonly used by newcomers. (2) Some families tended to restrict marriages in order to concentrate power. This characterized the Sáenz family and allies. The strategy may be used ordinarily only by a group having sufficient power to insure some security for future maintenance of power. (3) Both methods may be used, as with the Jiménez family, which made many matches with the important Echavarría and Oreamuno families but also married into all but one of the other thirteen families. This strategy is possible only with both a commanding power position and a very large family. The Jiménez family filled both qualifications and used this strategy to become the most influential and productive political family.

Figure 3 presents graphically the alliances among the thirteen families. Horizontal lines indicate the most frequently allied families; other lines connect intermarrying families, with interrupted lines indicating only two marriages.

Summary

In this chapter we have shifted from the geographical distribution of power to its social distribution. We have attempted to demonstrate the historical existence of what Dr. Stone has termed a "political class," which has dominated Costa Rican politics, economy, and society since early times. Evidence has been presented to show the importance of both consanguineal and affinal relationships within an endogamous political class.

Without disagreeing with Dr. Stone's conclusions concerning this political class, we have submitted his genealogical materials to an analysis emphasizing the importance of affinal, as opposed to consanguinal kin. This is not to say that consanguineal relations are of no account. To the contrary, Stone's analysis of the descendants of Juan Vázquez de Coronado shows conclusively that bloodline and political power are directly related. The point we wish to make here is that noble bloodlines unsupported by successful marriage strategies do not yield power. While the duties inherent in blood relationships must in most cases be unavoidable, marriage offers special opportunities for creating, increasing, and consolidating the access to power of consanguinal kin groups. The material just presented has been organized to argue that marriage within the political class not only followed a pattern of general endogamy, thus ensuring exclusive access to power for the group as a whole, but also revealed distinctive patterns of family alliances and inbreeding which



Figure 3

Important Political Families

cannot be accounted for by a simple practice of endogamy. Finally, it has been suggested that marriages outside of the group were employed to recruit important foreigners (the Spanish envoys in colonial times, rich Germans and Americans in more recent times). In emphasizing the importance of affinal relationships, we must not lose sight of the fact that so many members of the political class are also related by blood. In many instances the blood relation between marriage partners is of such antiquity as to obscure their awareness of the relation. We have seen, nonetheless, many examples of sibling exchange, first cousin marriage, and cross-generational inbreeding, in which the marrying partners must have been aware of the superimposition of affinal and consanguineal ties.

The assertion of conscious marriage strategies implies a competition between families and individuals not necessarily implied by the existence of a political class. While power and social position may have been limited by birth, within the political class there was differential access to power which was an important source of conflict and competition within the group. This means that power and wealth were not automatic, that birth within the elite group was a necessary qualification for high political position without necessarily entailing additional hereditary rights to power. We have seen that Costa Rican chiefs of state have been more often close affines than close consanguines, and we have seen the consistency with which the most important families have arranged marriages with other important families.

The foregoing discussion presents a problem. While acknowledging a political group united by marriage and blood, can we call this group a political class? Stone--and the same may be said of several other Costa

Rican genealogists--traces relationships only to politically significant persons. This in itself tends to bias the genealogical presentation by omitting non-productive branches of the families. The implication is that those not listed are elite persons who are not actively involved in politics. While this may be so, it does not necessarily follow. Arguing from the materials Stone presented, we found that powerful families were traditionally divided between those engaged in the production of wealth (e.g., coffee-growers) and those involved in the manipulation of power, viz., the politicians. We see, nevertheless, that this division is not hereditary in the sense that the coffee-grower's son often becomes a politician and the politician's son becomes a coffee-grower. We must question, then, whether bloodlines which are politically unproductive are not also economically unproductive. Because of the rarity of outside recruitment to the power group, we have been led to assume that an endogamous class exists. It is possible, however, that there has been a significant downward drift. This would suggest that large elements of the so-called "middle class" are the descendants of the less fortunate or less astute members of the elite. Fluharty (1973), describing the Colombian situation, paints a picture which must not be unlike that of Costa Rica in that a traditionally prolific aristocracy, accustomed to dividing estates between many heirs, produces a small few who are able to maintain immense power and wealth with many more who carry on the values, beliefs, and prejudices of the aristocracy without possessing the wherewithal to remain at the top rung. These last Fluharty calls the "middle class that is not in the middle."

Unfortunately, evidence supporting the thesis suggested above is not immediately accessible--the less important descendants of Juan Vázquez

de Coronado have not occupied the attention of the genealogists. We may argue on structural grounds, however, that this thesis is more likely than middle class recruitment from below. An intended similarity is drawn between the appearance of figures 2 and 3. The power relationship between San José, other cities in Costa Rica, and the countryside is built upon centrality and concentration of population. In the same manner, the Jiménez family owed its political dominance to the two marriage strategies of concentration, i.e., repeated marriages with key families, and centrality, i.e., scattered marriages with influential but less important families, placing the Jiménez at the center of the marriage network.

Costa Rican history provides a geographical analogy.[19] Following the announcement of Independence from Spain there arose in Costa Rica a rivalry between Cartago and her allies and San José and her allies. Cartago, the colonial capital, represented the closed, conservative tradition of the colonial aristocracy (if Costa Rica can be said to have had an aristocracy) while San José represented the open, progressive attitude of a growing commercial bourgeoisie.[20] Ultimately San José achieved hegemony, with the result that San José is today the undisputed capital while Cartago, still conservative and traditional, is just another city of Costa Rica. Centrality and concentration have operated as general principles of the organization of power at every structural level in Costa Rica.

If, as has been suggested earlier, family estates in Costa Rica were historically handled as family corporations headed by a chosen son, subsequent developments make sense if we view these "corporations" as

competitive units organized to concentrate power. Marvin Harris (1971: 423-425), in a summary sketch of recent pertinent sources, has described how corporate structure in the United States has operated to concentrate wealth and power in the hands of the members of a relatively small group which could not control such wealth through personal holdings alone. The corporate group exercises significant power by concentrating the wealth and power of the several natural persons in one fictitious person, i.e., the corporation, and in this way gains a competitive advantage over other persons not similarly organized. The corporation need not engage in economically productive activities but may act simply as a holding company, distributing its wealth and power where they have the greatest impact and obtain the greatest rewards. In this way, the power of the corporation can be extended far beyond its natural limitations. This principle is particularly important in disputing the notions of those who are inclined to view power in the simple terms of physical coercion, especially with regard to Latin America.

To return to the diagrams with which we began this chapter, it should be clear that our present discussion represents power in terms of concentric clusters about a small but structurally powerful core. If man has shown a marked ability to concentrate human population through the advance of technological means of utilizing newer and better sources of energy, he has also demonstrated an ability to develop forms of social organization which harness the physical and intellectual energies of his fellow men. We are accustomed to call the specific organization "institutions."

The State, the corporation, and the family (in its broadest sense) are institutions particularly concerned with the organization of power (along with other functions). In the next chapter we will discuss the institution which is to a large extent responsible for perpetuating the insignia of power which the other institutions have created.

NOTES

[1]Two events helped to focus attention on coffee in Costa Rica: In 1803 coffee (as well as cacao, sugar, and cotton) were exempted by the Spanish Crown from taxation. In addition, Tomás de Acosta', the Costa Rican governor, attempted at that time to encourage the production of coffee in Costa Rica. Thus provincial politicians could anticipate a favorable attitude from the one area which could endager their venture--the Spanish administrators. This may have governed their choice to go into coffee rather than tobacco, which was of proven profitability, produced in Costa Rica and sold in Panama and Guatemala. Tobacco, however, was a carefully controlled government monopoly. For documentation of these events, see Sáenz Maroto (1970).

[2]The principal source for the genealogical materials was Stone (1971:Sup.). Since this work provides genealogical completeness only with regard to the descendants of Juan Vázquez de Coronado, additional material was sought in the Revista de la Academia Costarricense de Ciencias Genealógicas, which has to date provided extensive genealogies on many of the most illustrious Costa Rican families. In particular, the following articles were consulted: Revollo Acosta (1960, 1961); Prado (1941); Hack-Prestinary (1965); Fernández Peralta (1958, 1964); Luján (1964). Because of the extent of intermarriage among these families, much of the material is repetitive, so that the genealogical research often duplicated that already accomplished by others, especially that of Dr. Stone. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that contradictions were extremely rare, indicating the great care with which the genealogists treated the original sources. Finally, we must note the important work of Archbishop Sanabria (1957), whose extensive research into colonial genealogies provided a good deal of date for Stone's later work. In addition to strictly genealogical materials, important personal data related to the individuals named was collected from a variety of sources too numerous to mention here, although we must again express our debt to Dr. Stone.

[3]There is a certain type of economic interpretation of history á la Charles and Mary Beard which tends to view the early anti-colonial revolutions, specifically the American Revolution, as the perpetration of successful local entrepreneurs chafing under the restrictive fiscal policies of the mother country. However appropriate this may or may not be for other colonies, it does not seem applicable to Costa Rica, where Independence was gained quite accidentally via Guatemala. In fact, Costa Rica was at first somewhat reluctant to accept Independence from Spain. Cartago proved not to be as intrepid as San José, and the latter subsequently wrested political control of the new Republic, when Cartago attempted to join the Mexican Empire.

[4]Costa Ricans use two surnames. The first surname is one's father's first surname, the second surname is one's mother's first surname, or,

put another way, a Costa Rican uses the surnames of his grandfathers, the paternal surname first. Thus the children of José Fernández Jiménez and María Vargas Gutiérrez would be called Fernández Vargas. At marriage names are not changed, as in the English-speaking world, but the wife simply adds her husband's first surname, preceded by de, to her own names. Thus, in the example above, the wife could be designated as María Vargas Gutiérrez de Fernández, which is often abbreviated in practice to María Vargas de Fernández, or simply María de Fernández, so that, in fact, a woman may come to be known by her husband's surname. The use of more than one surname helps to clarify genealogical relationships. Naming practices in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries were more complex and variable than at present. Wherever multiple names were listed for an individual in the genealogical records, the choice has been made here in the direction of modern practice in order to minimize confusion.

Since surnames are not pluralized in Spanish, they will not be pluralized here, so that "Coto came from Spain," would indicate an individual while "The Coto came from Spain," would indicate the several persons referred to with the surname Coto.

[5]Table III is intended to the extent of affinal relationships between important coffee-growers in the first half of the nineteenth century. A more complete account of these relationships, including consanguineal relationships, may be found in the Appendices. Many of the names encountered in Table III may be found in Appendices A and B, which trace the descendants of Antonio de Acosta Arévalo for several generations. Many of the same names, as well as other important coffee-growers, may be found among the descendants of Juan Vázquez de Coronado, the first conquistador of Costa Rica, only a small portion of whose descendants have been included in Appendix D since the persons of especial interest here may be found in the other appendices and because the descendants of Vázquez de Coronado have been amply recorded elsewhere (Revollo 1961; Stone 1971). The Mora Porras family is described in a separate chart (Appendix E) since it is descended from Vázquez de Coronado but not from Acosta Arévalo.

[6]Averages were not attempted for family size since some variation occurred during different periods (e.g., in 1856 a cholera epidemic wiped out much of the population) and because genealogical materials are rarely complete--many omit unmarried offspring or children dying at infancy. Nevertheless, one is struck in the genealogies with the frequency of families with six, seven, or eight children. Three cases were found in which individuals had more than fifty grandchildren. The sixth generation descended from Peralta de la Vega is said to contain more than 900 individuals, of which half belong to illegitimate branches (Fernández Peralta 1964:39-40).

[7]We are grateful to Dr. Stone for much of the information concerning inheritance patterns. Several informants had previously told of a strict rule of primogeniture among the members of the elite. This would not seem consistent with some genealogical results, namely, brothers seemed often to be of equal political and social importance

despite the fact that only one might be an important coffee-grower. One of my informants, who was in fact the first son of an important coffee-grower, told me of his struggle to build his own coffee empire once he had divided his father's estate among some twenty heirs. Small families and primogeniture probably only become adaptive strategies when land becomes relatively scarce or when markets are difficult to expand.

[8]Perhaps the word "common" is inappropriate here. In fact such cases are numerically small, probably constituting less than five percent of all marriages in the elite. Nevertheless, such marriages need not occur at all. Statistics are of little use here since not all marriages are recorded nor have we compiled genealogies of other social strata to examine whether or not this is a generalized Costa Rican pattern. It is difficult to assert the size and membership of the elite at any one time since those on the periphery (in both time and space) of this group inevitably occupy an ambiguous position. There are many persons descended from illustrious bloodlines who must now be considered "middle class." As a matter of fact, one discovers genealogies of acquaintances who are quite surprised to learn of their ancestry.

[9]This has probably been true longer than most Costa Ricans realize. The Biesanz's note acceptance of the "modern" practice in 1945 (Biesanz and Biesanz); Ricardo Fernández Guardia's (1908) story, "The Debut," suggests that young lovers had their ways of gaining parental approval at the turn of the century (the story is also informative in that one of its themes is the impossibility of marrying from the upper middle class into the upper class, despite the clever strategies of a scheming mother).

[10]An argument can be made for an absence of conscious strategy, i.e., within a small, homogeneous upper class it is quite natural that marriages take place between persons of long-standing acquaintance, similar taste and background. Conceding the reasonableness of such a statement, we will argue, nevertheless, that the success or failure of important Costa Rican families to gain and maintain advantageous positions of wealth and power can be directly related to the marriage alliances they formed. While recognizing that our logic is after-the-fact, i.e., fortuitous alliances unconsciously formed may appear in retrospect to represent conscious strategies, we assume, without apology, that a person guides his decisions by political considerations and the more power a person has the more important will be these political considerations. This assumption is based upon personal experience in the United States but continually confirmed in Costa Rica. We must also remember that those at the top have the most to lose and must weigh all decisions carefully.

[11]The Montealegre family is an excellent example. Mariano Montealegre, the founder, married into the Fernández-Val Acosta family and the children (Table III) made important political marriages including the Mora Porras family, although a rivalry ensued between José María Montealegre and his brother-in-law Juan Rafael Mora Porras.

Both families were rich in coffee and political power. The turning point came when Montealegre recruited two opportunist army generals (Blanco and Salazar) and succeeded in exiling President Juan Mora Porras and his followers, including General José Marí Cañas, Mora's brother-in-law (Table III) and a military hero from the National Campaign. The Montealegre were in turn ousted by Generals Víctor and Tomás Guardia, the latter brother becoming dictator and ruling Costa Rica with an iron, though apparently enlightened and progressive, hand for many years. The Montealegre had learned the game of marriage well, however, and President Montealegre's granddaughter married President Guardia's nephew, producing a distinguished line. One of Costa Rica's most controversial recent presidents, Rafael Calderón Guardia (President 1940-44), was a direct descendant of a half brother of Víctor, Tomás, and Miguel Guardia, the last being the father-in-law to the Montealegre-Guardia marriage. This illegitimate (although paternity was recognized) half brother, Carlos Guardia Barrios, married Juana Mora Monge, granddaughter of Juan Mora Fernández, the first Chief of State of Costa Rica. President Montealegre was related to Mora Fernández by blood and to the Mora Porras branch of the same family by marriage (Table III). Perhaps as a result of this complex network, we find the Montealegre descendants among Calderón Guardia's cabinet ministers. The awkward complexity of the kinship sketched above is not amenable to simple graphic presentation and was gleaned from a variety of sources, especially Fernández Peralta (1958) and Revollo Acosta (1960).

[12]Analogous to the choice of a spouse for one's child is choice of a godparent, which, in most of Spanish America, creates the important relationship of "co-godparents" (compadres), entailing important reciprocal obligations usually of greater importance than the obligations between godparent and godchild. That the relationship between parents and godparents is more important is suggested by the fact that reference to spiritual kinship in Spanish America is usually made to that relationship, namely compadrazgo, rather than the relation between godparent and godchild, or padrinazgo (Deshon 1963; Mintz and Wolf 1950; Foster 1953; van den Berghe and van den Berghe 1966). The first comprehensive comparison of this form of ritual kinship stressed two alternative patterns of choices represented in Middle American cultures. Kinship was either fictionally extended to non-kinsmen or kin relations were intensified by adding spiritual kinship obligations to close kinsmen (Paul 1942:56). The dominant choice in a given community indicates the degree of willingness (or reluctance) to extend personal obligations beyond the family. Those who have studied this institution emphasize its variability throughout Spanish America, asserting its inherent flexibility with regard to specific needs of the community. Choices are generally well-considered and political and economically expedient. If we assume that parents choose their children's affines as carefully as they choose their godparents, marriage choices are consciously and carefully planned.

Compadrazgo in San José falls at one extreme of the scale implied above. Fifty-six elementary school children interviewed in San José demonstrated a consistent pattern with regard to baptismal godparents, indicating that these godparents were either grandparents or parents'

siblings. In only one instance did a child recall the name of a godparent who was not a kinsman. There appeared a nearly total unwillingness to extend spiritual kinship beyond close kinsmen. As a neighbor remarked: "My husband thought that it was silly to name my mother as godmother since she was already a grandmother to my child, but in the end we named her godmother because we knew she would be hurt if we didn't."

The sample of school children may have been biased since most were, by Costa Rican standards, affluent, if not actually elite.

[13]The last part of this statement appears to present faulty logic if we think of power in terms of separable power-holding entities rather than structural relationships. The power wielded by persons within social networks is not a simple sum of assets and liabilities but depends upon relationships within a constantly changing structure. Even where an alliance results in balanced reciprocal gain for both parties when viewed independently from their networks, the changes in structural position incurred by the readjustment of the structure in the aftermath of a new alliance can easily result in differential benefits (and losses) to the parties concerned. The structural benefits accrued by such alliances are the important elements of power. The extent of power inherent in a specific position within a network does not only consist of the control over others linked in the network and their penetration beyond the network. Key positions allow their occupants to speak and act for the network as a whole. Thus, some persons may take advantage of the corporate power of the group while others may not.

[14]In Costa Rica, we are speaking of the interbreeding of related individuals, which, although intended presumably to concentrate and maintain power, results in a homogeneous biological group because of a restricted gene pool. The principles of power inbreeding need not be biological, however--the term "inbreeding" is sometimes heard with reference to Academia in the United States, nearly always with reference to prestigious, here meaning "powerful," universities, which tend to recruit from within their own ranks, thus preserving their position of power (as well as validating their "prestige" by making it possible for their own products to succeed).

[15]Cousin terminology in Costa Rican Spanish parallels the Anglo-American system. In investigating kinship in both the United States and Costa Rica it became clear that Costa Ricans, including schoolchildren, had a much clearer conception of the kinship system than do Americans, many of whom cannot precisely define degrees of cousins. This implies, of course, that such categories are more important to Costa Ricans than to North Americans.

[16]It is of some interest that United Fruit Company founder, Minor C. Keith, could be located in a central position within this network, having married a daughter (Cristina) of President José María Castro Madriz (Stewart 1964:50).

[17]Some of the names are represented with different spellings in their genealogical history, e.g., Yglesias and Iglesias, Chavarría, Echavarría, and Echeverría. Alternate spellings are grouped together throughout this discussion since the differences are orthographic and not genetic.

[18]Clearly, the more a surname occurs, the more likely that intermarriage occurs. Thus, for example, the most frequently occuring, Jiménez, has intermarried with more families, while the least frequently occurring, Volio, has intermarried with the fewest families. This does not refute the observation that the Jiménez family had great political success for many generations, while the Volio family produced but a few important politicians during one period. The figures presented should not be interpreted to imply that the families not intermarrying in Table VII never intermarried. Quite the contrary. The important point is that these marriages indicate political alliances; there may be other marriages of the "upper class" without political repercussions.

[19]The analysis following this introductory statement was adapted from Cerdas Cruz (1967).

[20]Cerdas Cruz (1967) uses the term "bourgeoisie" although it is clear from the genealogies that Cartago and San José politicians represented conservative and progressive factions within the elite (Vega Carballo 1971:379).

CHAPTER IV
INSTITUTIONAL POWER: EDUCATION AND THE ELITE

Institutional Power: Organizational Coercion

Power is not necessarily physical, nor does the use of power require physical coercion or even the threat of physical coercion. The individual is less often confronted with a choice between obedience and punishment than a choice between reward, often illusory, or no reward. In complex societies, rewards are commonly offered through institutions, which may themselves offer the reward, such as employment, or they may offer the only viable channel to follow in search of specific rewards. In this chapter we will discuss education, an area which has become highly institutionalized in modern societies. In Costa Rica, formal education, i.e., education within formally recognized institutions, provides requisite credentials for high socioeconomic position. Higher education promises the most important avenue to social mobility. The promise, however, is rarely fulfilled.

Education and Ideology

One slogan which is confronted time and again as part of the Costa Rican political mythology is the "more-teachers-than-soldiers" theme. The import of the comparison is clear: In contrast to the military oppression characteristic of so many other regimes in Latin America, Costa Rican democracy manifests itself in the enlightened educational policies of Costa Rican leaders. We have already noted that there are flaws in the non-military implication of the mythology; it remains for us to examine the content and purpose of Costa Rican education.

Education in modern nations is an accepted responsibility of the State. "Democracy" is equated with universal social rights, of which literacy has become more and more accepted as an automatic right of citizenship. Nevertheless, it is no secret that, at least in capitalistic nations, the well-born advance farther and reap greater rewards from the educational system than do the poor. There seems to be some relationship between educational systems and the maintenance of power. Bendix points to two opposing aspects of democratic educational ideology,

> To provide the rudiments of education to the illiterate appears as an act of liberation. Nevertheless, social rights are distinctive in that they do not usually permit the individual to decide whether or not to avail himself of their advantages....the right to an elementary education is indistinguishable from the duty to attend school [Bendix 1969:105-106].

Modern educational systems are powerful social and political tools. Ostensibly these tools are employed for the benefit of all or nearly all of the citizens. This is certainly part of the ideology concerning education in Costa Rica. The results, however, are another matter.

The origins of public education in Costa Rica reveal interesting features of the social and political structure of the past. The written history of education reflects the same conflict between myth and fact that we have considered before. Luis Barahona (1970) paints a picture of Costa Rican history according to the ideological myths we have seen before, i.e., colonial isolation, egalitarianism and poverty. He notes, however, that the "youths of the rich families" attended universities in Nicaragua and Guatemala, which qualified them to assume control of the government at the time of Independence since the "ignorant public knew nothing of 'sovereignty'" (Barahona 1970:24). That the early Costa Rican political leaders were so educated is a matter of record which cuts deeply

into the picture of an egalitarian society given by historians. There were certainly some persons who had sufficient wealth to send their children abroad to study. The masses were thus precluded from the administrative tasks of government and business which required some degree of literacy. Barahona's characterization of the public probably reflects an accurate picture of how the learned felt about their rightful exercise of political authority.

Founding of the University of Santo Tomás in San José

'Education played a curious role in the early days of the Republic. Soon after Independence from Spain, political factions arose which were associated with different cities. Originally Alajuela and San José allied against Cartago and Heredia, although later San José successfully defended her new hegemony against all three (in the "War of the League" in 1835). The rivalry between San José, the emerging Republican capital, and Cartago, the colonial capital, is regarded primarily as a conflict between traditional (Cartago) and progressive (San José) elements, a distinction which is still made between the two cities. More specifically, the difference has been described as one between traditional-agricultural and progressive-commerical (Cerdas Cruz 1967), i.e., the Cathaginians were an aristocratic, land-owning group, while Josefinos lived from the profits of their commercial operations. San José benefitted greatly from the establishment of the Tobacco Factory which gave the city an importance it had not previously enjoyed (Fallas 1971), and this importance increased as the profitability of cacao, on which depended the families of Cartago, declined. Perhaps San José's first "progressive" act was to found, in 1814, the first institution of higher learning in Costa Rica, the

University of Santo Tomás which, by the way, at first met at the Tobacco Factory (Fallas 1971:209). To instruct in the school, the Josefinos hired Rafael Francisco Osejo, known as Bachiller Osejo, a professor of philosophy from Nicaragua. Osejo, as it turned out, was filled with the philosophical ideas of the French Enlightenment, and he became a rallying point for the republican spirit of San José a few years later when Independence was presented to Costa Rica (Pérez Zeledón 1971:133-144). The Montealegre were among the supporters of Osejo (Pérez Zeledón 1971:134) and it will be remembered that the first Montealegre was the Director of the Tobacco Factory and one of the first great coffee-growers. The University of Santo Tomás gave San José a great advantage over the other cities, training a corps of ideologically sophisticated politicians who formed the Generation of '89, governing Costa Rica for several decades.

The dictator Braulio Carrillo, Chief of State from 1835 to 1842, is credited with giving the first impulse to education in the republican period. He is also credited with establishing Costa Rica as a centralized bureaucratic state under the undisputed dominance of San José (Cerdas Cruz 1967:157-167). Santo Tomás established San José as the cultural-educational center of the country.

The Closing of Santo Tomás and the Liberal Reformers

The university of Santo Tomás continued to operate as the one center of learning in Costa Rica until it was closed in 1888. The act of closure has been discussed at length by a number of Costa Rican authors and appears to have transcendental significance with regard to the nature of Costa Rican politics of the late nineteenth century, as well as demonstrating some of the principles of importance to us here. The University was

closed during the administration of President Bernardo Soto. The key figure in the closure was Mauro Fernández, Soto's Minister of Education. Don Mauro[1] was himself educated at Santo Tomás. Barahona (1970:90-92) calls him a "liberal positivist" who put public instruction in the hands of the State. The argument for closure was simple: since there were no primary or secondary schools in the country, it was ridiculous to have a university. The policy of the liberal government was literacy and public education for the benefit of State and society, and opposed to an elitist university. Interestingly enough, the generation of liberal republicans was trained, almost to a man, in the university it closed.[2] Previously, under the dictatorial hand of President Tomás Guardia, the University had flourished with his blessing. The new politicians were partially correct about elitism in the University, since, despite their ideological notions, they were themselves members of the best families. Mauro Fernández, the father of Costa Rican public instruction, is pictured frequently as a national hero. This, of course, fits perfectly with political ideology which has ever since his time stressed education as the important democratic function of government. It seems, however, that those writers who noted a rise in Costa Rican class consciousness trace its growth to this very period. Cordero notes that the closure of the University had the opposite effect to that intended,

> The liberal political current which guided the footsteps of government during the last period of the century took charge of closing the university. Year after year the students of the secondary schools graduated. Of these, those blessed by wealth or official patronage left for Europe and returned professionals, physicians and lawyers....
>
> Before, only a few studied since education was for the better classes. This was the most serious argument urged by enemies of the established system. It was necessary to

> popularize and democratize education. Once the University was closed, the group of professionals would be greatly reduced because the group of families economically able to send their children to Europe was very small. High culture would be reserved for the privileged group. This very group was that ruling the State.
>
> Without doubt the exclusiveness engendered by the horizontal extension of instruction would create a higher education of economic caste and a monopoly of knowledge. A small number of "elites" would be in charge of public functions, thus installing a timocracy [Cordero 1964:94-95].

Yet Cordero does not blame Mauro Fernández for the resulting differentiation of social classes. Both Cordero and Barahona argue that Don Mauro could not have foreseen this. This may not have been true. The Rector of the University, ex-President Castro Madriz, attacked the closure, saying

> ...the suppression of the University will come in time to concentrate literacy titles in the wealthy families which can send their children to acquire them abroad [Cordero 1964:97].

It need not have taken much imagination to see that the closing of the university would simply limit higher education to the rich as had been the case some years before when Costa Rica had no university. Closing meant simply that instead of having a few non-elite receive an education, none would. In other respects, Cordero does not give the liberal group the benefit of the doubt:

> For the liberal "elite" of the eighties, freedom and democracy were subjects for thought, for oratory and poetry without any life in experience. That expression of Don Mauro--"I believe in the Law"--confirms my judgment. This was theoretical, abstract, universal law, not law in actuality [1964:115].

Cordero (1964) explains what he means: the reformer, President Bernardo Soto, elected by free popular vote, thanks to the magnanimity of outgoing President Rafael Iglesias, proceeded to rig the next election for his own candidate, all the while asserting his democratic intentions.

The following election was stolen, in turn, by Rafael Iglesias. Democratic liberals were sufficiently convinced of their principles not to allow others the opportunity to establish their own regimes.

The Generation of '89, an outgrowth of the liberal movement, ruled until 1936, achieving power in the first instance by free elections and maintaining power by force (Rodríguez Vega 1971:31). In 1940, a new president was elected, Rafael Angel Calderón Guardia, who was attacked by a new generation of liberals, the Generation of '48, as it is now called, Calderón Guardia was accused of serving the interests of the "oligarchy," although he sponsored extensive social welfare and founded the University of Costa Rica anew. Once again it has become possible for a few individuals outside of the ruling elite to obtain higher education.

In justice to Don Mauro, it must be said that he spent a life devoted to teaching Costa Rican youth. We have little basis upon which to assume ulterior motives for his part in the educational reforms of the nineteenth century. It is quite possible that he may have erred somewhat in following too strictly an abstract point of view without foreseeing the immediate consequences of his actions. It is also possible that public instruction might have been greatly delayed in Costa Rica without his reform.

Differential Access to Education in Contemporary Costa Rica

A new generation of liberals is currently in control of the government. Although it is too early to judge their accomplishments, we may note that educational reform is important in their agenda. In 1972 total reform of the public school system was effected overnight. Since it was a paper program, it created a certain degree of confusion but

little change. The Minister of Education promised seven new universities in the immediate future, a promise which seemed to be impractical and impossible. Education continues to be a rich source for political propaganda.

Despite the emphasis on public education, certain features of Costa Rican education reveal a close relation between power and access to education. San José's dominant position in Costa Rica has brought special rewards in education. Although the Central Valley contains only 60 percent of the Costa Rican population, only 15 percent of the illiterates reside in the Central Valley. It could easily be argued that because of the concentration of population in the Central Valley, educational expenditures reach more people there, but it is just as clear that there is regional discrimination. When a second university was under consideration not long ago, the first sites proposed were within a twenty-five mile radius of San José. San Ramón, on the edge of the Central Valley, seemed to win for awhile as a compromise in favor of outlying Puntareñas and Guanacaste Provinces. Needless to say, it would be almost as difficult for a Cuanacasteco to attend a university in San Ramón as in San José. Fortunately, pressure finally resulted in the establishment of university extensions in Liberia and Turrialba, which provide opportunities for higher education to the residents of Guanacaste and Limón Provinces.

Educational statistics demonstrate the superior position of San José. As noted, San José has the only university. The Province of San José,[3] with 31 percent of the national population, has 40 percent of primary school (compulsory) students, and 48 percent of all secondary schools

(the percentage of students is probably higher because the secondary schools of the city of San José include the largest schools in the country). Significantly, 62 percent of Costa Rica's private secondary schools are located in the Province of San José. By contrast the provinces of Guanacaste, Puntarenas, and Limón, the only provinces whose capitals lie outside of the Central Valley, with 60 percent of national territory and 28 percent of national population, had only 15 percent of the secondary schools, none of which were private.[4] The presence of private schools are important since their graduates excell on the university placement tests and have the advantage over students in public school in entering the university (Denton 1971:4; Goldrich 1971).

Despite a large government budget for education, San José always seems to benefit disproportionately. In 1952 there were but eight public secondary schools in Costa Rica, one in each provincial capital, with two in San José. The latter, amazingly, graduated 43 percent of total graduates. In 1969 the number of public secondary schools had risen to 65, an increase of 700 percent, while the number in the Province of San José had risen to 25, an increase of 1250 percent. From having 25 percent of the secondary schools, San José jumped to 40 percent. Add to this a virtual monopoly of private schools and we can see that education in Costa Rica means, first and foremost, education for Josefinos.

The Costa Rican educational system favors the rich in a multitude of subtle and not-so-subtle ways. Colegios (secondary schools) require shoes and uniforms as well as school supplies at the expense of the students. Few campesions, few urban poor can afford such luxuries. The Costa Rican practice of wearing uniforms differs from that of some countries,

such as Japan, where uniforms are daily clothes, similar for different schools, reducing status distinctions based upon clothing. In Costa Rica a student whose shoes or uniform are in poor repair may be ridiculed by his peers and his teachers. Each colegio has a different uniform and insignia so that better schools are easily recognized. Many of the girls' uniforms have numerous well-ironed pleats, which present a chore for mothers without maids.

The social class basis of educational distinctions was revealed clearly in a questionnaire given to one hundred students at the University of Costa Rica. As part of the questionnaire students were asked to suggest "types of people" associated with a number of elicitation sets. Included were places of entertainment, types of liquors, cigarettes, clubs, periodicals, broadcasting stations and colegios. In general the students were well able to make distinctions for each category except periodicals. The category of colegios was the only category in which students made frequent reference to social class ("middle class," "upper class," "aristocracy," etc.), which was used to the exclusion of other distinctions. The responses were consistent, i.e., different schools fell into similar classes, relative to each other. At least among university students, the social ranking of each colegio in San José is clear and distinct. Private schools invariably ranked high in social class, especially the bilingual schools where classes are taught in English.[5]

Private versus Public Education

Another facet of educational discrimination is differential quality. As Denton (1971:4) notes, students from the private colegios consistently score much higher on the university entrance examinations than those from

public schools. When the results from the examinations were published in the Costa Rican newspapers in 1972, the top ten scorers were all private school students. In addition, the wealthier families can assure the success of their children by sending them to the United States for high school or college. At the university, students are required to learn the fundamentals of English. Many affluent parents send their children to one of the bilingual colegios in San José or to the United States. This not only gives them a great advantage in the university but also prepares them for the important elite role of broker between foreign companies and the nation. Naturally a Costa Rican who has acquired a proficiency in English as well as some acquaintance with American habits and attitudes is in a favorable position in foreign trade, the major business of Costa Rica. These are the people who can deal most effectively with American businessmen and who can manage the Costa Rican economy.

As the proliferation of public schools hit its climax in recent years, many private colegios were founded.[6] In the earlier years of this century, when few of the non-wealthy classes attended colegios, there were but a few private schools, and these were Catholic schools. In recent years, non-sectarian private schools have been established and bilingual or American-type schools have grown up (Lincoln, Metodista, Country Day School). These cater to the children of resident Americans and Europeans and the children of the elite. The elitist attitudes present in the private schools find expression in social exclusion and ridicule.

Solari (1967:468) has categorized Costa Rica with Uruguay as one of the few countries in Latin America which has not emphasized vocational training at the secondary school level, which would have channeled lower and upper sectors of the society into different types of education. This seems an essentially correct interpretation of the statistics; however, it should be clear from what has been written above that distinctions are clear and precise. The development of vocational schools, perhaps unacceptable in Costa Rica because of the democratic credo, might have been fairer since, with the present system, the lower sectors have been duped into believing that education offers them excellent opportunities for social mobility. Such mobility does not come easily; the situation of a workingman's university daughter, who was about to receive a degree in Philosophy from the University after great sacrifices on the part of her parents, offers a case in point. She could not find employment. Her case was particularly sad since the father was a jornalero, that is, a dayworker and not a skilled tradesman. He had innocently accepted the social mobility concept of education, permitted his daughter to follow an academic career rather than a technical one, only to find to his dismay that her credentials were useless without the influence and social position necessary for securing employment.

"Culto" and "Inculto"--Discrimination Based upon Socialization

Maintenance of power is greatly enhanced by preserving the solidarity of one's interest group. The effective use of collective power requires consensual support. For the powerful this means two things: (1) Bonds with those of similar interests must be continually strengthened. (2) Every group which has some characteristic in common with the elite must be convinced of its real or illusory connections with the interests

of the elite, a requirement which often means presenting the appearance of an interest group even when one does not in fact exist. C. Wright Mills (1956:247) illustrates this point with businessmen in the U.S.A.; the corporate elite succeeded in convincing the small businessmen that business was their common interest and that they ought to support one another for the benefit of both, although it was the corporate businessman who most benefitted.

Banding together in a united front can be seen on both subtle and gross levels. Men may band together to keep women in inferior statuses; two families may intermarry to strengthen the social networks of both. In Costa Rica, the elite reinforces its interests by maintaining the support of the urban middle class or the rural elite, the native-born as against the intruders. In a multitude of ways, each characteristic of the members of the elite is used separately to draw support from groups who identify with that characteristic, but who cannot join the elite for lacking all of the characteristics.

Since the Costa Rican elite shares language, race, culture and religion with a large portion of the population, it can muster great support in this way. But this presents another problem: there are too many people who come close to the Costa Rican ideal--from families of ancient Costa Rican-Spanish heritage, literate, respectable, urban people, who are often difficult to distinguish from the elite in dress, manners, breeding, and education. While economic status differences may have subtle distinctions among the various sectors of the urban middle class, money is not a suitable criterion for elite membership. A minority of those interviewed saw money as the only criterion for social class. The

elite would have little control over its own membership if money were the sole criterion of membership. The elite could not maintain old and reliable, but somewhat impoverished members, nor could it exercise selectivity in recruitment of new members. In essence this would result in a sort of "democracy" of wealth, that is, where it is in fact possible in Costa Rica for an entrepreneur to rise substantially in wealth, the upper strata of society would be open to any lucky or clever man. Such is not the case, not only because the powerful limit the life-chances and wealth of others, but more importantly because of the social limitations imposed.

One way in which social exclusion or limitation is achieved is through education. We have seen how the elite maintains its advantage in the acquisition of formal education, jealously guarding entry to prestigious formal education. Yet the elite legitimizes its hold over society in even more subtle ways. It distinguishes between gente culta and gente inculta (roughly, "cultured" and "uncultured people"). This is the "general high culture" of which Solari states:

> ...if traditional academic education is conceived of as the antechamber to the university, it is also an institution of general high culture. It has given generations of leaders a fairly homogeneous outlook on the world and has contributed to the establishment of a common elite ideology [Solari 1967:480].

Within the homogeneity of Costa Rican culture, heterogeneity is introduced by means of the degree of cultura a person has acquired. Cultura is somewhat equivalent to "culture" in the classic sense--good breeding, good taste, appreciation of the fine arts, etc., but the terms are not precisely correlative. Cultura and culture comprise a content of perceptions and discriminations which form the basis for social distinctions.

In formal educational institutions it is sometimes possible for a person of less than elite background to rise to a position of power. A great educator may be of humble origins. He might, if he were clever or had a certain degree of charisma, establish educational standards within the grasp of the non-elite. With regard to cultura, however, the well-born, the aristocracy of taste, the members of the elite, remain the arbiters of taste. While the rich bourgeois may cultivate the arts, fine wines, and in general the life-style of the elite and thus win grudging membership, he may do so only by imitation and he is constantly watched to see that his standards do not fall, that he not be considered "uncultivated," and thus reveal his questionable background. When he makes a misstep it is because he is a Jew, or his father was a plumber, and so he does not really belong. But a man born to the elite, with the proper credentials, may abuse the same standards of good taste and not lose his membership as long as he does not become a "traitor to his class" (all this is stated in terms applicable to the United States, but the principles are nearly universal in societies with observable, hereditary or semi-hereditary upper classes). There is good reason for this to be so. The well-born learn the rules of "high society" from the start, they know all the subtle taboos, they can distinguish the undesirable, which may be forgiven if not too frequent, from the prohibited, which will never be forgotten. The upwardly mobile most learn the rules through their own efforts, usually as adults. They mistake all the obvious symbols of wealth for the true elite characteristics. They become Gatsbys, who are accepted, used, and mocked all at the same time.

Costa Ricans find it difficult to spell out exactly the difference between culto and inculto. This is to be expected since the differences

are subtle. Recognition of the two types, however, is not restricted to the elite; this would serve no functional purpose. Most useful to the elite is the situation which exists: a recognition of differences between the cultured and uncultured without the ability to specify exactly what those differences are. In Costa Rican primary schools, children receive a grade for conducta, or "comportment." A child receiving a failing grade in conducta may be required to repeat a year although his scholastic achievement is acceptable. Children whose behavior does not meet proper standards are sometimes sent to lower grades for an indeterminate period and many Costa Ricans recall this treatment with considerable reflective anxiety. This shaming process is very effective. At times it seems justified, but sometimes the student has no control over the conduct for which he is punished, as, for instance, punishment for soiled clothes or a non-regulation uniform.

At this early time in life, the cultos and incultos are discerned. The workingman's child grows to dislike school, probably will be an "underachiever" and drops out of school as soon as possible. The poor girl of sacrificing parents will leave the Colegio de Señoritas for the Liceo del Sur and end up in secretarial school rather than the university as her parents had hoped.

For the elite child, school is not a traumatic experience. He arrives at school prepared for the tasks that will be presented. His manners and speech already conform to the patterns expected. The attitudes he holds and the attitudes of his parents prepare him for success. The wealthy have an advantage in that they do not need to think of education in terms of immediate practicability, i.e., education is

viewed not in terms of obtaining specific employment, but rather in terms of status-prestige, leadership, association, etc. Thus the children of the wealthy, the educated, and the powerful are prepared to accept all the non-instrumental aspects of the formal insitutions, and, if mature enough, they will concentrate on those aspects of learning which make for success within the educational system. The non-elite parent is likely to innocently regard educational credentials as a sufficient means for upward mobility. He may believe that success depends solely on intelligence and hard work. The elite parent may actually believe these principles as well and instill them in his children, but education involves requisite credentials for continued maintenance of high-status, and he is much more aware than others of the many other factors involved in success within an institution; he is, in short, an excellent counselor to his children. While the non-elite child, to succeed, must learn not only his subjects but also the way the system operates, the elite child experiences "systems" from birth.

The child of an elite parent thus has a psychological advantage in school, believing from the beginning in his ultimate success. He need not question the rightfulness of the system nor its practicability. In school, as at home, and unlike the child of the poor, he is rewarded for successfully performing tasks of no demonstrable value. He will never have to ask whether what he is learning is valuable; it is a "natural" part of his life. Of course, it is valuable socially, politically, economically, but he need not be concerned about this.

As the child destined for success rises in the academic system he becomes "culto." Cultura lies at the top of the academic ladder:

philosophy, the arts, fine speech, and familiarilty with the world of fine things. In a country as poor as Costa Rica, only a very few can afford the leisure and money to cultivate this life of good taste. Studying philosophy at the University of Costa Rica is possible only for two sorts of goals: to become a teacher of philosophy or to accept a position in the family business. An individual who studies impractical subjects at the university may find himself unemployed if he does not have the connections necessary to secure employment.

In essence, then, cultura refers ultimately to the cultivation of taste. Standards of taste, of course, are set by the elite. Costa Ricans deny that cultura could be directly related to formal education or economic position. Many say that an uneducated campesino could be culto. They assert that good taste may occur at any socio-economic level. It may consist, for instance, in the attention given to the details of daily life, the effort to live in harmony with one's surroundings, cleanliness, self-respect, courtesy, and good manners. This picture represents the attributes of good taste in terms which could be within the reach of anyone. The fact remains, however, that it is much easier to be culto if one is rich. An uneducated man may be culto in spite of his lack of education, but he has to prove his cultura through his actions, and he may then be regarded the exception. The uneducated are presumed to be inculto unless they demonstrate otherwise, while the educated are presumed to be culto. Costa Ricans insist that a peasant may have cultura, they insist in such a way as to emphasize that it does not often happen.

Educational credentials and "cultura" combine to legitimize the superior power of the elite. Since anyone may be culto, the man who

is both rich and culto partakes of a certain aura of superiority. He can hardly help but impress others with his fine taste, elegant speech, and good-breeding. His education, if he continues far enough, provides him with social as well as professional status and privileges.

Education and Power

It is not difficult to see that the wealthy and powerful may obtain education more easily than others. Nor is it difficult to see that these same persons control educational institutions and establish educational standards and requirements which are most easily fulfilled by themselves. While all this is important to the powerful, education does something else for the powerful: it educates them. Although this may seem tautological, it is not. Formal education often entails a multitude of tasks which serve no practical purpose. We often wonder why people study Latin, Greek, philosophy, etc., if they are not planning to teach these subjects to others. There is room for serious doubt as to whether any academic course in philosophy ultimately aids the student in understanding or dealing with anything except the subject-matter of the course. For the elite, however, philosophy teaches a needed skill--it teaches the manipulation of word and symbol essential to the art of politics. Politics does not consist simply of administrative skills. For those who have power, politics involves the maintenance and control of the existing power distribution and control over changes in society which may affect the distribution of power.

Scholastic training in literate societies has always emphasized those studies directly related to verbal skills and abstract symbols. The first advanced programs established at the University of Costa Rica were in law, philosophy and philology. One might wonder at the usefulness of

such studies in an underdeveloped country in which the economic base is almost entirely agricultural exports. We may note that all three subjects deal with training in verbal and symbolic skills. Except for law, these fields offer little opportunity for employment. Philosophy and philology are nevertheless desirable studies at the University of Costa Rica. Few but the rich can afford to do more than dabble in those fields; they tend rather to pursue professional and technical studies.

Verbal and symbolic skills are vital in ideological salesmanship. In religion or in politics, ideology involves the critical process of translating behavior into symbols and symbols into words. Law does just that, as we all know; but politics in general consists in abstracting the principles desired by the politician into values which appeal to others. The powerful are in constant need of persons skilled in manipulating words and symbols so as to legitimate the status quo. Acquisition of these skills mark one as an educated person and they always provide the advantage in an argument--abstraction clothes outrageous statements in logical garb. Cordero seems to have recognized this principle in criticizing the liberals of the Generation of '89:

> This generation betrayed their words with their deeds. This generation inaugurated a democracy in words but behind it an enlightened despotism. Some scholars in our time lament the loss of many illustrious discourses and valuable manuscripts of the period. This lament is justified but only for the literary critic or the historian of our national literature. If they had been preserved in entirety, those discourses would only have served as clear proof of the distance between their verbal, poetic and emotional content and the practical politics of their authors [Cordero 1964:91].

Summary

In Costa Rican history, formal education until recent times has been an exclusive privilege of the elite. This has been true primarily of higher education, where it is still true today although limited numbers of non-elite social strata are now entering the University. While public instruction is not divided into academic and vocational schools or programs, which distinguishes social classes in some nations of Latin America, the relative inaccessibility of higher education for the non-elite serves a similar purpose since university education is a pre-requisite for the limited offering of white collar positions. Thus, while vocational training in one country might be said to channel lower classes into blue collar jobs, in Costa Rica the same result is achieved by limiting white collar jobs to university-trained persons (Denton 1971:5-6). Unfortunately, the upwardly mobile can anticipate little relief in the future since the export-dependent agricultural economy is not likely to generate large increases in white collar jobs even if university enrollment is increased.

During the colonial period, formal education was practically non-existent in Costa Rica. Those who could afford to do so sent their children abroad to be educated, thereby restricting literacy to the elite. The progressive young city of San José founded the first institution of higher learning in 1814, called the University of Santo Tomás, which, from its beginning, represented liberal reformist sentiments in keeping with the Josefino spirit. Eventually Santo Tomás was closed by its own liberal alumni who, having come to political power, viewed the University as an elitist anachronism and closed it in favor of extended

public instruction at lower levels. Elimination of higher education in Costa Rica resulted in the reinforcement of elite power, however, by again restricting higher education to those who could afford to send their children abroad. This situation continued until the end of World War II, when the University of Costa Rica was founded in San José. Although higher education is now available to non-elite individuals, entrance to the University is limited. Rich families still educate their children outside the country, often at secondary schools. In recent years many private secondary schools have come into existence, primarily in San José; and their graduates have consistently scored high marks on university entrance examinations, thereby enabling the affluent to maintain a privileged access to higher education.

It should come as no surprise that the children of the wealthy and powerful in Costa Rica have always had special advantages in acquiring advanced education. Even the United States, with one of the longest histories of democratic reform of public education, manifests marked elitist favoritism (Karier 1967; Mills 1956:63ff.; Domhoff 1967:16-19). The historical relation between higher education and social class in Britain as a determining factor in elite training and recruitment is generally well known; present-day Germany appears to be even more elitist despite strenuous attempts at reform (Dahrendorf 1967). While the advantages of the Latin American elites in acquiring higher education are quite well known by area specialists (cf. Lipset 1967:44), the most comprehensive statement yet to be published concerning Latin American elites, including four chapters devoted to education, declines to describe this bias toward elitism in favor of structural analyses of university

systems (Lipset and Solari 1967). Unfortunately, this approach, which emphasizes routes of reform, characterizes the rhetorical style of educational reformers who have laid grandiose plans for social change through democratized education. Such reformers have been a principal subject of the present chapter. In Costa Rica we have found that these men are themselves members of the elite, and we must add that their privileged position allowed them to acquire the rhetorical skills with which they were able to guide the course of education.[7] The continued elitist nature of contemporary Costa Rican education has been asserted by Goldrich (1966) and Denton (1971).

As a final note, it is interesting to consider Costa Rican high education in the light of a recent statement considering a Nigerian university:

> The University is in fact training a bureaucratic elite that resembles the mandarin class of imperial China. It creates learned gentlemen versed in an esoteric and recondite intellectual tradition which is little more relevant to the realities of their society than the Confucian classics were to pre-revolutionary China.... Nevertheless, the very difficulty of acquiring these skills ensures a double selection of students in terms of intellectual quality and socioeconomic background [van den Berghe 1973:59-60].

We might add that such education is highly "relevant" to the realities of the social structure if not to the needs of the country.

NOTES

[1]In researching Costa Rican history the use of "Don" for affectionate respect is encountered more frequently with Mauro Fernández than with any other public figure. He appears to be the one untarnished god in the pantheon of Costa Rican statesmen. We will therefore take the liberty here of departing from our customary practice in following the customary practice in San José.

[2]While Don Mauro and associated political reformers of the late nineteenth century are consistently labeled "liberals" the supporters and builders of Santo Tomás may be similarly described. In particular, José María Castro Madriz and Lorenzo Montúfar advocated programs for Santo Tomás which would be classified as liberal even today (Claxton 1970:210-231). They, too, however, revealed elitist-conservative viewpoints in actions which betrayed the enlightened content of their liberal statements. "Liberal" in the context of late nineteenth century Costa Rica, often meant a reformist philosophy based upon the French Enlightenment and, above all, a strong anticlericalism. Education was inevitably an important concern of reformers since the schools were staffed by clerics, often the only persons qualified or desirous of academic instruction (cf. Claxton 1973:17, in 1882 the National University of Guatemala closed because there were not enough secular professors).

[3]Educational statistics have not been broken down by cantones, so that comparisons in some cases must be made by Provinces. The Province of San José includes a rural area which has little relation to the city of San José beyond the provincial administration. The rural area lies outside of the Central Valley. San José Province occupies approximately 10 percent of national territory; about two-thirds of the population of the Province lives in the Metropolitan Area (guaranteeing political control); only San Isidro in the South can boast of being a population center (the distrito numbers 30, 898 persons).

[4]Calculations based upon data from the Anuario Estadístico (1971).

[5]Goldrich (1966:17-18) surveyed a group of students attending a private Catholic boys' school in 1962 and found that the students classified their fathers as 9 percent from the working class, one-third professional men, and the rest managers and businessmen. Sixty-nine percent of the students' families were automobile owners, in itself an indication of high economic status. One-third of the students had family members in the highest-level political posts.

[6]While this statement is based upon the observations of several informants, Samuel Stone (personal communication) has provided additional

information worth repeating here:

> Private colegios began to appear as a result of a special type of 'zoning' by Government, whereby children residing in a given area had to go to the public school in that area. Up until then, there were several highly prestigious public schools to which all elite children went, regardless of place of residence (Edificio Metálico, Juan Rudin). When the change came, private schools were formed at the instigation of elite families to avoid what was considered excessive inter-class mixing.

[7]We may contrast the rhetorical and empirical views of education by comparing Vázquez de Knauth (1967:202), who describes Mexico's "national integration through education" as one of her "most successful achievements" with a recent political analysis of the Mexican city of Jalapa which indicates that there has been little indication of change in the direct correlation between high social and political position and educational achievement (Fagen and Tuohy 1972:84-87).

CHAPTER V.
PHYSICAL DIVISIONS OF THE CITY AND THEIR SOCIAL CORRELATES

Geography and Society

In this chapter we will describe the major physical features of the city of San José and its immediate environment. Our discussion will turn quickly to features which are the result of human settlement. Physical features not only include rivers and mountains but also streets and buildings. These latter provide the context in which we can best understand the Josefino. Where man simply adjusts to the impositions of natural terrain and climate, the social significance of his settlement is partly obscured; but, where man has remodeled the landscape for his own purposes, we can anticipate that manner in which the remodelling is done will reveal important aspects of the society (archeologists in fact draw important inferences from settlement pattern as primary evidence).

As the cornerstone of the Costa Rican nation, San José has grown and developed in accordance with historical events and trends, with major social divisions, and with geographical necessity. We can anticipate that the physical organization of a city bears some resemblance to the organization of social forces which create and maintain it, and in this respect San José does not disappoint us. In fact the organization of the city and its inhabitants' perception of that organization confirm and clarify the historical and contemporary organization of Costa Rican society.

The City Plan and its Physical Context

San José exhibits a grid-plan or "checkerboard" physical organization

common to Latin American cities (Foster 1960:34). Streets lie at regular intervals, running north-south or east-west, forming blocks that are square. This pattern is followed consistently in virtually all Costa Rican towns. Because of the great modern expansion of San José, the pattern breaks down somewhat in peripheral areas of the city where buildings must conform to uneven terrain. Streets are numbered from two central axes. North-south streets are calles (streets) and east-west streets are called avenidas (avenues). There are few differences between the two except that there is more east-west movement so that some of the avenidas assume greater importance. Streets are numbered from the center outward, i.e., Calle Central is numbered "0" as is Avenida Central, and the two intersect in the heart of the city. Like most other Costa Rican cities, the town was originally built about a church facing west, overlooking a town plaza. Costa Rican towns, like many other Latin American towns were established in colonial times to concentrate the scattered population. In Spanish America the Crown attempted to organize Indians in repartimientos, towns organized around a church, plaza and nearby governing agencies usually located in buildings surrounding the plaza, with commercial enterprises nearby. In Costa Rica the same pattern was followed except that the population consisted of colonists as well as Indians. It is far from clear whether the scattered farmers in and around the area that is now San José were Indians, Spanish or a mixture of the two, but it is clear that the pattern of dispersed settlement did not suit the Spanish administration and efforts were made to establish nucleated settlements where practicable. San José was established in this way as a center for the farmers scattered throughout the area and

appears not to have been a town prior to the building of the church,[1] later replaced by the Metropolitan Cathedral in the center of the city. At present the Cathedral overlooks Parque Central, which remains a central gathering place for Josefinos.

San José Center, i.e., the downtown area composed of the four distritos which form the Cantón Central, is roughly rectangular, bounded on the north and south by two rivers, Río Torres and Río María Aguilar, and on the east and west by artificial, or "political," boundaries. San José lies at the eastern end of the Valle de San José. The area around San José is called the Central Plateau (Meseta Central) or the Central Valley (Valle Central) and in some ways the latter designation is more appropriate since this area falls between two mountain ridges. Driving through the Central Valley on the old InterAmerican Highway, one is impressed by the uneveness of the terrain, but looking down from the surrounding mountains, one has the impression of a long plain stretching from east to west. The area designated by Central Plateau in fact included two valleys, the Valle de San José and the Valle del Guarco, the latter forming the eastern half of the Central Plateau and the former the western half. While San José dominates the Valle de San José, Cartago, the colonial capital, dominates the Valle del Guarco, which was the first area of the Costa Rican central highlands to be settled by the Spanish. Although each of the four important cities of the Central Plateau has something of its own character, Cartago, separated from the others by a low pass between the mountains, is distinctive in character, considered by Costa Ricans to be conservative, traditional, very Catholic (religion), and less cosmopolitan than the other cities.

This is a highland area, varying in altitude from 3000 to 5000 feet above sea level. The temperature is moderate and changes little throughout the year, never varying but a few degrees from 70° Farenheidt in San José. Seasonal climatic changes are marked primarily by the amount of rainfall. May marks the beginning of the rainy season, called Winter. Humid air crosses the Caribbean lowlands until it is forced to rise over the Cordillera Central, a spine of high mountains, often volcanic, which extends through the center of the country from northwest to southeast. The Cordillera mountains lie to the north and east of San José, and, as the months of the rainy season progress, one sees earlier each day the clouds which rise over the three great volcanoes of the area (Poás, Barba, and Irazú) about to drop rain on San José. Thus, many days in San José begin with warm, sunny skies, only to be followed by cold (relatively speaking) rainy afternoons. Perhaps because of this, Costa Ricans of the area are early risers, even in the city, taking advantage of the early sunshine. Clothes-washing may begin at five o'clock in the morning in order to get the clothes on the line in time to dry before the rain begins. In a sense, Costa Rica is like an island where the weather depends more on sea currents and conditions than on the topography of the land. The rain seems continually to defy prediction. During the "Summer," from December to May, there is relatively little rain and the countryside turns from lush green almost to brown. The period from New Year's to the end of March marks school vacation and is the time when Josefinos flock to Puntarenas and the Pacific beaches.

This seasonal variation has a great impact upon activity in San José. Ordinarily, during the rainy season, downtown San José appears empty in

the afternoon. Josefinos remark that October and November are depressing months, when everyone is locked up in the home or office. On those few days of this period when it appears that rain is not coming, about three o'clock in the afternoon everyone flocks toward the downtown area, marching up and down the Avenida Central, enjoying the beautiful day. In December, the end of the rainy season is generally marked by a cool period of two or three weeks with misty, envigorating days and cold nights. Josefinos describe this as their favorite time of the year; the rainy season is ending and Christmas is at hand. During December, the shopping area of the Avenida Central, the major thoroughfare of San José, is closed to vehicular traffic, and Josefinos spend every available hour of leisure walking the street and greeting their friends. A sigh of relief breathes through the whole city, and it becomes alive, friendly, and charming. At night parents take their children to the "avenida" to throw confetti at passersby.

The Christmas season is immediately followed by a three-month school recess. During this period, those who can afford vacations at the beach or visits abroad take the opportunity to travel and enjoy themselves. This season is probably the pleasantest of the year since there are no disrupting rains nor has the hottest part of the dry season arrived. This seems to be the principal reason for having school vacation at this time, since a vacation during the September to November period would in fact be less disrupting on the schools since this is the period of the coffee harvest, at which time the children of poorer parents are employed in the harvest and add substantially to family incomes at this time. As a result there is a great deal of absenteeism in which students

of the lowest economic strata suffer the most.

While seasonal variations reveal relatively little of the social structure of San José,[2] physical or geographical variations relate closely to important social and economic divisions. Differences in residential patterns occur primarily outside of the central core of the city, which is dominated by commercial activity and where rich and poor are likely to live in proximity within the residential areas. While differences of social strata are evidenced in distinctions between barrios (roughly, "neighborhoods") many residential barrios are difficult to classify because they are not economically homogeneous. Thus, residence in certain barrios would imply socio-economic stratum but residence in other barrios is socially ambiguous. Since individuals participate in the activities of different parts of the cities and do not simply belong to the area in which they reside, a judgment of social position is best determined by the entire round of activities in which an individual participates. Different activities show different distributions; an individual's social rank relates directly to the manner in which he uses the city, where he goes as well as where he lives.

Major Physical Divisions

The center of San José constantly draws people to it. People work there, shop there, and entertain themselves there. Movement through the city as well as in its central commercial core is stronger in an east-west direction than north-south. To the west lies most of the Valle de San José and to the east lies the Valle del Guarco, including Cartago, the rail route to Limón and the highway to Panama. To the north and south are mountains, limiting population, transportation and communication.

The InterAmerican Highway travels through the center of San José, forming the Avenida Central and its extension to the west, Paseo Colón. Except for the Paseo Colón, which is broad, nearly all streets in downtown San José are one-way streets. Avenidas north of the Avenida Central are odd-numbered in sequence, with the Avenida Central numbered "0"; avenidas to the south are even-numbered. From Calle Central, also numbered Calle 0, calles to the east are odd-numbered while those to the west are even-numbered. The lower the number of a calle or avenida, the closer it is to the center of the city. While we will here make a few references to numbered streets, it should be kept in mind that Josefinos rarely calculate locations in terms of streets. Only important streets are generally identified by name or number and this is usually done either with reference to a prominent landmark on the street, or for thoroughfares, by their destination outside of San José, e.g., the Highway to Desamaparados. The Avenida Central is a prime exception, being a landmark in itself, even referred to at times simply as "the Avenue." Although the Avenida Central extends to the east toward Cartago, "the Avenue," i.e., what a Josefino thinks of when Avenida Central is used as a referrent, is that portion which extends from Paseo Colón, intersecting Calle 14, to about Calle 11, or a distance of 13 blocks. Within this section, extending the area three blocks to the north and three blocks to the south of the Avenida Central, are to be found most of the government ministries, bureaus and agencies, most of the home branches of Costa Rican banks, the two large produce markets of San José, the department stores, a majority of San José clothing stores, and a large number of places of entertainment. All of the large hotels of the

downtown area are found in this area, and the Cathedral, Central Park, and the National Theater are all located within a block of the Avenida Central. In short, most of the "national" activity to which San José owes its prominence takes place within this small area. During the day it is crowded with people and vehicles and during the night it is one of the only areas of the city where more than a few people may be seen on the streets.

Avenida Central has two parts, to be distinguished as much by the people who frequent them as by the activities which take place in them. From Calle 4 west, the commercial area of San José which surrounds the Avenida Central can be said to be dominated by the market area and the people who frequent it. From Calle 4 east, the Avenida Central is characterized by shops for luxury goods, department stores and other concerns which cater to the well-to-do. The contrast is striking, even to the new visitor. The western half is extremely crowded, the streets are lined with produce stalls with barely enough room for vehicular traffic. The people are dressed simply, and the shop windows contain a crowded and disorderly arrangement of inexpensive goods. By contrast, the eastern portion has many fine shops with luxury goods from abroad, pedestrians are more elegantly dressed, and the streets are for the most part clear (Avenida Central has no parking or stopping but the streets leading away from it are often difficult to traverse). The status-prestige of the two sections of the area can be suggested by the distribution of activities to be found within each of them. In the western portion are to be found the two markets, many cantinas, repair shops, many retail shops and, at night, this area becomes the "red-light"

district, complete with bars, cantinas, dance-halls, bordellos, and streetwalkers. The eastern section contains most of the government agencies, the Cathedral, the National Theater, and the "first-run" movie theaters (to see current U.S. and European movies, one goes to the eastern section; to see old Mexican films and "Italian" westerns one goes to the western section). Entertainment in the eastern section is strictly for the affluent--discothéques for the young rich, some excellent restaurants, a few bars where the visiting foreigner can meet the higher-priced prostitutes.

From the eastern edge of this prestigious section of the central commercial district, Avenida Central ascends toward San Pedro and, ultimately, Cartago. As the commercial sector of the city expanded in the last few decades, affluent Josefinos moved steadily eastward. Around the turn of the century, when San José numbered about 30,000 persons, many of the important families maintained their residences in the immediate vicinity of Central Park, and others were building large homes in Barrio Otoya and Barrio Amón, immediately to the north of what is now the commercial district (these barrios still have some of the largest and most impressive residences in San José). In the 20s and 30s, many of these families moved to Barrio González Lahman. In this barrio was built the College of Law, the lone surviving element of the University of Santo Tomás, which later moved to San Pedro with the founding of the University of Costa Rica. The zone to the east of the commercial district contains what we might term the "prestigious" agencies of the government. Here are to be found the Legislative Assembly, the Presidential Palace, the National Museum (a fortress until the 1949 Constitution disbanded

military forces), and the new Supreme Court building. Significantly, the National Library, completed in 1971, was moved from the commercial district to this area. In the 40s, 50s, and 60s affluent Josefinos began populating the barrios north and east of Barrio González Lahman to form what are now considered the conspicuously rich barrios: Los Yoses, Francisco Peralta, Escalante, and Dent. With this development, eastward movement reached the town of San Pedro, an old town which today is dominated by the university and surrounded by prosperous barrios. Eastward movement has continued to the present day to be the favored direction of expansion for rich families. A number of elegant and ostentatious homes have recently been built and others are under construction east of San Pedro, near or in Curridabat, one of the oldest towns in the Valle de San José and until recently an agricultural community of scant economic resources.[3]

The tremendous expansion of San José in the twentieth century (from 30,000 to 350,000) has put great pressure on the downtown area, where few spaces remain for construction. In addition to eastward movement, the population has expanded in all other directions. The southern barrios, which once contained only workingclass families, often new arrivals to the city, have expanded northward to meet the center of the city. While the fact seems not to be recognized by many of the residents of the more prosperous barrios, many of these southern barrios have risen considerably in economic stature in recent years. The prices of city lots have risen enormously and few workingclass families can now afford to build in their old barrios, so that where one sees new homes in the area, they are generally unostentatious but attractive, not unlike many

of the homes recently built in the northern barrios of Otoya and Amón, which are losing much of their former aristocratic grandeur.

It is interesting that in the recent history of San José, both the barrios of the affluent and the poor grew up around the two railway stations. The two stations are named for the coasts each serves--El Atlántico and El Pacífico. El Pacífico serves all of the Valle de San José as well as Puntarenas on the Pacific and is the point of arrival for commerce and migrants from these areas. Established in the southern part of the city in 1897, there grew up about the station a number of industries, especially lumber yards, many still in evidence today. During the administration of President González Víquez (1906-1910), small, cheap lots were sold in Barrio El Laberinto, just north of El Pacífico and the site of several small factories (Rodríguez Monge and Terran de Beck 1967:70). From these beginnings grew the workingclass southern section of the city. Today the area immediately to the north of El Pacífico contains the heaviest concentration of both small and large repairshops, machine-shops, lumber yards and woodworking shops. Notable as well are brothels nearly as numerous as those of the red-light district in San José Center.[4] This period of growth of the southern barrios reflected the increasing prosperity in Costa Rica through the coffee boom of the nineteenth century and the opening of Pacific and Caribbean ports which transformed the country from its traditional colonial isolation to a growing agricultural exporter. For once the ruling group had money to spend, and San José offered employment to a new urban proletariat. With the establishment of the southern barrios, San José became geographically divided between workers and wealthier urban dwellers,

adding a new social division to the long-standing and prominent (even today) division between rural and urban dweller.

The railroad to the Atlantic seems to have had a lesser impact upon the social strata of San José. The railway station was and is located in the northeast section of the city and fine homes were built along, or close to the tracks. While this railway was important to the economy, it did not bring an influx of workers as did the Pacific Railroad. In the first place, the Atlantic seaboard was sparsely populated. The workers who lived there were predominantly Negroes brought from Jamaica to build the railroad and tend the banana plantations and they were not, originally, allowed to travel beyond the rail stop at Turrialba, entrance to the Central Valley.

The elitist aspect of the Atlántico station area is symbolized by two seemingly trivial events. In 1920, the church of Santa Teresita was built on the border of Barrios Aranjuez and Escalante as the affluent were expanding into this area. It developed and maintains a reputation for a rich membership and generally has the most elaborate processions in San José during Holy Week. It replaced the Metropolitan Cathedral in social prestige as the rich moved away from the center of town. In recent years, however, Josefinos have noted a severe decline in the quality and elaboration of the processions from Santa Teresita. The explanation probably lies in the fact that an expensive and modern church was recently built in the heart of prosperous Barrio Los Yoses, the membership of which must certainly be the richest of the country. Fátima, as it is named, unlike most of the churches of San José, is located in a depression, at some distance from through streets and the poorer barrios

nearby. Its architecture is "rough-and-rugged" modern, clearly distinguishing it from traditional Costa Rican churches. This church does not open its arms to all.

Westward expansion has been the most recent in San José. As the Avenida Central passes the market leading west, it expands and becomes Paseo Colón, the only street in San José with four-lane, two-way traffic. Paseo Colón is the grand entrance to San José from the west. It extends for some twenty blocks to La Sabana, a long flat grassy area that was the site of the first San José airport, more recently replaced by the international airport near Alajuela. For a time La Sabana was used as a municipal light aircraft landing field, but extensive residential and industrial building around the area created safety problems, and the airport was relocated farther to the west in Pavas.[5] Paseo Colón is lined with many fine homes although restaurants and new-car showrooms are commercializing the street which was once the elegant boulevard of San José, a place for Sunday promenades down to a ballroom in La Sabana where romantic Josefinos were accustomed to spend their Sunday afternoons. The area on either side of the Paseo Colón is primarily residential though not exclusively rich as are the eastern barrios. The western extension of the city, while newer, rivals the Los Yoses area in ostentation. To the north and west of La Sabana, about three or four blocks in depth, are richly appointed homes. This area is known for the predominance of resident Polacos, Jews who migrated to Costa Rica to escape the persecutions of Nazi Germany.[6] The area farther to the southwest, toward and including the town of Escazú has an area of sumptuous homes, a great many of which are owned by Americans and Europeans. Most

of the Americans resident in Costa Rica are extremely rich by Costa Rican standards. Until recently Escazú was populated primarily by impoverished agricultural workers and the rich American colony residing there today presents an extreme contrast which encourages resentment against the intruders. It is interesting to note that a few years ago the American Ambassador's residence was moved westward from a fine house next to the Legislative Assembly downtown to Escazú near the Costa Rica Country Club, while many other embassy residences moved to Los Yoses, in keeping with the Costa Rican current.

Pavas, a town directly to the west of the city, together with its surrounding area, has in recent years become the center for burgeoning light industries. La Uruca, a section to the northwest of San José, has also recently experienced industrialization. From San José, the west offers the only land which is neither heavily settled nor mountainous, and it would seem that this area will eventually develop into an industrial zone and workingclass residential zone connecting San José with Alajuela. Logically enough, Pavas was not only the site for the new psychiatric hospital and municipal airport but also for an extensive low-cost housing development constructed by the government for inhabitants of the urban slums, hiding these elements even more than they had been hidden when they had lived beneath the city's bridges.

In 1851 more than one hundred years after its founding (in 1737 or 1738) San José was still a simple grid-plan city with only nine streets running east-west and nine running north-south.[7] At this time the city streets delimited an area identical to what is here described as the commercial center. By 1889, the city had roughly doubled in area,

demonstrating a distinct eastward movement. The compactness of the city during this period suggests that the primary distinction in basic geography was between town and country--Meagher notes in 1858 that the surrounding coffee fincas could be seen from almost any spot in the city (Fernández Guardia 1971). The twentieth century has been marked by a continuous and accelerating expansion which has entailed not only extension from a central core, but also incorporation of outlying towns. The originally compact, square city has moved in several directions, evidencing economic and social differences and, to a lesser extent, ethnic differences. Rich residents of San José have moved steadily from the center toward the east. The southern part of the city, with the establishment of the Pacific Railway station, has become a center for basic industries and the area of residence for a growing urban proletariat.

While Costa Rican political and social ideology asserts a traditional absence of social classes and a present preponderance of a middle class, at least in the Capital, the growth of the city suggests otherwise. Whether by accident or by plan, manual workers were early restricted to the southern area of the city at some distance from the center and out of the way of the eastward movement of the more prosperous. Until recently, the affluent have spread out along major arteries of communication (the railway to the Caribbean and the road linking San José with the other provincial capitals), while the poor have been concentrated in the least conspicuous areas of the city and surrounding countryside. At present, the less-than-affluent are encroaching upon the center of the city and the rich are moving beyond the city limits to homes not always visible from the major thoroughfares.

Residential Divisions of San José

The Josefino may refer to the area of San José in which he lives in a variety of ways. His "neighborhood," or vecindad, goes by no name but refers simply to the cluster of residences among which some interaction is present. In many instances interaction is so rare that an individual has difficulty conceptualizing his neighborhood. In contrast to this subjective category, the term barrio refers to a wider geographical area. Barrios range greatly in size, some being little larger than a vecindad. As a rule, however, barrios are too large to permit frequent contact among all their residents. Josefinos say that barrios were friendlier in the past. As recently as twenty years ago each barrio had its own futbol ("soccer") team, youths tended to identify with the barrio and there were strong inter-barrio rivalries. Today barrio identification appears to have more significance with regard to social position than with group solidarity.

Barrio boundaries are usually main thoroughfares or natural features such as rivers or streams, but sometimes they are marked by a pulpería (a small general store) or some other man-made landmark. In the downtown area many of the barrios are named for the churches they surround. The newer, prosperous barrios are often named for the man who owned the coffee plantation which later became a residential area. Many of the downtown barrios have become so invaded by commercial establishments that they have little feeling of community identity.

Barrios are semi-official units. Although they do not have official political organization or administration, many of the barrios have formed groups to represent their interests before the national and municipal

governments; these "protective juntas" (juntas progresistas) are generally to be found among the barrios in the economic middle--the poor have neither the time nor the expertise for such activities, and their residents are more concerned with moving out than with cooperating to improve the barrios; and the rich have little need for such organizations since they can solve problems by calling influential friends.

On official maps of the city, barrios are indicated by name but boundaries are not drawn. Many Josefinos, especially those residing near the center of the city, are not certain about the name of the barrio in which they live. In attempting to ascertain barrio boundaries, Fonseca Tortós et al. (1970) found that residents had difficulty placing boundaries and often called the same area by different names. Nevertheless, barrio identification is often important for social reasons. Josefinos have very clear notions of what many San José barrios are like and the people who reside in them. A University of Costa Rica student once remarked that she could name the barrios in which Carmen Granados, a radio personality, placed her skits. Carmen Granados portrays several different San José women in a series of comical caricatures. Although barrios are never named in the skits, the student was convinced that San José barrios had sufficient individuality to be recognized in the skits. Barrios, then, constitute perceptual categories as well as administrative and geographical units.

Perhaps because of the amorphous geography of the barrios, Josefinos tend to identify themselves with a prestige barrio whenever possible. When a number of civil servants were interviewed at one of the government ministries, it was found that many lived in an area called Hatillo.

Hatillo lies on the southwestern outskirts of San José and has both an old, impoverished section as well as a new area, called Ciudadela Hatillo, which consists of homes built and financed by the Costa Rican government. When asked where they resided the respondents named Hatillo, Ciudadela Hatillo, or Hatillo #3 or #4. Those who lived in the poorer section were the ones who responded with "Hatillo." Since the six sections of the Ciudadela each correspond to a different price range, those who lived in the less expensive sections responded with "Ciudadela Hatillo," which distinguished them from the poor, while those who lived in the more expensive sections always provided the numbers of the sections.[8]

Residential areas of San José may be roughly divided into four categories which correlate with a perception of the wealth of their residents. Barrios residenciales refers to the residential areas of the rich; the translation "residential barrios" could in fact be used to distinguish residential areas from commercial areas but in general the terms apply to the new areas which have many fine homes and have very few commercial establishments. Tugurios are the areas of slums considered to be the poorest sections of the city. These are not "slums" in the sense of decayed dwellings, as in the United States, but usually consist of squatter settlements, makeshift structures which provide minimal protection from the elements and little else. This is where the urban poor live. The dwellings are often built on land which has no commercial value, such as river banks and under bridges. Because of their location, the tugurios, like the rural shacks of the peasants who live near their fields, are rarely seen by anyone except the people who live in them.

A third type may be referred to specifically rather than by category, namely, the Barrios del Sur, or the southern barrios, a large group of

residential areas traditionally associated with the workingclass. These barrios may be referred to as poor by Josefinos but this judgment seems to be less definite than the "rich" designation. There is a great range of economic standing among the many barrios in this area. The price of land in San José is high, even in this area, by contrast with land values elsewhere in Costa Rica.

The final category of San José barrios is corriente, i.e., "average" or "typical." Barrios so described may also be called middle class, although agreement on this matter would be difficult to achieve since many Josefinos do not use this term and others would disagree over which barrios of San José are middle class (this term, of course, refers to the residents, while even "rich" and "poor" could be used to refer to a barrio itself, as well as its residents). Despite these difficulties, we can acknowledge that there are many barrios surrounding the center of the city which are classes as neither conspicuously rich nor conspicuously poor.

The four categories can easily be related to social strata and even better to economic strata. The terms used correspond to four major socio-economic divisions which are recognized by a great many Costa Ricans, namely, rich, middle class, poor and "those who live in extreme misery." The four categories were listed above in a logical but not an economic or social class order. Costa Ricans have little difficulty describing conditions of great wealth or great poverty, i.e., "those who have everything," and "those who live in extreme misery." It is somewhat more difficult to draw lines for those who are merely "poor" and more difficult still to determine what is "middle class." While these are admittedly

subjective and relative terms, whose definitions vary among different individuals, conceptually we may recognize two distinct boundaries--one setting off the rich from the rest of society, the other setting off the very poor. Many Costa Ricans define the "poor" as those with enough material resources to survive but not enough to enjoy life as it should be enjoyed. The middle class thus remains a residual category between rich and poor and for this reason must be presented last among the four categories.[9]

The Middle Class in San José

One of the ideological supports for Costa Rican democracy is the "large" middle class. Yet it is difficult to find this large middle class. The ring of barrios which surround the commercial center of San José are neither rich nor poor. They provide San José with much of its middle-class flavor. This area provides support for the middle-class image Costa Rica enjoys, at least to the visitor, for whom this area is the most visible and accessible. Objectively, however, the economic stratum represented by these barrios is a small segment of the population of Costa Rica. A majority of the people who work in San José cannot afford to live in the central area, and certainly not in the middle-class area. Of the Metropolitan Area of San José (population: 395,401) little more than half (205,650) lives in the Central Cantón. The distritos, cantonal subdivisions, which form the downtown area (Merced, Carmen, Hosptial, and Catedral), contain 113,085 persons, including rich, poor, and middle-class residents and constituting 29 percent of the residents of the Metropolitan Area.[10] In addition, many persons living outside the Metropolitan Area work within it. Many civil servants interviewed who live outisde of San José but who work in the downtown area stated that they

could not economically afford to live in San José, and all those interviewed earned at least twice as much per month as the national average.[11]

The "typicality" of the central barrios of San José and the notion of a large Costa Rican middle class are views which cannot be supported statistically. Few Costa Ricans consider the Costa Rican average income a living wage. People earning 400 colones per month (the national average) cannot afford school uniforms for their children to attend high school; they cannot afford to rent a home with plumbing facilities in San José, nor electricity nor hot water; they cannot eat meat more than once a week, if that often. If such people are middle class, then Costa Rica has a large middle class. Costa Ricans themselves do not call such persons middle class.

Outside of San José the inequality of wealth is even more striking. Alajuela, Heredia, and Cartago, small cities within twenty-five miles of San José and each a provincial capital, are all miniature copies of San José, lacking, of course, the commercial, political and cultural advantages which are concentrated in the national capital. In these cities the distribution of wealth is more disproportionate than in San José--a few fine homes, a few small barrios with material amenities, all surrounding the town center, and all surrounded by large areas of rural poor. Yet these towns are prosperous by general Costa Rican standards. They are agricultural centers which provide some profit for agricultural processers, shippers, and retail merchants. Thus, even within the Central Valley, only a small area within the orbit of San José can boast material prosperity as understood by Western standards. The rest of the country is generally beyond the awareness of Josefinos, who speak of the Central

Valley as the "real" Costa Rica. Guanacaste and Limón Provinces are viewed almost as foreign countries; their residents and local cultures are referred to disparagingly by Josefinos.

The implicit vagueness of the term "middle class" makes the grouping difficult to pinpoint in Costa Rica. The area of San José most readily identifiable as "middle class" represents a small portion of the population of the capital city; it has virtually no counterpart elsewhere in the country. Well-to-do Josefinos provide the cliché, "Ask any Costa Rican what class he belongs to and he will say 'middle class.'" The notion that Costa Rica has neither rich nor poor has been uncritically accepted by some American investigators (Busey 1962; Biesanz and Biesanz 1945). In fact, however, when many Josefinos are asked about their economic condition, they say "poor," and they can furnish convincing arguments for the veracity of their response, often adding, "but we are more fortunate than the people in the countryside."

The distortion of actual economic conditions in Costa Rica is not difficult to understand. The middle class of San José is the most visible Costa Rican group, concentrated as it is in the heart of the capital city. Its relation to other classes is somewhat similar to the position of San José in relation to the rest of the country; it is centralized while others are dispersed; it is found all in one place, with access to every form of institutional power in the country. This is an educated class, one which has access to some of the benefits of Costa Rican society and government. To a great extent, this group of Josefinos fills all the minor posts in government and business. Nevertheless, no salaried person in Costa Rica is really well-to-do; only the highest administrative

positions pay more than $300 per month, and the cost of living, beyond minimal subsistence requirements, is quite high, owing to the fact that Costa Rica produces very little in manufactured goods. The rich invariably obtain most of their income through non-salary sources.

The "myth" of the middle class, however, is an important element of the political ideology as it relates to the distribution of wealth and power. First of all, it has the practical benefit to the rich of disguising their monopoly of power and political influence. This sleight-of-hand is accomplished in an apparently logical manner:

> It is a difficult task to determine at what moment the three-class system was inaugurated in Costa Rican society. But I believe that there is no doubt about the existence of a middle class, becoming more and more defined, during the nineteenth century, as a continuation of the small landowners of the colonial epoch. As evidence of this, suffice it to point out that the most energetic rulers of the nineteenth century pitted themselves against the oligarchy, accomplishing their progress despite it.... It cannot be thought that these statesmen [Mora, Tomás Guardia, Rafael Iglesias] would have confronted the powerful economic interests without relying on popular support. It is inconceivable that they could have maintained the exercise of authority and ordered steps necessary for the national interest without having behind them a people giving them support, a people whose political support could be sought by the governor who was defying the powerful, especially if we consider that these statesmen, with the exception of Guardia, did not try to obtain support by force of arms [Gutiérrez G. 1963:98-99].

In continuing this argument, Gutiérrez claims that the middle class obtained "definite control of Costa Rican political life" in the beginning of the twentieth century. Two points must here be emphasized: (1) The middle class is not now and never has been in control of Costa Rican politics. Stone (1971:125-126) demonstrates that most of the important political figures of the post-World War II period are the descendants of the same group of powerful coffee-growers which have maintained political

dominance ever since Costa Rica achieved independence from Spain. (2) The middle class, if that is what we wish to call it, despite this label, is a highly privileged group with respect to the vast majority of the people. This group obtains the important white collar, salaried jobs; lives close to good schools for its children; and lives in modest but comfortable homes with "American" luxuries. This group, like the ruling elite, is able to maintain its privileged position by virtue of the geographical position which it occupies and the special access it has to wealth, education, and power. The so-called middle class is presently taking advantage of geographical centralization of social institutions, living close to schools and jobs. The rich are at the central power core even though not residing in the center of the city (although some do). Nevertheless, their expensive suburban homes are bought with the rents and profits they have gained on their property in the center of the city. They own the commercial center, which is the most valuable and the most important.

It has never been demonstrated that the middle class actually originated from the alleged class of small landowners. In fact, everything points to an opposite conclusion, namely, that the small landowners of the nineteenth century were reduced to peonage by the agricultural capitalists who turned coffee production into a profitable business (Gutiérrez G. 1963:96). The urban proletariat which grew up in San José toward the end of the nineteenth century was segregated, uneducated, and underpaid; this was the migration from the rural areas, not the middle class. For some unknown reason, the growth of middle classes ordinarily implies upward mobility or differentiation from lower classes. In Costa Rica it

would appear more likely that the present middle class is primarily derived from the less successful descendants of the upper class. Because of the customs of inheritance, many sons of the elite entered medicine, law, other profession or occupations which offered prestige and remuneration (Stone 1971:111) and the conservative-liberal political schism in Costa Rica was traditionally based upon the different interests and perspectives between the landowners and professionals and merchants who all came from the same families. Thus the support which the "middle class" may have given the liberals of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries was support of the rich branch of the family by the poorer branch, which, of course, was the recipient of bureaucratic patronage.

Summary: The City and the Elite

It has been common to assert dual divisions in Latin American nations, especially "rich" and "poor." We take the view here that there are the rich (or powerful or elite) and the others, or, as the Costa Ricans put it, los ricos y los demás. These "others" could all be economically distant from the rich or they could range from very poor to "almost" rich. The important point is that some people are at the core of power and wealth, and this is more important than the sum of their financial assets. To speak of wealth tends toward quantitative distinctions which are relatively precise and suggest a vertical stratification of society. One can always set arbitrary measurements of stratification, TV set ownership, area of residence, yearly income, etc., and such measurements have been commonly used in Costa Rica (Fonseca Tortós et al. 1970; Loomis and Powell 1950; Sariola 1958), used, we believe, inappropriately, arbitrarily, and even capriciously.[12] Nonetheless, social reality consists

of interrelationships which are difficult, if not impossible, to quantify. We have attempted to show that power presents another picture. Since power involves energy and networks of interrelationships, units of power are measured in terms of energy flow, so that interrelationships are always involved. It would probably be best to describe an individual as using power rather than having power. These concepts do not lead easily to a picture of vertically arranged separable entities.

Like figures in dollars and cents, population figures only tell a small part of the story of society. In San José the center of the city has always had special importance. During the colonial era, the present center was the limit of the city, forming a compact urban area distinct from the agricultural countryside (see Figure 4). Over the years the city expanded in several directions; and as it expanded, lines of social class were drawn. The wealthy and powerful maintained control of the Center, which has in modern times become a commercial center (see Figure 5). As the residences of the wealthy have moved away from San José Center, many of the most important symbols of the nation (government ministries, the National Palace, the National Library) have moved with them. San José still belongs to this group, and to San José belongs the nation.



Figure 4

Historical Growth of San José (schematic)



Figure 5

Contemporary San José (schematic)

NOTES

[1]González Víquez (1958:481-485) argues that the date of the founding of San José should not be 1738, the date of the founding of the Parish, but should be 1755, the year Tomás López del Corral, Alcalde of Cartago, ordered various persons to move and establish residence in the new town (actually called "Villa Nueva") under pain of corporal punishment and exile for the poor and a one hundred peso fine for the well-to-do (it seems a clear distinction was drawn between classes as early as 1755).

[2]In addition to the fact that school vacations come at a time which accomodate the rich rather than the poor, these vacations also play an important part in social differentiation. Those who can afford to do so travel at this time of the year. Many go to the Pacific beaches, especially Puntarenas (not all these beaches have the same social significance--Puntarenas might be called "popular," with the social connotation that term implies in English). It is also common to visit Miami, Florida, but more distant points, such as New York, San Francisco, or Paris, carry considerably more prestige.

[3]The preceding discussion of San José was derived from a great variety of sources, the most important of which were personal interviews and conversations with Josefinos. Some of the flavor of San José in the first half of the twentieth century can be gleaned from the numerous sketches in the anthology collected by Lilia Ramos (1965).

[4]To give the reader something of the flavor of the area, one of the brothels overlooking El Pacífico is named "The Logs," after the many logs which surround it and which belong to a nearby lumberyard. Some of the most famous, or perhaps most "notorious," brothels seem to be located in this area. During the day, however, one is generally unaware of the brothels since, except to the discerning eye, they are practically indistinguishable from other residences of the area. In daytime the area manifests the great activity of more respectable occupations.

[5]The municipal airport was relocated on property adjacent to the new psychiatric hospital and has proven to be disturbing to both the patients and the staff. One is forced to conclude that the government is more concerned with the anxieties of the rich residents of La Sabana than with the mentally ill.

[6]"Polaco" may refer to Polish nationals in general, but because a large number of the Jewish immigrants were from Poland, the term in Costa Rica, has come to refer to this group of immigrants, and even more specifically to the Jewish merchants who own retail stores in the market area. The term Judío would refer to Jewish peoples in general or to non-Costa Rican Jews. Chacón Trejos (1970:12) in writing of christianized

Jews who came to Costa Rica during the colonial era is careful to distinguish them as Sephardim, not to be confused with Ashkenazim of "Germany, Russia, Poland and other countries."

[7]The historical data presented here were taken from Rodríguez Monge and Terran de Beck (1967).

[8]A university student claims to have heard people give their address as "three miles east of the first entrance to Los Yoses." Barrio Los Yoses is the most prestigious and houses are located by the distance from the entrance to the barrio from Avenida Central. Three miles from the first entrance would place a home two miles from Yos Yoses.

[9]It should not be thought that Costa Ricans always verbalize four socio-economic categories; quite the contrary, most provide two or three when asked to enumerate social divisions. The position of the individual within the social structure has a great impact upon the relative importance of these social divisions, so that many state that Costa Rican society is divided into the "rich and the rest (of us)" or the "poor and the rest (of us)."

[10]Figures are for 1969 (Anuario Estadístico 1971).

[11]It is difficult to obtain accurate income breakdowns in Costa Rica, but in 1972 newspapers and official sources repeatedly quoted 400 colones per month (roughly US$50) as a national average. Skilled tradesmen working for a government ministry earned 800 colones per month on their salary and supplemented this with work outside of the ministry. These workers considered themselves "poor" although all readily admitted that they were much better situated economically than the rural workers.

[12]The classification of barrios in San José which served as the basis for several stratification studies (Fonseca Tortós, et al. 1970) began classifying according to a number of empirical indices, only to later reclassify several barrios according to the personal impressions of the researchers. While we would prefer the latter method (personal impressions of the researchers--the researchers, except for one, were native Costa Ricans), biassed as it is, classifying according to a combination of personal impressions and empirical measures seems a peculiar method of classification.

CHAPTER VI
THE PERCEPTION OF SOCIAL DIFFERENCES

Introduction

Thus far, many of the residents of San José have been given short shrift. Most Josefinos are not members of the elite, but this does not mean they are the senseless pawns in games of power. Their access to power may be limited; but they, too, act to better their relative positions. Nonetheless, in most instances they must accept the injustice of having been born outside of the inner circle of the elite. They must continue in their daily lives; and in so doing their activity comprises most of the activity of San José--they work, they go to school, they keep house and raise children. All this must be done within the social context of the city; and, being human, they must often attempt to understand this social context of which they are a part. We will here examine selected examples of these activities, of the perception of the social context, and some of the beliefs, explicit and implicit, which actions and perceptions reveal.

Of particular interest to us are the characterizations of the nation and national and local society. We all must categorize important elements in our panorama, particularly our fellow human beings. This chapter is largely devoted to an analysis of such categorizations by native Costa Ricans as well as observable categories. Our interests and methods are not unlike those of Warner (1963) with the difference that native perceptions and categorizations are themselves of minor significance to us

in comparison with what they tell us of the power relationships which underly them. Since the ideological viewpoints we have discussed so far have been those of the elite, we must now investigate their impact upon the rest of society.

Native Perceptions

A special problem confronts the anthropological investigator in his attempt to ascertain social or cultural "truth." As is well known to veteran fieldworkers, informants are often as unaware of the social facts as the anthropologist who begins to study them. Also, informants are eminently capable of deceit--there is no reason why, in the presence of an anthropologist, a native should suddenly become open, ingenuous, truthful and guileless, especially if such characteristics are uncommon qualities in his culture. A healthy skepticism is advisable in the fieldworker--"don't believe everything they tell you!" Informants are human and have personalities as well as interests to protect. This is a problem for any fieldworker, but the problem is accentuated when dealing with educated, sophisticated Western city-dwellers. For instance, the anthropologist arriving for the first time in Latin America will find in the capital city that, despite his prior preparation, he knows less about the people he is about to study than many of them know about him. For example, the sophisticated Josefino is probably more likely to know what an anthropologist is than the sophisticated Miamian. Part of this is due to the dependent status of Costa Rica; Costa Ricans must know about Americans, Americans need know little about Costa Rica. The fieldworker in San José encounters a special situation. As one person put it, "It is one thing to come as an anthropologist to study our country, but as

an American you come as a representative of a country which is here considered an imperialistic exploiter." Thus, the image which a Costa Rican presents to the anthropologist is based upon his evaluation of his interest in making the presentation. He may want to get something from the anthropologist. He may want to represent Costa Rica in the most favorable light. He may want to justify his own place in society. He may want to propagandize the political ideology which legitimates the structural systems in existence. While the anthropologist in a tropical forest may represent a quantity unknown to the people he is investigating, the urban anthropologist in a foreign culture can be at a terrible disadvantage; many of his informants have already acquired expertise in dealing with Americans.

Even without this problem, it is important that the anthropologist attempt to find the means to investigate cultural patterns which informants cannot disguise. The ultimate objective of anthropology is to get into the minds of peoples of many cultures to understand what it is to be human. This often involves the search for tools to investigate what people think without the intrusion of either investigator or informant, i.e., the ways in which people express their thoughts without realizing that they are doing so and the neutralization of the investigator in his influence over the respondent and in his bias as a social person and a bearer of his culture.

As part of the investigation of Costa Rican culture, a questionnaire (see Appendix H) was developed which attempted to accomplish the ends enumerated above. The questionnaire asked for classifications of Costa Ricans by Costa Ricans in such a way that prejudices would be difficult

to disguise, and the self-interest of the respondent would be involved only as a facet of his belief rather than as part of his relationship to the investigator. The questionnaire aimed generally to elicit linguistic categories, namely, words, for "types" of people in San José. This was done in a variety of ways but the principle was basically simple--the question would ask a simple association between a place, a thing, etc., and kinds of people. In this way it was hoped that the respondent would be unaware of the principal purpose of the questionnaire, which was to examine the categories used to discriminate between different people and the principal characteristics involved in such discrimination. The stimulus used for the discrimination was initially unimportant, that is, of prime importance were the ability to discriminate and the categories used. The questionnaire was entirely subjective; no attempt was made to elicit standardized, quantifiable results, since the questionnaire was intended to be investigatory. Nevertheless, once it was found that the respondents were in fact able to discriminate closely between types of people and that their categories showed sufficient similarity to suggest cultural rather than idiosyncratic patterns, the stimuli used became relevant. Since the questionnaire was given to university students first and primarily, certain conclusions about social class are related to the nature of the sample. That this group represents the ruling elite cannot be doubted, although individuals may not belong to the elite. The number in the sample was 100, but many students neglected to answer many of the questions so that the number of answers for a given question may vary from 20 to about 70. The responses were examined for content rather than statistical analysis so that figures will be given only where there is

some doubt as to the validity of the results. The same questionnaire was given to an additional 28 persons, ranging from adolescents to the aged and masters to servants. In general the university students were among the best informed and best acquainted with their city of those questioned. As we shall see, each person is to some extent restricted in his use of the city and therefore is restricted in his knowledge of the city. Nevertheless, the range of responses elicited from the students presented a diversity similar to that of the others questioned. In the months following the administration of this questionnaire, many of the problems raised were resolved through interview and observation so that the discussion below must be considered to be the result of much more than a strict evaluation of responses to the questionnaire.

One part of the questionnaire consisted of a series of 42 adjectives (see Appendix H) for which respondents were asked to name a barrio of San José to fit each adjective. The list was too long. Many respondents grew weary of answering since the number of omissions increased in relation to the last adjectives. Some of the adjectives drew little response, suggesting that they were inappropriate for categorizing barrios, but this enhanced the reliability of the other adjectives as stimuli. For example, while many respondents provided answers to "Jewish," few answered for "Negro," "German," or "Spanish." Subsequent interviews revealed that Josefinos do not perceive residential enclaves of these groups, i.e., no particular barrio holds a reputation for containing a large proportion of Negroes, Germans, or Spanish. Few respondents had difficulty categorizing the barrios of San José. Those who responded to most of the adjectives included between twenty and thirty barrios. Many

gave towns instead of barrios, usually the towns, like Moravia, Desamparados, and Alajuelita, which are part of the Metropolitcan Area and are characterized as a whole rather than by barrio.[1] In addition to towns and specific barrios, the Barrios del Sur were named as a group in response to "poor." Two streets were mentioned--Avenida Central and Calle 12, the latter enjoying a notorious reputation for houses of prostitution. The Central Market was named for "dirty," and San José Center for "commerical."

Of particular interest in Josefinos' characterization of themselves were the responses to "patriotic" and "political," with which most respondents had difficulty in naming a specific barrio. Several put "none" for patriotic and "all" for political.[2]

The responses are not amenable to statistics since they are open-ended and subjective. Certain features, however, deserve comment. First, the greatest agreement occurred with the adjectives "rich" and "poor." While most of the adjectives achieved a wide variety of responses, more than 80 percent of those answering for "rich" gave Barrio Los Yoses. No other response approached agreement of this degree. For "poor" were given barrios of the southern group or the slums adjacent to them. Barrios named as "rich" were also named for "pretty, clean, well-cared-for," and "stingy." The "poor" barrios were also named for "dirty, bad, ugly," and "pachuco." The area around the University of Costa Rica was named as "intellectual" and "cultured." The area of downtown San José which forms a zone around the commercial center and which I have suggested might be categorized roughly as middle class contains the barrios most frequently named for "good, stay-at-home, and courteous."

The responses in general reflected the divisions already described. Greatest agreement was found for rich and poor barrios; and, although the former were characterized favorably in physical characteristics, those adjectives which may be construed as referring to the people of the barrio rather than the barrio itself obtained the most favorable responses for barrios which were neither rich nor poor.

A second part of the questionniare which is relevant to our discussion here related places to people. The question asked was: "What kind of people go to....?" This was followed by a list of thirty-four places (Appendix H). The purpose of this and some other questions was to discover (1) how residents of San José classify their fellows and (2) the extent to which such classifications could be made in association with places. Included in the names of places were bars, stores, churches, movie theaters, cities in and out of Costa Rica and various other places of entertainment.

There were, of course, wide-ranging differences among the responses. Those few students who were not native Josefinos demonstrated significantly less knowledge of the city than Josefinos. This was to be expected. A few of these, however, such as the students from Heredia, were sufficiently knowledgable to be included; their answers conformed closely with the answers given by Josefinos.

Before discussing the classifications made, some observations concerning different types of responses are in order. First of all, among the university students, there was a striking difference between male and female respondents. Since the questionnaire was subjective, analyzable results depended upon a willingness of the respondent to give the

questionnaire serious consideration. One of the problems with the questionnaire was that respondents had only a vague idea of the purpose of the questions. Ostensibly the questions seemed to inquire about specific but apparently trivial matters. It was anticipated that few, if any, respondents were generally aware that the classifications used were important independent of the reference which stimulated a particular response. For example, the respondent is unlikely to be aware that the specific places mentioned are of less importance than the categorizations evidenced in the responses.

Initially it was of prime importance to discover whether or not the respondents could classify at all since there was at this point no certainty as to whether or not the general categories used and the specific listings were culturally relevant categories. The apparent ease with which most students were able to classify on both counts put this problem to rest. It was then necessary to determine what conclusions could be generalized from the results. Where classifications demonstrated clear uniformity, conclusions were generalized. Where uniformity was lacking or ambiguous, it was concluded that the area was trivial or ambiguous. In some cases this confirmed a failure to find meaningful distinctions through either observation or interview. In asking for classification of types of people from among places, radio stations, cigarettes, liquors, social clubs, periodicals, and secondary school affiliation, only periodicals proved difficult for respondents. Some periodicals, such as news dailies, were so widely read as to defy classification, or so specialized as to be unknown to the majority of respondents.

Males and Females

Among the student respondents, difference between male and female

responses was striking. They differed in the manner in which they dealt with the questionnaire and in the specific responses which they gave, even though the terminology and general characterizations were used by both sexes. The most striking difference was in "quality." The best questionnaires were selected for later interviews with the respondents. The criteria for the "best" responses were the extent of completion of the questionnaire, the ability and willingness to make fine distinctions (a few respondents tended simply to divide people into "good" and "bad"), and general knowledgeability. It was discovered that, quite unintentionally, of ten questionnaires selected, eight had been completed by women, despite the fact that the male-female ratio of respondents was roughly equal. This difference was echoed throughout the questionnaires. Nearly one-third of the questionnaires were sufficiently incomplete to be excluded from a general comparison of the responses; males were prominent in this group. A few respondents provided joking or absurd responses; all these were males. A few commented negatively on the questionnaire itself; all but one of these were men. By contrast, four women and one man commented that they regretted not having sufficient time to answer the questionnaire properly. In general, females accepted the task seriously while a significant number of males did not. In addition, women tended to provide more specific distinctions while the men evidenced a tendency to make casual or sweeping generalizations.

The sex difference is interesting in view of male-female stereotypes and "ideal" types. Traditionally the Costa Rican female is typed as submissive, dutiful, responsible, and obedient; her activities should center around the home and child-bearing and child-rearing.[3] Women are

thought to be less knowledgeable of affairs of the world, not inclined to be intellectual, even less intelligent than men, shy, often secretive, and unaggressive. Men, on the other hand, conform to a masculine image, roughly equated with the machismo image described for Latin American men, especially Mexicans.[4] Facets of this image appropriate to Costa Rica are male dominance, particularly in the home; sexual aggressiveness of the male, openness in interpersonal relations, and individualism. At first glance, these stereotypes may seem to have been fulfilled in the two approaches to the questionnaire; the women dutifully answered the questions while the men took a cavalier attitude in responding. However, one of the paradoxes of the masculine ideal image was reflected in the questionnaires: Men are by nature more intelligent than women, implying that less effort is needed on the part of men in intellectual tasks. The questionnaire may have been perceived as representing a menial task unworthy of men but quite appropriate for women. Many students criticize a tendency they perceive in their countrymen to obtain benefits with a minimum of effort. The behavior and attitude criticized appear to be analogous to the male criollo personality described by Simmons (1955) in coastal Peru. Simmons contends that the criollo who lives by his wits, surviving and succeeding through cleverness rather than physical effort or long-range planning, is much admired even though his behavior is not condoned. Many elements of this image are present in Costa Rica. It is sufficient here to make the judgment that in many areas of activity, identity as a male, by which is meant conformity to the principles of a generalized male peer-group, may be more important to the individual than other activities. While male identity is permanent, masculinity must be

continually maintained. We shall see later how male values support and maintain the dominance of the ruling group. Within the context of international market and political dependency, plus internal political insecurity and change, clever manipulation of people and situations for immediate benefits may well be a strategy more likely to succeed than long-range planning.

These remarks concerning sex differences are germane to our discussion since the city of San José has a different meaning for men and for women. A peculiar aspect of any city is that it does not all belong to all the people. Despite the apparent legal and social equality of Josefinos, various groups within the population have privileged or prohibited access to different places and parts of the city. Thus social clubs are closed to all but members and their guests. Even more important, however, is preferential access, often due to simple differences in economic position. Many would prefer to sit in the shady side of the soccer stadium but cannot justify an increased expenditure. One of the most noteworthy differences in access corresponds to difference of sex. Women, unlike men, do not have freedom of access to the city. If men must maintain an image of masculinity, women must maintain the image of respectability, of which the prime ingredient is a reputation untainted by the slightest hint of sexual infidelity. In San José, proof of infidelity is socially subject to few evidentiary rules. Assumption of guilt is the rule, and there is someone in every block watching to insure that every indiscretion is reported. This has differential consequences for males and females. For men, especially single men, reports of frequent sexual conquest increase his prestige among male associates. Discretion is called for

only to the extent that harmony at home need be preserved. For women, however, any implication of extra-marital sexual interest (except, of course, interest in the misbehavior of other women) is a mark against their reputation. The conduct of women in public is subject to constant scrutiny.

Some consequences of these attitudes are obvious. A woman who enters a drinking establishment alone takes her reputation lightly. Specifically, women who enter cantinas, best translated as taverns, are presumed to be prostitutes and treated accordingly. Cantinas are for men, "off-limits" to respectable women. Most other places in the city are not as clearly segregated. The rules are complicated. There are places a woman may go with her husband where she would not dare enter alone or even with a female companion, e.g., public-dancing places. A married woman who shops downtown alone may be suspect, especially if such visits are frequent and her absence from home is noted to be of long duration. It is better to go with a female relative than a close friend. These rules, and many more like them, vary in importance according to social position (women in the "middle class" enjoy somewhat more freedom than others) and individual circumstance (families seem to vary considerably in the degree of trust they place in female relatives). Clearly, few women can conveniently afford always to abide by all the rules and do not attempt to do so. Nevertheless, a women must be on guard to avoid compromising situations.

For the women, San José during the day and San José at night constitute radically different situations. During the day, shopping must be done and, for those women who work, work must be done. Unaccompanied

women on the streets deserve no comment except from the gossip-monger. As long as she disregards the suggestive remarks of male bystanders, the woman alone has little to fear for her reputation. Nighttime is another matter. There are few justifications for a woman to be walking the streets alone at night and to pass through an area that is poorly lighted is considered to be dangerous for any woman, a good prospect for physical and sexual assault. At night the center of the city sometimes presents the appearance of a vast bordello, especially after ten o'clock when most of the restaurants have served most of their clients for the night. Most activity occurs in the red-light area and adjacent quarters, but street-walkers gather on the corners behind the Post Office, the Banco Nacional, the Cathedral, places which are eminently respectable during the day. The Central Market area in particular shows these two faces. Although avoided by many men and women during the day for being crowded and dirty, the Central Market is a place of business, work, and shopping. Many a shiftless young male wanders about eying every woman, but there is little danger. At night the Market is less crowded. The Market building itself is closed except for Monday and Thursday nights when produce is brought from the countryside and the campesinos wander about spending the money they have obtained for their produce. In general the cantinas each have a few customers, the dance-halls have a handful of dancers. The market at night sells liquor and sex but little else. Many Josefinos consider the area "very dangerous" at night and the police describe it as the "zone of greatest danger." However, these fears appear largely unjustified.

Listed on the questionnaire were several of the better-known night-spots in the downtown area. Female university students were cognizant

of these places and able to categorize them. Both male and female students tended to classify the clientele as "prostitutes" and "pachucos,"[5] stereotypes which were also reflected in other negative characterizations such as "uncultured people (gente inculta)" or "bad people (gente mala)." Only a few of the male students responded in accord with personal observation that, although the female clientele appeared to be composed almost exclusively of prostitutes, the males evidenced a wide range of social class (not referring here to the Market district, but to the other area of the red-light district). Relatively few of the men patronizing these places fit the usual description of "pachuco," and prostitutes denied that many pachucos frequented these establishments. Few, in fact, could afford to do so. It appeared that both male and female university students were at some disadvantage in classifying the habitués of these places.

In general male responses were broad, with fewer distinctions made than were made by women. Although terms expressing social class were used in only a minority of responses, males showed a much greater tendency to use such terms than women. Males also tended much more toward condemnatory terminology. This was manifested, for instance, in categorizing smokers of different cigarettes. One cigarette would be smoked by "intelligent, discriminating," or "good" people (presumably the respondent's favorite brand) while all others were smoked by the opposite sorts of people.

Of particular interest was the general absence of terms for social class. Fortunately, for the purposes of comparison, one area was referred to consistently with levels of social class, i.e., upper class,

lower class, upper middle class, etc. The area so classified consisted of secondary school affiliation. There is a pointed correlation between class and secondary school attendance. Although other items on the questionnaire, such as red-light district spots as just mentioned, often elicited responses of social prejudice, no other section of the questionnaire evoked such clearcut social class terminology. Education was also the one area in which there was no significant difference between male and female responses.

As might be anticipated, stereotyping in the questionnaire occurred most frequently with sets which were unfamiliar to the students, e.g., female students tended strongly to characterize those places frequented by prostitutes as having a clientele composed of a lower group of males variously described in terms of lack of culture, delinquency, poor taste. A few male students, on the other hand, while denying approval of the clientele, recognized that these places are frequented by all types of men, difficult to classify. Although negative classifications reveal a certain social bias--few prostitutes, for instance, are recruited from the social strata in which university students are to be found--prostitutes were not universally condemned. While many considered the extent of prostitution in San José to be a national disgrace, the prostitutes themselves were commonly viewed as victims of circumstance. Interviews with college-age informants, frequently evince compassionate attitude toward prostitutes. Many of those interviewed were concerned about prostitution as a social problem and interested in the rehabilitation and education of prostitutes. There is something of a paradox about this attitude. While sexual misbehavior is condemned, prostitution is

of a different order. To indulge in prohibited sexual liaisons for pleasure marks a woman as irresponsible; to do so for remuneration is interpreted by other standards. No native-born Costa Rican interviewed suggested that sexual pleasure was a factor in the recruitment of prostitutes, although one long-time resident, a native of Guatemala, felt that some prostitutes entered their profession for such reasons. Among the more affluent interviewees, "lack of culture" was frequently given as a determining factor. Lack of culture, i.e., the individual called inculto, is generally attributed to lack of parental care, supervision, the failure of parents to inculcate good moral and social customs in their children, and, to a lesser degree, lack of formal education. As previously noted, the poorest Costa Rican may be "cultured" and the richest "uncultured" since "culture" (cultura) is a reflection of one's manners and behavior not necessarily dependent on one's wealth. Few Costa Ricans would deny, however, that the majority of incultos are to be found among the lower classes, including campesinos. "Culture" corresponds to the ideal life style of the upper class. Though an individual is deemed "cultured" by virtue of personal conduct independent of wealth, an important mark of culture is an interest in the arts, philosophy, and literature as well as tastes and activities thought by the upper classes to reflect good taste and breeding. Although the prestige attached to identification as cultured is within easy reach of the wealthy, it is difficult for the poor and uneducated to obtain. Thus, when a university student describes prostitutes as incultas, he is in essence saying that they have not had the advantages he has had and that the best way to reform a prostitute is to educate her to be like him. He

belies his own assertions of lack of social prejudice and the accessibility of culture for all segments of society. We might ask whether the "reformed," cultured prostitute could be incorporated into the social stratum of the university students, but this question would be purely academic; anyone denying social prejudice is not likely to be objective about such matters. Some Costa Rican friends have remarked that it is common to find American men marrying Costa Rican prostitutes. They attribute this to lack of prejudice or to ignorance.

An interesting contrast to the attitudes mentioned above is the workingclass attitude toward prostitution. While workingclass people readily admit poverty and lack of parental guidance as factors in contributing to prostitution, they consider laziness as the most important factor. Since there are no legitimate occupations for poorly educated young women which are very remunerative, prostitution is a great temptation for those who are not willing to work. In the lower socio-economic segments of the population, the "work ethic" is strong since few have the opportunity to better their economic position except through hard work. The prostitute earns her living through neither work, cleverness, nor skill. She manages to escape the arduous life of others of her stratum by means of violating approved behavior. Such conduct cannot evoke approval or sympathy.

Social bias was demonstrated by the students in two areas. The first has already been discussed, namely, places patronized by those without culture. That this reflects social bias is demonstrated by its opposite. While many of the places listed in the questionnaire elicited differing degrees of approval and disapproval and represented the bias or preference

of the respondent, only the National Theater consistently elicited "cultured" for its clientele. This is significant. The National Theater occupies a unique niche in Costa Rican culture. It is owned by the state and thus open to the public. The National Theater was completed in 1897, a copy on a reduced scale of the Opera in Paris. The building was constructed at the height of the initial coffee boom when, for the first time in Costa Rican history, there was sufficient wealth for Josefinos to aspire to the glories of European culture.[6] The building is located in the center of town, two blocks from the Cathedral and one block from the best shops on the Avenida Central. Like Costa Rican churches, the National Theater faces West, has its own charming plaza in front, bordered by the Gran Hotel (built in 1930), once the most elegant hotel in Costa Rica, the name and architecture of which suggest old-world elegance. It is worthy of note that this replica of the church-plaza pattern was created during the very period in which the Catholic Church was struggling unsuccessfully to maintain its important role in politics. San José had become a truly secular city.[7] Nowadays, in order to observe the wealthy in all their finery one need only wait outside the National Theater on any gala evening. Entertainment ordinarily consists of music, dance, comedy, or drama. The National Symphony conducts regular concerts, but the usual fare during the regular season is more often visiting performers from abroad. Since the theater is small, admission prices are high, prohibitive for most Costa Ricans. In addition, most persons attending concerts are fashionably attired in gowns, furs, and suits inappropriate for daily wear and an impractical expenditure for those who do not frequently attend gala social events.

Although such attire is not actually required, clothes-conscious Costa Ricans naturally avoid situations in which their wardrobe is likely to reveal lower social or economic status. Finally, concerts rarely reflect popular taste so that a great many Josefinos would prefer other forms of entertainment. As a result, the one public place where "cultured" people go is in fact utilized primarily by a small elite. For the wealthy the cultured image is within easy reach; for many others the obvious symbols of high culture are virtually inaccessible. An individual with distinctly upper-class status remarked, for example, that many Costa Ricans do not go to the National Theater even though they can afford to because they do not consider themselves of a sufficiently high social status. Such a statement must be considered conjecture since few Costa Ricans would admit to such an opinion of themselves. Yet many undoubtedly avoid potentially embarrassing social situations.[8]

It is interesting to reflect upon the difference in responses elicited for the National Theater item and the items for social clubs. While many students distinguished between the three clubs named (Club Unión, Costa Rica Tennis Club, and The Country Club), since the prestige attached to each of the three varies because of the relative exclusiveness of the membership, responses reflected social class, position, and social prejudice. Unlike the social class terms for secondary school affiliation, which most frequently indicated relatively neutral levels of social class, i.e., upper, lower, upper middle, etc., terms for the clubs often suggested life style, such as "aristocracy, bourgeois (burgués), capitalist," etc. Considering the prevalence of Marxist

ideology in the University, such terms often imply social resentment or condemnation. The contrast with the National Theater is clear. The social clubs are seen in terms of power and wealth and not "culture." Because the National Theater is ostensibly open to the public and because of its legitimation through aesthetic entertainment, the people who attend, by and large, are the same people who belong to the social clubs, are "cultured."

A key point is illustrated here. Although the same persons go to the social clubs as go to the National Theater, they are characterized differently. The clubs are exclusive by regulation, the National Theater is indirectly exclusive. While theoretically open to everyone, the National Theater is in fact open to those who can pay and attended by those who desire to go. The clubs serve admitted social functions and are legally restrictive so that their elitist nature can hardly be disguised. The National Theater ostensibly provides high culture for the public in general so that its elitist nature is cloaked by the image of universality in appeal and purpose. Although the exclusiveness of the clubs is legal, it does not conform to current political ideology. On the other hand, the National Theater legitimates this same elite by attaching to it the aura of high culture.

The students who so highly approve of the National Theater while condeming the clubs are supporting the prestige system by esteeming activities closely associated with the ruling group. This is the insidious element of social class distinctions of taste--discrimination on the basis of intangible measures. While the students feign social equality, they also condemn popular life styles. Many university professors have

observed that the students quickly lose their radical and reformist tendencies once graduated and gainfully employed. We can anticipate many of the university graduates becoming active members of the social clubs to which they belong as a birthright. The negative attitude shown by the students on the questionnaire towards all things Costa Rican as well as toward Costa Ricans may represent a desire to disparage the populace from which the university student wishes to distinguish himself.[9]

Difference of social position is shown not only in attitudes toward places of entertainment, but also in observable behavior. In contrast to the sedate and sober behavior of the patrons of the National Theater, the patrons of Center City are raucous. In the downtown area these two are the only public places which show live entertainment to large audiences. Center City lies in a less prestigious part of the city, close to the red-light section. It serves as a movie theater during the afternoon and night, but on two nights a week it presents live entertainment, called "shows." One night is reserved for amateur performances of music. The audience is quick to show its disapproval of inferior performers, who are often shouted off the stage after a few opening bars, but is equally warm in its praise of other performers. The other show consists of a Costa Rican striptease, or so it is identified by Josefinos. Few performers remove any clothes, remaining quite modestly attired by international standards of striptease. Commonly the dancers merely perform rather lethargic dances clad in bikini swimsuits with a few sexually suggestive body movements. Good or bad, the performers evoke much shouting and laughing from the audience, whose enthusiasm is

undaunted by its evaluation of the performances. The members of the audience consist primarily of young Josefino males, a number of whom dress pachuco style, while others appear to be workingmen. There are a few prostitutes in the theater, but few other women. At the other weekly show, more women, though still a minority, are present, few of whom appear to be women of the street.

The contrast in behavior between Center City and the National Theater reflects the difference between culto and inculto. At Center City, in addition to hoots and shouting, one sees lighted cigarettes tossed from the balcony,[10] spitting on the floor, and behavior which in general would not be condoned in the National Theater. Student respondents to the questionnaire frequently classified patrons of Center City as "uncultured" or simply lacking taste and good manners, although many students described them simply as "poor."[11]

Taste in public entertainment elsewhere reflects social differences. A number of San José movie theaters were included in the questionnaire to test the criteria for discriminating different sorts of people. Theaters in San José can be roughly divided into two groups--those which show first-run, current American and European films and those which show Mexican films and Clint Eastwood-type "Italian" westerns (Center City falls in the latter category). The former group is the higher priced of the two and reflects the taste preferences of people with correspondingly higher incomes, yet in each group prices vary according to the accomodations. For the theaters in the center of San José, those of the first group are located in the "fashionable" half of downtown while those in the second group are located in the other half of the center. Many student respondents indicated that preference among the first group was primarily

a question of having the price of admission. There was a strong although unprovable implication that individuals attended the best theaters they could afford, yet there are observable differences in attire between patrons of movie theaters showing similar types of films at different prices.

Dancing is popular in San José and reveals some interesting aspects of society. Preferences for different dancing spots are distinct. Admission price tends to separate different social strata, but these differences are not always clearcut since many people visit places beyond their economic resources. Three dance-halls are located in the center of the city, but these are patronized by prostitutes and fall in a different category from the numerous dance-halls on the outskirts of town. Also in the center of town are a few discothéques. These are located in the fashionable area of Avenida Central and patronized by students and young adults. The discothéques play recorded music, predominantly American, in contrast to the traditional dance-hall which has a live band and plays exclusively Latin music. The separation of the young and old is important since it would be embarrassing for youths to encounter their fathers out on the town with their mistresses. Many dance-halls are sufficiently isolated as to require automobile transportation, which restricts attendance to those who have cars or can afford a long-distance taxi ride. Attendance is by couples and singles, so that the dance-hall is a good place to meet a girl. The majority of single women in these dance-halls are not professional prostitutes, but neither are they presumed to have their virtue intact.

Subtle distinctions are made between dance-halls which are difficult to ascertain. Since it is common for married men to take their mistresses

to dance-halls, great discretion must be exercised in selecting a dance-hall. For example, on one occasion several married couples were intent upon dancing and were discussing which spot to go to. One favored spot was objected to by one of the men, who was a physician, on the grounds that the dance-hall was the favorite place for his colleagues to take their mistresses and he would not go there with his wife because everyone would be embarrassed.

Much of this discussion of places in San José has included references to sexual behavior. There are excellent reasons for this. As already mentioned, the Costa Rican version of machismo has a high degree of sexual content. A male's reputation for masculinity is closely associated with the frequency and quality of his sexual conquests. However, social prestige is also involved. The conquest of a beautiful woman of good taste confers considerably more prestige than the conquest of a market prostitute. In this, wealth has great advantages. Not only may a wealthy man "buy" a better woman, but the social prestige of such a man attracts better women, and wealth permits the sort of discretion which lets a man hide his affairs from his wife while revealing them to his peers. It is said also that men with political connections often receive the sexual favors of attractive young women in return for a minor post in one of the government agencies. Thus the values placed on male sexuality serve to enhance the prestige of men with power and wealth while encouraging the impoverishment of those men with lesser economic resources.

Clandestine sexual activity shows a geographical distribution different from legitimate daytime activity. The bordellos and night spots condemned by the students are located downtown in low prestige areas.

Upper-class sexuality, when it does not take place in the private quarters of the individuals concerned, occurs far from the center of town, away from the lower classes and away from suspicious wives. In addition to the dance-halls so located, there are several "motels" located on the outskirts of San José, particularly in San Francisco Dos Ríos, where discretion is the watchword. This geographical distribution points out a conflict in values. That clandestine sexual activity takes place either in low-prestige areas or in areas removed from the low-prestige/high-prestige dichotomy indicates its questionable character. Nonetheless, a clear prestige ranking of commercial establishments where this activity takes place shows the importance it has in male society.

Besides university students, a number of other people were given the questionnaire. Groups other than university students were in general less knowledgeable about places in San José. This would seem partly due to the fact that the questionnaire was formulated with university students in mind, but it would seem also that, since most university students are unmarried and relatively affluent, they would have greater opportunity to visit a broad spectrum of places, especially places of entertainment. For others, entertainment is restricted. Besides the great proliferation of cantinas, which are for men and are frequently dirty and undecorated, there are not many entertainment spots. In the daytime, Josefinos frequent the soda for a soft drink or a cup of the justly admired Costa Rican coffee. Although the soda varies in quality, prices, and decor, it attracts a diverse clientele--commonly shoppers or the people who work in the immediate vicinity. A few sodas have special clientele and reputations; one can nearly always find a group of

Americans, especially tourists, in Billy Boy's in the fashionable part of Avenida Central; Soda Palace on Central Park is full during the day with middle-aged men, many of whom are involved with street-corner money-changers a half-block away, plus fanáticos, the devotees of sports; Soda Esmeralda, near the Cathedral, is a hangout of guitarists, and is one of the few sodas which shows nighttime liveliness. From there groups of guitarists and singers are hired to serenade parties at private homes.

Rich families entertain at home or at one of the social clubs. A rich married couple is rarely seen on the street except at the National Theater. For a great many of the poorer Josefinos, paid entertainment is beyond their budget. The men will spend a few pesos on cheap guaro or a Sunday soccer match; the women, when not occupied by their many household tasks, visit family or friends. Sunday is family day, and Josefinos stroll the city or visit the countryside. For most Josefinos, most of their time is spent at work or at home with the family.

Lower-income women interviewed evidenced incomplete knowledge of the places listed on the questionnaire. They did not recognize the names of sodas, bars (good or bad), and showed little knowledge of the "fashionable" sections of the city. While knowing of Center City, they did not condemn it to the extent that university students did but noted simply that it was for poor people, while the National Theater was for the rich. Lower-class men generally knew the city well, i.e., they could locate most of the places listed, but they commonly declined to classify the patrons since the men had had few occasions to visit many of the places named. By broadening the sample, however, important social groupings could probably be established on the basis of differing patterns

of response. Properly refined, such a methodological tool could prove an excellent technique for cross-cultural social taxonomies based upon native perceptions rather than apriori socio-economic indices which self-adjust for three-class systems and provide little information other than relative wealth or poverty. This could obviate problems, such as those mentioned in the earlier discussion of the "middle class" in Costa Rica, in which it was pointed out that whether that class is small or large depends, to a large degree, on the measures employed.

The questionnaire was administered to 14 secondary school students, most in private secondary schools, precursors of the university. While in most respects their responses paralleled the responses of the university students, they tended toward extensive use of social class terms. In addition to upper, middle, and lower class, many of them used the terms "bourgeois" and "capitalist."[12] Another curious result in the responses of secondary school students was that two of them recognized one of the bars listed as frequented by homosexuals. Only two of one hundred university students noted this. It is difficult to draw much significance from the statistics in comparing age groups. It is significant, however, that so few respondents knew of this bar since it is in the fashionable area near Avenida Central where many other places listed in the questionnaire were located and recognized by the students. Homosexuality conflicts with machismo as well as with religious and social values in Costa Rica, so that homosexuals are under great pressure to avoid being identified. Interestingly, the two bars in San José noted for homosexual clientele are located in the very area avoided by clandestine heterosexuals--the prestige section of San José Center.

Conclusions: Values, Perceptions, and Social Differentiation

The social and political ideology which represents Costa Rica and has been accepted by many Costa Ricans and most outsiders is supported only if we take the narrow perspective of a small number of Josefinos. The notion that Costa Rica has a large middle class might be restated to read: "San José has a conspicuous middle income group." In the daytime in downtown San José, we observe large numbers of apparently middle-class people, using any sort of rough visual index for judging social class. Yet middle-class identification is too often treated as a residual category, i.e., the middle class consists of those we cannot identify as either rich or poor. It may be that such a negative categorization merely masks the fact that the middle-class stereotype is so dominant that others are distinguished from it, i.e., one is poor, not by comparison to the rich but to the middle class, and one is rich because he is noticeably richer than those of the middle class. This point of view would support the notion that Costa Rican ideology seems to make sense only if viewed from the perspective of this middle group in San José. For the nation as a whole, however, such a perspective would be a great distortion. A second point, equally important but more difficult to substantiate, is that this perspective is highly beneficial to those Costa Ricans with the greatest power. The assertion of a large Costa Rican middle class, supported by favorable, whether true or not, comparisons with other Latin American countries, minimizes social resentment, suggests social mobility (supported by educational ideology), and implies that power and wealth are diffused through the social system. The image of other Latin countries presented in Costa Rica is one of

rigid two-class systems, patrón-peón or White-Indian. By contrast Costa Rica's "large middle class" presents a radically different image. While a great many Costa Ricans may wonder where all these middle-class people are, to the extent that they accept the image they may see their political and social superiors as less exploitative and more benevolent than they are. The ploy seems to be successful. Costa Ricans express an intense distrust and disappointment with current political leaders and political parties but great adherence to the abstract principles of the Costa Rican political system.

San José, through its dominance in every sphere of activity, reaps disproportionate rewards from the national labor force, economy and political system. As the conspicuous representative of the nation, San José presents an image of the Costa Rican as urban, white collar, and educated although the great majority of Costa Ricans are rural, working-class or peasant, and have enjoyed only limited education. The relatively high literacy rate in Costa Rica only masks the fact that higher levels of education for remunerative positions in the society are effectively restricted to a small few.

Residential patterns within the city of San José demonstrate gross as well as fine distinctions of socio-economic divisions of Costa Rican society, the initial division between town-dweller and rural resident became, after the coffee boom and creation of an urban proletariat, an urban dichotomy between workingclass and white collar, or poor and rich, in which the workingmen were segregated from the rest in the southern section of the city, while the rich have followed to this day an eastward movement away from the center of town.

Use of the city reflects social divisions. A rough scale of prestige can be attributed to different places within the city which affect social position. Although differences in use of these places appears frequently to be correlated with the wealth of patrons, a questionnaire administered to university students and others indicates that neither wealth nor abstract social class are ordinarily associated with most of the places in the city. Instead, prestige values are employed which increase in positive valuation to the extent that they conform to the life style of the most powerful group of Costa Ricans. Social differences are thus perceived not as simply objective and fortuitous, but are imbued with prestige factors which permit the wealthy and powerful to maintain an image of superiority beyond their wealth and power. In Costa Rican society, prestige is one channel through which unequal positions of wealth and power are legitimized. Even where social mobility is not otherwise restricted, relative prestige may be invoked to maintain a status quo. The one area of the questionnaire which consistently elicited terms for social class was that of secondary school affiliation. This fact contrasts with the ideological notion that upward social and economic movement is accessible through education. Social class is directly associated with different schools of the same level (and the high rate of success of prestige-school graduates) so that the educational system minimizes social mobility. But the myth of an open society continues to be effective. Many workingclass people make great financial sacrifices to provide their children with formal education. Some have been disappointed by the discrepancy between anticipated and actual results of education. Social mobility through education is like a carrot

on a stick. For adults with little education, the promise of social betterment resides primarily with the delayed rewards their children may achieve through education. Prestige is attached to the education which the ruling group members already have and can easily gain for their children. Education is correlated in abstract terms with "culture" or cultivation, behavioral and personality characteristics ostensibly unrelated to social or economic position but in fact readily available only to those with wealth and leisure.[13]

City geography demonstrates social divisions through the exclusiveness and inclusiveness of its physical components. There are a few places, such as the National Stadium, which attract all segments of the population. Josefinos commonly declare that 99 percent of Costa Ricans are soccer fans, and the subject of soccer is decidedly one which crosses social strata. Yet a single visit to the National Stadium reveals essential social differences. Not only do the prices vary,[14] but behavior in different sections follows different patterns. While the game is not in play, before the game and during halftime intermission, the Sol section is in a constant uproar with a variety of missiles (usually orange peels and beer cups) and firecrackers, or lighted newspapers at night, but the Sombra section by contrast appears staid. The difference in behavior is none other than that between culto and inculto already discussed at length. Difference in sex is also to be noted. Many women refuse to sit in the Sol section. Women are a favored target for missiles and sexual epithets. Women do not attend unaccompanied by a man, and usually the male companion walks between the seated fans and the woman to protect her from missiles. The spectators are predominantly male but

many women, often well-coiffed and well-dressed, attend and are enthusiastic supporters of a team. Married couples and families who do not spend money for Sombra seats arrive early to the Sol section and sit in the end behind the goal, the poorest seats, but generally free of many of the disturbances common in the rest of that section. Small children, about eleven years and under, are the only spectators exempt from the threat of hurled objects or joking insults; a family with a small child will not be molested. This is totally in character. Josefinos, who are not conspicuously considerate toward their fellow-beings in public encounters, almost invariably show warmth, interest, and helpfulness toward children.

The differences between members of society observable in the National Stadium are refined and graded elsewhere in the city. Specific exclusion of the public is present only at the social clubs and, of course, in private residences, although entrance to upper echelon government and business offices is carefully monitored. Statistical, as opposed to legal, exclusion is practiced by means of a number of restraints--admission price for entertainment and luxury shopping prices serve to limit patronage to economic groups (remember that low prices serve to exclude prestige-conscious affluent nearly as much as high prices exclude the poor). Exclusion by means of social restraint is most clearly and effectively applied to women, whose freedom of movement is curtailed both by male family members and by other women. While men have freedom of movement within the city, a man's prestige depends in large part upon the ways in which he uses the city, the parts he frequents, and in whose company he is found, so that men, too, are

subject to social restraint in their movements. Affluent men have the greatest freedom of movement and exercise this freedom to a limited extent. Businessmen and government officials can be seen in ordinary cantinas, but workingmen avoid expensive bars. Men in business suits stop for a beer in cantinas but to enter an expensive place, the workingman masquerades as affluent by dressing beyond his means.

Not only difference of sex, but also sexual behavior is important in establishing social distinctions. Nighttime movement in San José is primarily concerned with courting behavior and to a lesser extent with drinking, the latter commonly interwoven with sexual pursuit. Married couples frequent movie theaters, the National Theater, restaurants, but most of those away from home are unmarried couples, men looking for women, or women looking for men. In the late hours, the red-light areas of San José are the only areas with observable activity (on weekends the dancing spots are active but these are scattered about the periphery of the city and do not form an "area" of activity beyond their doors). Patterned sexual liaisons demonstrate the superiority and privilege of males; in any extra-marital sexual relationship the female runs counter to the ideals of her sex while the male fulfills the ideals of his, i.e., machismo. Sexual patterns inevitably operate to enhance the prestige of the upper class as a whole and of upper-class men in particular. Respectability, or at least the image of respectability in sexual behavior, is easiest for the upper-class woman. While the lower-class woman may be subject to sexual interest and a desire to better her economic position, the rich woman need only be subject to the former. Reportedly, prostitutes come from all classes, but there is little doubt that recruitment to prostitution may be statistically correlated to

a background of poverty.[15] Young women of the lower strata seem to a great extent to be considered "fair game" or the prey of men of all classes so that, regardless of the degree of promiscuity present among women of lower economic groups they appear to be sexually exploitable, i.e., less responsible, less "pure," and sexually more active than the rest of the population. Few men would make such an accusation, nevertheless, such a bias is shown, for instance, by the fact that many men regard maidservants as promiscuous and as potential prostitutes. There are many rumors of the sexual misbehavior of upper-class women but it is apparent that much of this is conjecture since these women are able to exercise greater discretion than other women.

Masculinity is shown by sexual conquest. For upper-class men sexual conquest is accessible, easy, and involves women of higher caliber under more "tasteful" circumstances than is possible for the less affluent. What the poorer man may achieve through charm, cleverness, attractiveness and a little money, the rich man can obtain simple through wealth and influence. Thus for some men masculintiy comes naturally with the experience of many victories and few humiliations.

In San José the perceptual models of society and the value system, both in its ideal form of family loyalty, respectability, and responsibility and in the variation applicable to persons as representatives of their sex, correspond to the ideological model of Costa Rican society in asserting as universal certain characteristics which in fact belong to, or are within access of, a small few. Not only do the perceptual models and the value system gloss over real differences, they also enhance the position of the members of the elite by interpreting much of

their behavior in a favorable manner and by inducing others to emulate elite behavior when they can ill afford to do so.

NOTES

[1]This reflects the bias already discussed: that of considering downtown San José as the Costa Rican model. The towns named show almost as much heterogeneity as the downtown area yet are subject to behavioral generalization by those closer to the center of the city.

[2]Costa Ricans often say there are but two topics of conversation--futbol and politics.

[3]For a discussion of the traditional ideal female character and role behavior see Biesanz and Biesanz (1945:87).

[4]While university students are familiar with the concept of machismo, most other people interviewed were either unfamiliar with the word or had no precise notion of the concepts behind it. It appears to be a word recently diffused into Costa Rica, presumably from Mexico. While the masculine image of machismo may be said to characterize Latin men in general, it is incorrect to equate all Latin men. While Costa Rican men express some admiration for the independent, individualistic, dominant male, exemplified by the campesino with his horse and his machete, an island in himself, they also decry the aggressive violence inherent in the image.

[5]The term "pachuco" is used to refer to a counter-culture group of young males who are noted by their style of dress and a special argot. They are associated with the bootblacks of Central Park in San José and are considered young delinquents in their general life style, disrespectful and aggressive conduct and alleged criminal activities.

[6]Around the turn of the century, there seems to have been some tendency in the Americas for rude, isolated, or frontier communities experiencing boom periods to attempt to enhance their images by building opera houses and importing "culture," e.g., Colorado, California, Belem in Brazil. This seems to have been one way in which coffee barons, rubber barons, and gold barons could socially legitimize their recently gained wealth with the prestige which cultural patronage so often brings. This patronage introduced social class symbols into formerly egalitarian frontier societies. Perhaps the most recent example of this phenomenon is Texan extravagance.

[7]The secular aspect of San José is well recognized by Josefinos and other Costa Ricans. Although San José is the administrative center of the Catholic Church in Costa Rica, Cartago, the colonial capital is the spiritual capital. Religious processions in San José

are small and poorly attended while those of Cartago are extravagant and draw pilgrims from all over the country. In the tourist guides, Cartago is always represented by her cathedral while San José is represented by the National Theater. In the telephone directory for Costa Rica (1971-72, p.5, Guía Turística) the National Theater is the first item in "centers of interest for tourists," while the Cathedral ranks a poor fifth. The directory describes the National Theater as "...a beautiful building of unusual architectural characteristics in the classic style, the interior of which strongly attracts the attention of every cultured person by its works of art, luxury and courtly splendor."

[8]There are two dangers for those attempting to live beyond their social and economic status. First, contact with a higher group may prove to be humiliating, as implied above. Second, they are very likely to become the subject of ridicule from members of their own group for "putting on airs." A common subject of gossip, gleaned from informants of all economic stations, is the neighbor or associate who tries to appear richer than he really is. As a result, inappropriate displays of wealth seem often to occur in anonymous situations. For instance, a woman from Alajuelita, a small and relatively poor town on the outskirts of San José, said that some of her neighbors would sacrifice daily essentials for months at a time to be able to buy fancy clothes and spend a night dancing at the Versailles, the most expensive dancing spot in San José (the Versailles is located on the other side of the city from Alajuelita, which has a number of fine dancing spots where the entrance price is less than a quarter of that of the Versailles).

Display is also to be noted in an account given by a young Costa Rican man, also of modest resources. He said he knew other young men who would occasionally spend all their current funds to rent a car and drive through sections of the city where they were not known. Similar stories abound in San José. Many are undoubtedly apocryphal, exaggerated, or even malicious, but they underscore distinct attitudes which might be called Costa Rican "class consciousness." Few Josefinos show reluctance in asking about the cost of the objects and furnishings in one's house. The actual cost is frequently not given, but in responding to the question, the owner may quote a price not too high and not too low. If the price is too high, the purchaser may be made to look foolish for spending so much. If the price is too low, the purchaser may seem stingy or the object considered of little value.

[9]The U.S. intelligentsia (scholars and artists) have at various times evidenced Germano-, Franco-, and Anglophile tendencies disparaging the American masses and popular culture. The elitist attitude toward forms of entertainment is exemplified in the term, "the legitimate theater," emphasizing the superiority of expensive stage productions which are restricted to a few urban settings and are not only more expensive than the popular media, television and the cinema, but commonly involved large expenditures for social activities preceding and following performances.

We may even note a recent Russophile and Sinophile element among the intelligentsia, although the latter seems to be gaining in favor since the Russians are appearing more and more middle class, i.e., American, in attitude and behavior. While student radicals are self-confessed revolutionaries, their condemnation of the "establishment" ordinarily includes the mass, popular culture. We may consider such a tendency to be elitist in the sense that the persons who adhere to the radical ideologies believe in the superiority of their acts and thoughts to those of the mass of conforming citizens, even though these same radicals may be violently opposed to the established elite.

[10]I have seen young Costa Ricans at the Tennis Club also throw lighted cigarettes from the restaurant balcony without looking to see if anyone was on the walkway below, confirming the assertion that the affluent may also be inculto.

[11]Although the price of admission is low (3 colones, or U.S. $.35), this can represent a considerable expenditure for frivolity among the truly poor.

[12]It is quite possible that class-consciousness is stronger, or at least more overt, in those below university age. One university student said that he had found this to be true in administering a questionnaire on "scouting" for the international Boy Scout association. Costa Rican boy scouts acknowledged that scouting in Costa Rica was generally restricted to upper social classes and some of those interviewed preferred that it remain so to avoid "mixing the social classes." There are many stories of social exclusion in the secondary schools of students from poor families. Some university students acknowledged that they had acted in this biassed way. It is interesting that democratic idealism does not take root in some students until they have reached the university, by which time most of the non-rich have been eliminated from the educational system.

[13]It is worth noting that prestige is often attached to those endeavors which have little economic impact and do not receive sufficient remuneration to furnish social advancement to the upper group, such as university professor, classical musician, poet. In general these positions receive both prestige and remuneration primarily through the generosity and patronage of the ruling group. In this way many of the most talented and intelligent members of the non-elite mass are encouraged to pursue careers which cannot threaten established economic divisions of society and, at the same time, enhance the prestige of the ruling group by supporting those values which lend prestige to and legitimize existent social positions. Some will no doubt argue that many of the most vociferous dissenters are to be found in this group. While this is true, particularly for university professors, in Costa Rica as it is in the United States, it should be noted that professors are employees of the bureaucracy and dependent upon it for their livelihood and have been socialized for many years to an "ivory tower" mentality which estranges them from other members of the masses (in Costa Rica workingmen are distrustful of the motives and sincerity of the radical university students advocating social and economic advancement of the working class).

[14]Prices vary to some degree depending upon the caliber of the teams playing or the avidness of their fans, but tickets for a regular league game cost the following: Sol (the section in the sun, about two-thirds of the stadium) 6 colones, Sombra (shade section) 12 colones, Sombra Reserved seats 15 colones, Palco (box section above the Sombra seating) 20 colones. Although the prices vary, the proportions between the various sections remain roughly the same, i.e., if Sol costs 10 colones, Sombra will cost 20.

[15]The Costa Rican newspapers report studies of prostitution which give high rates of illiteracy among the prostitutes studied. We must remember, however, that many of the more successful prostitutes or "courtesans" escape detection and detention through the influence of the men with whom they are associated. Many of these women are never involved in open soliciting, which is the most dangerous activity in terms of police harassment.

CHAPTER VII
IMPLICATIONS FOR SOCIAL THEORY

The discipline of anthropology has concentrated during its short history upon non-Western peoples living in small communities. There have been relatively few urban studies, relatively few studies of modern communities, and few studies of peoples closely integrated into important Western nations. For a number of reasons of little importance here anthropology has concentrated upon primitive and peasant peoples. The result of this concentration has been a wealth of studies of "microcosmic" societies, i.e., societies circumscribed by one or a few small communities--tribal or village societies or communities sufficiently independent or isolated from the larger society of which they may be considered a part that field researchers treated them as isolates. Cultural anthropology has for this reason tended to avoid complex societies. As a result, there has not been much need to delve very deeply into theories of power since most such theories have focussed upon complex, specialized, and often highly bureaucratic states. Costa Rica presents most of the characteristics of highly developed states except for the dominant influence of agriculture and a corresponding low degree of industrialization, and smallness. Costa Rica is much smaller in area and population than nearly all industrialized nations. The Netherlands, for example, although smaller in area, has eight times Costa Rica's population. Notwithstanding, The Netherlands ranks low on the roster of industrialized nations. Because of her size, Costa Rica

is never likely to exert great influence upon world markets or world politics. Costa Rica is Western, in many respects modern, and certainly very different from many of the primitive and peasant groups usually studied by anthropologists.

Field research in San José presents certain problems other anthropologists will face in the future. First, the very existence of this city depends upon its relationship to a larger entity--the nation. An important feature of this relationship is power, since city and country neither associate nor bargain on an equal footing. Costa Rican cities were originally established as administrative and population centers for the purpose of maintaining better control over the rural areas. This is still an important feature of the relationship between San José and the nation at-large. Perhaps it should not be said that San José "exploits" the rest of the country, yet there seems little room for doubt that, with regard to distribution of material goods and wealth, of schools and government services, and of both public and private facilities of the nation, San José manages to gain most of the valuables obtained by Costa Rica as a nation. One is forced to deal with power relationships.

Once admitting the impossibility of dealing with San José as an isolated community, we reach a second problem--how to deal with the "nation." The field researcher in a far-off peasant community may be able to discount the nation as an unwanted intrusion, a "foreign" element whose occasional presence is felt but ignored by local residents. Such a portrayal may be an accurate ethnographic representation of the local village but may also unnecessarily underestimate the importance of the city or the nation in local affairs. Famine, financial inflation,

agrarian reform, revolution, taxation and a myriad of cataclysms may hit the village as a result of urban or national influences having no relation whatsoever to local causes. The local village grows or dies, flourishes or decays in part because of its relation and response to the city and the nation. Anthropologists seem dimly aware of this point; at least few anthropologists have felt compelled to examine in detail this relationship in the past.

The third problem, and the one to which we are primarily addressed, is,how to include the study of power in the study of society and culture. Not only does San José have a power position as a city, but a small group of Josefinos form an elite with vast power and influence over the life of the nation. Few anthropologists have attempted to discuss power at any length, perhaps because, in the societies they have studied, power and authority were virtually identical, or perhaps because the use of power was obvious and unworthy of comment. This is not the case in San José. As society becomes larger and more specialized, power becomes complex. Large societies offer many opportunities to concentrate power and we may anticipate that human beings will attempt to use their ingenuity to gain as much power as possible and to keep what power they have.

American anthropology has labored for long under the influence of theoretical perspectives best classified as "functional" and "equilibrium" theories. While these theories have undergone great elaboration over the years, our concern with such theories is their general tendency to overlook the exploitation of one member of a society by another through the superior position of the exploiter, that is, by using power.

Anthropologists have recognized that such behavior is all too human and too frequent. Why then do anthropologists treat human societies as functioning wholes where the parts seem to be happily melded into a whole which benefits everyone? This is an exaggeration of the functionalist viewpoint, but only an exaggeration. Few functionalists would argue, as is argued here, that the many elements in a culture "function" for the benefit of the elite with little benefit to the rest of society. Equilibrium theory attributes social equilibrium to "shared values" but few theorists would argue, as argued here, that these values are the values of the elite, slightly modified and forced upon the rest of society through every social institution.

We will concentrate here upon those authors who have discussed power in a manner compatible with the foregoing description of power in Costa Rica. As for the other social scientists, the vast majority, who have either not attempted to write about power, or who have held a different view than that about to be presented, little will be said here. Suffice it to mention that the mainstream of American sociology and anthropology ignores the realities of power. For example, Alvin Gouldner (1970:300ff.) argues convincingly that Talcott Parsons, whom Gouldner considers the most influential contemporary sociologist, ignores one important element of society--the rich. What bothers Gouldner is not Parsons' slighting of the rich in his theoretical formulations, but a distortion of certain obvious facts about the rich, i.e., that they have power far beyond their numbers and votes and that they continue to exert this power, democratic values notwithstanding. This, of course, is the contention of our discussion of the ruling elite in Costa Rica.

The ability to ignore the obvious depends upon a functionalist interpretation of society, which concentrates upon a description of social structure in terms of equilibrium based upon shared value orientations. Such interpretations ignore the simple fact that holders of power write the rules and manipulate them to their best advantage. It takes no cynic to recognize that people ordinarily choose themselves, and by extension their group, as beneficiaries of their actions. Logically, those with the greatest means to attain benefits for themselves will use those means whenever possible.[1]

Gouldner (1970:307) objects to Parsons' treatment of property in which possession appears to be a role relationship. Private property involves relationships between persons and things regulated by the state by means of the use of force "personally, directly, and routinely" (Gouldner 1970:310). Thus, property does not automatically entail the moral force implicit in strictly personal relations.

> To say that private property exists in a society is to say that some considerable part of the valuables in that society has been preempted by individuals who have the legal right to exclude all others from their use, whatever their "need" may be [Gouldner 1970:309].

The existence of private property defined by law grants power to those who possess it, and that power increases in accordance with the extent and proportion of property possessed. The authority to define and regulate private property suggests great power. Where this authority is combined with a disproportionately great possession of property, a power position is implied which dwarfs all others. While agreeing with Gouldner's viewpoint and his criticism of Parsons, we have here treated power as distinct from wealth or the possession of property

for the very reason that the correlation of wealth is likely to achieve. Although it is clear that the members of the elite of whom we have spoken have control over national wealth, we have neglected this subject in favor of analysis of the many ways in which power accrues to them through avenues related to their wealth indirectly. At this point in history, with Costa Rica inextricably involved in world trade, power can hardly be dissociated from wealth and the control of wealth. We will, nevertheless, concentrate upon power, keeping always in mind that wealth lurks in the shadows of our discussion.

In contrast to theories of social equilibrium are many theories, often diverse, formulated by thinkers who have concentrated not on the harmony of social life but on its disharmony, disequilibrium, injustice, inequality and discontents. The first to come to mind historically, perhaps because his name has inspired such distaste among his opponents, is Machiavelli. Simply by taking a cold, pragmatic look at the way the Prince might most efficiently maintain his princedom intact and under his control, Machiavelli incurred the ire of generations of well-meaning thinkers. His crime was that he was "amoral," i.e., he viewed means pragmatically in terms of success rather than morality. This, of course, is repugnant to contemporary democratic liberal thinking, and although it would seem to be consonant with objective science, is not compatible with social science, which is moralistic. (While social scientists make claim to objectivity, at least in empirical investigations, their very existence depends upon their ability to justify work which must be done on the basis of favorable results which their study can have for social change, i.e., they must have some moral goal, however

ephemeral it might be, and, as most social scientists recognize, one's goals have a great influence over the direction which investigations take and the conclusions derived from them.)

Modern pragmatic social theory often bears a tinge of Machiavelli to it. Unlike Machiavelli, however, it consists not of a treatise, a "handbook" for the Prince but an appraisal of the Prince's modern counterpart--the ruling class--and the resulting theories and studies are potentially revolutionary handbooks. A common theme of these "disequilibrium theorists is the conflict between the rulers and the ruled, but, like Machiavelli, the tendency has been to concentrate upon the rulers, the "elite," the ruling class, or "power elite."[2]

Historically the boundaries of the ruling class or elite have been well drawn, as with, for example, titled nobility. The significance of class distinctions was often clearly revealed in legal principles involving rights and immunities for those having titles, heritability of titles and the relation between landownership and title. It may be thought that the abolition of officially recognized titles in most modern Western States has democratized social and political elites, or even obliterated the boundary between the ruling group and the masses. Genealogical data from Costa Rica suggests the opposite. The persistence of the political importance of the descendants of important colonial families has continued to the present day. Democratic processes have been incorporated, peacefully, without seriously threatening the power of these families. In the twentieth century, the elitist tone of Costa Rican politics can be perceived through even a superficial examination of political leaders. Ricardo Jiménez Oreamuno who was

president three times between 1910 and 1936 and who is considered by many as the founder of Costa Rican democracy, was directly related by blood and marriage to the most dominant political families of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries and placed close relatives in many of the key political posts of the government. Although President Figueres appears to be an exception, many members of his family have married into the traditional upper class and the descendants of the important families continue to occupy top positions in cabinet ministries and other important government posts.[3]

Trade-union movements in Costa Rica have been singularly unsuccessful in recruiting members in Costa Rica. In 1971-1972 physicians, hospital workers, and teachers waged successful strikes while tradesmen and blue collar workers remained quiet. The Communist Pary grew out of the General Workers Confederation, directed by Jorge Volio, and has numbered among its influential members Carlos Luis Fallas. Both men were descendants of Juan Vázquez de Coronado. Ironically, under the regime of Rafael Calderón Guardia 1940-44, considered by many to have been elitist, the Communists joined with Calderón and the clergy. The relationship between political position and membership in historically important families has been convincingly portrayed by Stone (1971) and the two factors combined provide an excellent measure of membership in the Costa Rican elite.

The study of elites often results in viewing societies as dichotomous, or, at least, having but two primary diversions. It is to be noted that other social scientists commonly assume, consciously or not, a

"three-class" social division. The number of divisions is conceptually important. The three-class division has tended to move away from descriptive terms like bourgeoisie, proletarian, working-class, white collar-blue collar toward the more basic, if less precise, upper-middle- and lower-class. The natural hierarchical ordering of the latter three categories is interesting, but most interesting is the term "middle-class," which seems both in denotation and connotation to imply some sort of continuum rather than the dichotomous separation emphasized by elite theories. Three-sided conflict is difficult to manage conceptually, just as dichotomous categories lead naturally toward concepts of conflict. We must, in fact, be on our guard lest such primitive categories lead us logically toward viewpoints which distort the real meaning of human behavior. Elements of both types of theory will be used here; emphasizing ruling class and conflict theories. Functionalism is seen in a new light: The parts of society function in such a way as to benefit the ruling class (which is the only "class" existing) or, at least, the ruling class benefits so disproportionately as to characterize "functions" in this way. Equilibrium may be present, but an equilibrium issuing from conflict, control and accomodation rather than shared values. An intermediary group, not class, lies between the ruling class and the "masses" because the ruling group needs support, technical skills, intermediaries and recruits. The ruling class is a class because its boundaries are fairly clear while the boundaries of other groups are vague or ambiguous.

We have already compared the distortion implicit in vertical orderings (see figures 1 and 2) and need not belabor the point here,

except to reiterate our contention that power in society and geography is best represented in terms of central core and periphery. Henceforth, we will be concerned with the development of theories of elites in sociology. We continue to view elites as central cores rather than uppermost vertical strata.

The Ruling Class

Logically, we must start with Pareto and Mosca, since they are perhaps the earliest of modern social scientists to discuss elitism and power. Mosca is chosen here as the best representative since the concept of ruling class is the central theme of his work, while Pareto's "elite" is a significant but subordinate element in a very complex sociological scheme. These two scholars had much in common intellectually despite an historical rivalry, and it seems sufficient here to treat only one of them.

Mosca came to distrust representative government because he felt that a ruling class was the inevitable result of political society. The ruling class, for Mosca, consists of an active minority which is in control of power and authority in every society. This led him to the idea that so-called "democratic" government is a farce, a screen for oligarchical rule. While this point of view generally fits the picture drawn here of Costa Rica, we need not conclude with Mosca that the introduction of democratic processes is less desirable than the maintenance of old aristocracies. There are many reasons why a ruling group may decide to grant concessions to other sectors of society; these concessions may result in real benefits to the others and may even be the basis for later shifts in the distribution of power. If we look at Costa

Rica, we can see that the shift from an export economy based exclusively upon coffee to a modernizing and importing nation with some light industry and the development of other agricultural export crops corresponded to a shift from a simple land-ownership-to-power relation to a complicated market economy in which many skills were needed and wealth and political power were no longer sufficient to maintain the ruling group's dominance. As a result the ruling group "democratized," made some concessions in order to train a class of technicians to serve the changing economic needs. Although the same hereditary group appears to continue in political power, the new situation offers limited opportunities for social mobility which were absent before. (We must remember that we are discussing theories and that the models presented are simplified versions of what is supposed to happen in fact. For instance, it is clear that families of newcomers have consistently married into the Costa Rican upper class, so that this group is not truly "endogamous," if we insist upon exclusiveness characteristic of caste societies. Nevertheless, exogamous marriages have followed a consistent pattern, e.g., marriage with rich or powerful foreigners. The equilibrium theorists correctly recognize that society is dynamic and not static.)

Mosca begins his book by distinguishing the "science" of discovering the laws of society (referring specifically to the production and distribution of wealth) and the "art" of amassing and keeping wealth (1939:1). He mentions wealth specifically because he disagrees with his contempories who attempted to explain human history in strictly economic terms. Mosca seems to focus upon the "science" of studying

the "art," i.e., rather than examining the distribution of wealth or power, Mosca is intrigued by those who have them and keep them. He argues against the Spencerian "struggle for existence," and in so doing comes to a different conclusion than Spencer:

> If we consider, rather, the inner ferment that goes on within the body of every society, we see at once that the struggle for preeminence is far more conspicuous there than the struggle for existence. Competition between individuals of every social unit is focused upon higher position, wealth, authority, control of the means and instruments that enable a person to direct many human activities, many human wills, as he sees fit. The losers, who are of course the majority in that sort of struggle, are not devoured, destroyed or even kept from reproducing their kind, as is basically characteristic of the struggle for life. They merely enjoy fewer material satisfactions and, especially, less freedom and independence (1939:30).

This citation represents many concepts important to Mosca's scheme. First of all, it is clear that this is what we may call a "conflict" theory, i.e., "competition" and "ferment" are universal social facts. Secondly, this competition is directed toward attaining power. The term "power" will be used here in much the sense Mosca uses it, "control of the means and instruments that enable a person to direct human activities and wills." This is not far from Weber's (1967:323) concept of power as "the possibility of imposing one's will upon the behavior of other persons." "Control" is preferrred to the "possibility" of control in being more specific, concrete, and hopefully, measurable. Thirdly, one of the most important aspects of Mosca's thinking is the dichotomy between winners and losers in the "struggle for preeminence." This, of course, is the justification for describing the ruling group as a "class." Perhaps Pareto's term, "elite," is preferable to "class" since the latter evokes both emotional and intellectual sentiments which

often impede objective discussion, but it must be admitted that "class" suggests a rigid boundary between groups which is obviously implied by the separation of winners and losers. For Mosca the distinction between rulers and ruled is the single most important social division.

Mosca insists that the ruling class is always a minority. Dahrendorf (1959:197) disputes this, but Dahrendorf is concerned with "imperatively coordinated associations," which need not be "societies." We may view many events in terms of majorities imposing their will upon minorities, but it is difficult indeed to imagine a society of substantial size with a ruling majority.[4] Behind the concept of the minority is the concept of organization. By this Mosca means that the ruling class is organized while the others are not. We may accept this statement (at least for Costa Rica) without accepting the logic Mosca uses. This class is organized not "because it is a minority" and organized minorities come to rule, as asserted by Mosca, but because organization is required for rule, that is, control and governing, and because agreement and consensus are facilitated by small groups, especially when there is a larger and potentially hostile mass.

Questions of minority or majority rule may not be pertinent to the conceptual scheme which we have developed. While the Costa Rican elite is numerically quite small, it is concentrated in San José and its supporters, i.e., the middle class, are visibly dominant in San José Center, giving San José, and by extension Costa Rica, its middle-class character. That the majority of Costa Ricans are poor peasants or farmers is not particularly relevant to an analysis of the political and social structure, except to emphasize the inequality of the distribution

of wealth and power. Agricultural workers, dispersed throughout national territory, do not form a group in the sense that the elite or middle class may be viewed as united by residential proximity, cultural homogeneity, and economic interests. We have demonstrated that the elite and middle class combined form but a small part of the national population, but this does not mean that population figures are an absolute measure. For instance, Costa Rican Presidents are elected by majority vote of qualified citizens required to vote. It would be rash, nevertheless, to argue that the majority of Costa Ricans take an active part in the selection of a President. Where the term majority means a statistical headcount, social relevance is highly suspect. Society consists of interlocking relationships which are not amenable to simple quantification. In Costa Rica, for example, we might speak of the "White majority" since Whites and Indians are culturally and geographically separate, with the latter group much smaller in number. To speak of the "peasant majority" would not make much sense.

Mosca seems to be referring to the presence or absence of organization rather than the degree of organization or disorganization, the latter being also an important factor in society although one very difficult to clarify. We might argue, however, that the ruling class simply gives the appearance of organization because it exercises the administrative duties of the State, which are in themselves organized. We are confronted with a problem here; one that could be essential to power theory. If we are to assert the presence of a ruling group, how do we demonstrate that it is a group. For Costa Rica this has been done principally by influence, i.e., the continued occupancy of important

political posts by an intermarrying group over many generations seems to demonstrate an hereditary ruling elite just as much as if formal laws provided for an hereditary aristocracy. We wonder, nevertheless, how it is that this group is able to maintain intra-group discipline to the extent that the process continues without a formal statement of the rules. To a large extent this is possible because of an elite consensus which is derived from common interests, common socialization, frequency of intra-group interaction, etc., plus the obvious implications of affinal obligations extended laterally throughout the group.

Possibly a more important factor in elite consensus in Costa Rica is the concentration of power. The minority principle operates from a natural principle of concentration of power, i.e., as we have seen, San José exercises great power over the nation not simply by being the capital city, but more importantly by concentrating the control of various national activities. To put this simply, we can imagine a railway network--whoever controls a few hundred feet of railroad tracks in a railway station is much more powerful than he who controls a few hundred feet of track on a side spur.

Mosca's dichotomy between the ruling minority and the majority mass overlooks the simple fact that there often exist minorities which do not rule, which have little political power, so that his argument that a minority is organized because it is a minority does not lead logically to the notion that the minority is a ruling minority. Michels (1962), sympathetic to Mosca but writing somewhat later in 1915, argues the case better. He is concerned with what he considers a basic social principle,

"the iron law of oligarchy," in which he asserts that political organizations, regardless of the social class from which they derive their momentum, goals, and support, inevitably end in oligarchic ruling minorities.

> By a universally applicable social law, every organ of the collectivity, brought into existence through the need for the division of labor, creates for itself, as soon as it becomes consolidated, interests peculiar to itself. The existence of these special interests involves a necessary conflict with the interests of the collectivity [1962:353].

He insists that society must have a ruling class, or what could be also called a "political" or "dominant" class. He sees a natural process by which revolutionary organizations automatically develop ruling elites which, because of their elite position, develop interests in opposition to the collectivity which they represent. As has already been suggested, in Costa Rica dissenting groups such as the Communist Party and the National Liberation Party are often led by dissenting numbers of the national elite even though rank and file members are recruited from the masses. In Michels' view, the evolution of political parties always ends in oligarchic organization prior to assuming power. Recasting Mosca in this context, we could say that the ruling group does not rule because it is a minority (Mosca does not go this far, but it seems a logical extension of what he does say), but that organization itself leads to supervision and control by a tightly organized minority or oligarchy, which displays an economical use of energy by concentrating power with limited accessibility.

Mosca's basic organizational typology, which is a continuum, consists simply in a distinction between "feudal" organization and "bureaucratic" organization, the former applicable to those societies in which,

> all the executive functions of society--the economic, the judicial, the administrative, the military--are exercised simultaneously by the same individuals [1939:81].

In bureaucratic organization, specialization is present in which these functions are not held by the same individuals (1939:83). Mosca does not insist that either type may be found in its pure form, but, rather, that societies vary between extremes of concentration and specialization of executive functions. The concept here expressed is familiar to social scientists from notions of progressive, evolutionary specialization in the division of labor (Durkheim 1964) and especially among German writers who distinguished between "rational" bureaucracies based on training for specialized organizational services (Weber 1967) and the personal-impersonal distinction between community and society (Toennies 1957). Mosca (1939:82) relates feudal organization to societies in which wealth is derived almost exclusively from land. While small political units based upon commerce and industry often exhibit feudal characteristics in their organization, larger societies in which commerce and industry provide wealth are generally bureaucratically oriented. The rise of bureaucracy, Mosca notes, commonly takes the form of taxing social wealth in order to support the military and provide specialized public services.

If we apply these concepts to Costa Rica and Latin America some interesting results are possible. Latin America has been categorized as personalistic or particularistic (Lipset 1967:7), in contrast to universalistic organization prevalent in the United States, England and Germany. We note as well that throughout Latin American history land provided the major source of wealth and only the more industrialized states seem to have changed this in recent times. Politics in Latin

America under republican regimes has traditionally centered aroung caudillos, roughly, "leaders" or "political bosses," rather than permanent political parties with firm ideological commitments.

In general, Costa Rica has been characterized as having personalistic politics rather than ideological parties. This was certainly true before World War II, as noted by a writer of the time:

> In Costa Rica, political parties with definite orientation or tendencies do not exist. Every four years, one year before the termination of the tenure of the President of the Republic, as many groups are formed as there are candidates for the electoral campaign which is beginning....
>
> There are, of course, liberals and conservatives, but their ideology is a personal matter and has no impact upon public sentiment [Quijano 1939:33].

Two recent studies of Costa Rican politics take different stands on this issue. Both deal at length with the National Liberation Party (PLN) which has managed to maintain a strong political organization for more than twenty years, even between elections. To English (1971) this is strong evidence that Costa Rica is moving away from her former personalistic caudillismo toward the establishment of "modern" political parties, while Denton (1971:106-107) views the organizational strength of the PLN skeptically, seeing its continued existence dependent upon the success of Figueres, who, in turn, must rely upon support from the "prestige" class to such an extent that the PLN can no longer claim to be the revolutionary party it once appeared to be. English (1971:155) admits that the establishment of the PLN was due in large part to the "charisma" of Figueres. Unfortunately for English's assertion that PLN is a "modern" political party with permanent organization and ideological commitment, the party has never tested its ability to survive without

Figueres' dominance (only one other presidential candidate besides Figueres has been elected). "Charisma" is simply another word for personalism, though perhaps stronger and more favorable in connotation.[5]

Costa Rica appears to be neither feudal nor bureaucratic at the extremes of Mosca's continuum. But in studying the biographies of important political figures we rarely find political career specialization characteristic of the stereotyped rational bureaucracy. Politicians commonly occupy different posts which appear to have little in common, suggesting Mosca's "feudal organization" in which all spheres of organizational activity are centered in a single ruling group without specialized training. For example, President Ricardo Jiménez during his career was Secretary of Foreign Relations, Secretary of Police, President of the Supreme Court, and several times a Legislator. His brother Manuel de Jesús was at different times Secretary of Foreign Relations, Public Instruction, Police, and Commerce. President León Cortés moved from Secretary of Education to Secretary of Agriculture. Another indication of the unimportance of specialized training is the large number of physicians who have been Presidents of Costa Rica, e.g., Castro Madriz, Montealegre Fernández, Carlos Durán, and Calderón Guardia. While it can be argued that in a relatively poor nation, those with extensive education are likely to assume important positions, we must note that education has generally been restricted to the children of the elite. The physicians mentioned above can be shown to have had important political kinsmen, which fact seems to have been important in their choice to move from their chosen profession to the political arena. Such career patterns suggest a feudal type of organization, yet all the

positions noted formed part of a constantly growing bureacracy in which specialization is assumed for rank-and-file, if not for leaders.

The feudal system of which Mosca writes is another example of central core domination. Individuals, by occupying numerous key positions, are able to concentrate in a few hands many apparently separable systems or institutions. In a bureaucratic system which is too complex for this sort of domination, an elite may still control the organizational structures of society either by concentrating on key institutions, such as legislatures or banking systems, or through a holding-company extension of corporate privilege. In addition, any combination of these forms of control may be employed.

Mosca (1939:83) notes that bureaucratization encourages the ruling class to act as a whole, with a prominent and powerful group within the ruling class exercising authority. Elaborating on this theme, C. Wright Mills (1959) distinguishes between members of the "upper clique" of the ruling class, which is actively involved in political domination, and the rest of the members of the ruling class, who support the upper clique and benefit from their programs. The general group is much easier to delineate than the group which actually rules; the inner circle of power-holders is difficult to pinpoint. Mills (1956:Chapter 12) views the contemporary U.S. as developing a "power elite" which combines vast corporate economic power with the coercive power of the military. This is the third and latest stage in an elite evolution which started with the remnants of aristocratic colonial families, much like that described for Costa Rica in the nineteenth century, to a later stage of plural elites, loosely connected upper strata of various organizational forms.

While the power elite continues to be active politically, formal political processes do not occupy most of their attention as was the case in the 'thirties.

Contemporary Politics in Costa Rica

Stone (1971) notes a decrease since the 'thirties of Costa Rican legislators descended from the colonial families, but he does not argue that this has meant a diminution of these families' political power. Historically Mills' "power elite" in Costa Rica was easily recognizable by virtue of their direct participation in the political process; in recent decades the power of the elite has not been so obvious. One feature of Costa Rican development has altered the need for such direct participation. In the nineteenth century economic surplus was derived wholly from coffee exports. Power and wealth were controlled through ownership of large coffee plantations and a monopoly over those political processes which helped to foment the production of coffee internally and its sale abroad. In recent decades coffee has been much less profitable for its producers. Power and wealth have shifted toward mercantile endeavors so that the descendants of the large coffee-growers are now to be found as bankers, physicians, importers and exporters. Control of a large and growing bureaucracy reaps greater rewards than direct control of the legislature.

A great irony of Costa Rican democracy has been that as the electoral franchise has been extended, the relative power of elected officials has been reduced. For example, while the political families were in control of the presidency and the legislature, reelection was common, often through electoral fraud. In more recent times, however, laws were

passed prohibiting consecutive terms for presidents and legislators. While this would seem to prevent the establishment of caudillos, political "bosses," the effect of such laws is to enhance the position of non-elected power-holders. This is true because (1) it is difficult for an individual to attain political influence through the support of a constituency; (2) with the possible exception of Figueres' National Liberation Party, no political party in Costa Rica has maintained a party organization between elections so that political influence of minor politicians depends upon personal loyalties to important leaders rather than identification with party or ideology; (3) candidates for the legislature are ranked by the party leaders so that candidates at the top of the list assume the seats won by the party, thus intensifying personal loyalties and reducing the importance of popular support. In addition, the last three decades have seen the establishment of "autonomous institutions," derived from nationalization of the banks, public utilities, government housing, etc., over which the legislature has little control. These corporations, combined with the government ministries under the President determine and control the bulk of government revenues and expenditures. The end result is simple: the public has no control over the direction which Costa Rica takes.

The only choice which the public can make which will affect its destiny is the choosing of the President. This, however, has also been amply curtailed by law. Campaign expenses are reimbursed from government funds in proportion to votes obtained, with the restriction that a party so compensated must obtain five percent of the votes cast. This means that if and when a majority of wealthy Costa Ricans decide to

support a presidential candidate, they may do so without any financial sacrifice. On the other hand, few individuals are likely to support a candidate whose vote-gathering abilities appear slight. It should be obvious, also, that financial supporters gain the political patronage of successful candidates. In the 1974 election the laws were changed to reimburse candidates before the election reducing the dependence of candidates on rich capitalists. It is also argued that the government subsidy of campaign expenses permits the compensation of those candidates who are unable to rely upon wealthy supporters, i.e., since the government pays, the candidates are not beholden to the rich. This would be true, of course, if all candidates were reimbursed during the campaign. However, it is virtually impossible to become a serious candidate without some support from wealthy individuals.

At first glance, the National Liberation Party may be thought to be an exception to the pattern described above, as a well-organized and continuing political party with significant popular support and participation. English (1971) portrays the party in this manner although he also expresses serious doubts about the party's ability to maintain its strength in the future (p. 64) and considers the charisma of Figueres as one of the prime elements in the persistent strength of the party (p. 155). While the National Liberation Party has a complex and persistent organization, it can be seen that the economic position of its members influences personal power. Members are assessed for campaign contributions and higher positions within the party organization incur higher assessment. Affluent members or supporters are solicited

for "loans" to be repaid following elections. Elected officials are asked to pay ten percent of their salaries to the party coffers. Although English does not state this, he infers that only "loans" are repaid, since government compensation never equals campaign expenses and "lending members have never been paid back in full" (1971:76). Thus, the wealthier supporters seem to contribute less in proportion to their wealth than do the poorer members. Nevertheless, their influence is great:

> ...the wealthy persons in the PLN, as in most Western parties, retain economic power in decision-making circles that is disproportionate to their numbers. Since most affluent members are associated with the party's conservative wing, leftist elements convincingly argue that the system is weighted in favor of the right [English 1971:77].

In addition, the party's candidates are chosen by the top echelons of the party organization, so that the rank and file membership of the party seems to have as little voice in the party as the Costa Rican people have in government.

In sum, the reduction of elite membership in the Costa Rican legislature does not reflect a diminution of traditional power bases. The democratization of the electoral process has gone hand-in-hand with a deterioration in the power of elected officials. The ruling class has given the reins of government to the masses but has kept the horses and the carriage.

The Origin of Inequality

Ralf Dahrendorf argues that inequality is a fact of social living and that inequality is a prerequisite of society. Instead of viewing the social contract as general consensus, Dahrendorf considers it as "nothing but the idea of the institution of compulsory social norms

backed by sanctions" (1968:166-67). He draws this direct relation between society and law and its sanctions in the following manner: (1) The stability of association requires sanctions against certain forms of non-conforming behavior. (2) Applications of sanctions require at the very least an inequality which distinguishes those applying the sanctions and those who are sanctioned--"There is inequality because there is law" (1968:169). (3) Not only is discrimination through sanction applied to random behavior but also against social positions that keep people from complying with established norms.[6] (4) Social stratification is thus a system of distributive status whose structure is preceded by a power structure. Hence, (5) "...established or ruling values of a society may be studied in their purest form by looking at its upper class" (1968:174).

The scheme is plausible: Existing differential distribution of power enables those possessing the most power to attain control over the sanctioning agencies developing in a society and this control and the sanctions emanating therefrom establish the social statuses of the society. In this particular presentation, Dahrendorf speaks in the abstract. To make the process convincing rather than merely plausible, we must apply it to concrete examples. Rather than looking at Dahrendorf's other work, our purpose is served by using Costa Rica as an example. Costa Rica was historically one of the poorest colonies of the New World, providing little gold or other exportable natural products of value, having relatively few exploitable Indians for labor, and being relatively isolated from important commercial and political colonial centers. The majority of migrants to Costa Rica allegedly went there with the

intention of being small farmers and this is what most became. The only social, economic, or political distinction was between hidalgos, "gentlemen," and the commoners. The hidalgos had more land, but this land meant little in terms of wealth. And so Costa Rica drowsily continued for more than half its history--until coffee. Coffee brought wealth and eventually modernity. Yet what appeared to be a minor distinction between the well-born and the masses became suddenly the distinction between the great coffee-growers and the little coffee-growers, the rich and the poor, the rulers and the ruled, or as the Costa Ricans often put it: "Those who have and those who have not." A minor distinction in the distribution of power set the stage for a complex social system.

Myth: Softening the Impact of Inequality

Our discussions of Costa Rican history seem to have confirmed Levi-Strauss' (1967:205) contention that politics makes history into myth.[7] Costa Rican history has been presented by Costa Rican historians in such a way as to constantly minimize social distinctions and to provide an historical model which legitimizes the current political system. We note a constant allusion to the poverty of the colonial period, in which every man had his parcel of land and worked it himself and treated everyone else as an equal and formed the basis for modern Costa Rican democracy. There is very little evidence for such egalitarianism and a great deal of evidence indicating that the hidalgos continued throughout the colonial period to have greater wealth, power, privilege and social standing than others. It has also been argued that there were relatively few Indians in Costa Rica, which accounts for the

fact that the patron-Peon social class system found elsewhere did not flourish in Costa Rica. It is true that there were probably not many Indians in Costa Rica, especially when compared to urbanized areas of America, but there were also very few colonists; Indian and Mestizo elements of the population far outnumbered any other racial group during the colonial period.

Specific political myths, especially personal myths also have an important place in politics. For instance, we can look at Mauro Fernández' impact upon education in Costa Rica. He is considered the founder of democratic public instruction in Costa Rica. There is no doubt, however, that Don Mauro's closing of the University of Santo Tomás was instrumental in preserving the special position of the wealthy by denying higher education to those who could not afford to study abroad.

Political mythology need not be inaccurate or even controversial. Its importance as mythology depends not upon its veracity; this is a matter for scholars only. The importance of mythology is that it provides an explanation of society. We have seen how the historical perspective of Costa Rican ideology asserts that Costa Rica is now democratic and egalitarian and that this model of current social structure is a logical development of conditions which allegedly existed in the past. It is important to realize that this ideology is not the fabrication of an evil genius. It is instead a "folk" history, the "folk" in this case being the elite. Members of the elite can misconstrue present or past events just as much as the poor and uneducated. We can anticipate that historical reconstructions are most acceptable when they

cast in a favorable light the antecedents of present conditions. This is particularly true for the elite, which is anxious to validate its position or minimize outside perception of its power. Since the elite is in the best position to disseminate its view of society, elite "folk" history has the best chance for success.

The folk history of Costa Rica is not the simple product of the processes mentioned above. It should be obvious that the picture presented was adopted from philosophical and religious models. From the French enlightenment comes the Rouseauian idea of the corrupting influence of civilization. Costa Rican ideology stresses isolation, dispersal and poverty in breeding independence, egalitarianism, and self-reliance. To the extent that social classes exist, this is attributed to the sudden wealth in coffee in the nineteenth century. Josefinos still paint an idyllic picture of the honest, simple, generous peasant and his attachment to the land to be contrasted with the dishonest and deceitful city-dweller.

Myth serves to sanctify society, to maintain a unifying identity for the members of society. Ideology, on the other hand, is that part of the mythology which expresses the social structure in sacred terms. Given a de facto distribution of power, ideology represents the power structure as a social structure. The power relations follow normative practices which are statistically normal as a result of the natural imperatives of living conditions; but the social structure makes these practices socially imperative, i.e., the accidental patterns derived from unequal distribution of power become expectations of role behavior based upon recognized statuses. Thus, normalization (by way of ideology)

of power relationships tends to eliminate disorder by the establishment of statuses with corresponding role expectations. It also defines a social structure which becomes difficult to change because governing rules are known. Since the ideology is ambiguous and generalized, conflicts and inconsistencies arise. The principles are specified in political doctrine, or the "philosophy" of state and government; conflict and inconsistency are managed by the political formula, or law.[8]

Conclusion

It would be instructive to compare Costa Rica with other Latin American countries and other countries of the Third World for parallels in elitism and the distribution of power. Ultimately we must address ourselves to the question of dependency and its impact upon social organization. As yet we have relatively few studies of elite in Latin America (Lipset and Solari 1967 and Adams 1970 are notable exceptions). It is generally assumed that many Latin American nations are controlled by important families and it would be helpful to have documented evidence of this which might furnish a basis of comparison with the materials presented concerning Costa Rica. The collection of this data is a monumental task beyond our present scope.

It remains to be seen whether or not the picture of Costa Rica presented here fits other cultural contexts, or even whether it is accepted as an accurate portrayal of Costa Rica. The majority of Costa Rican historians have painted a different picture (Garro 1971:134) of the past; the majority of Costa Rican politicians paint a different picture of the present. The most recent political studies by U.S. scholars (English 1971; Denton 1971) interpret current political develop-

ments in opposing ways. We are tempted to ask how an anthropologist dares to invade the territory in which there are already so many with special expertise. Nevertheless, anthropologists must dare to do just that if they wish to complete the study of mankind. The temptation will be very great to present specialized studies of segments of urban society. Although specialized studies are more easily conducted, validated, and reported, there is little justification for anthropologists to conduct studies where specially trained experts are already working. Instead, the anthropologist ought to apply an inductive, macro approach as well. For many anthropologists, this approach fulfills a sense of mission, which is one of the most exciting aspects of anthropological study. "Anthropology is the study of mankind at all times and all places." If we proceed to study urban society piecemeal, the quest will never approach fulfillment.

The adoption of a theoretical basis in elite theory was the result of the peculiar circumstance of an anthropologist wandering about in a city trying to make sense out of the overwhelming complexity which even the small city of San José presents. Armed with ineffectual theoretical tools of anthropology and relatively untainted by doctrinaire sociology, elite theory appeared to best explain disparate observation and experiences and present a coherent form to information and opinion gathered in and out of the field. That the disproportionate distribution of power in elite theory corresponded in a rough way to certain theoretical notions of geographers was a fortuitous discovery which seemed to argue fundamental principles echoed in the geography and society of Costa Rica. The use of a geographical model departs from the traditional tendency to view society as an organism involved in an evolutionary

process á la Parsons, Malinowski, Comte, Spencer, Marx, etc.; and, although the model deals with economy, it is not an economics model of the sort now popular in anthropology, which in varying degrees argue economic determinism, e.g., Steward, Harris, and Rappaport. One can hardly escape noticing that urban man of the twentieth century has proven his ability to act independently of the forces of nature imposed upon the naked savage. Man, the clever, handy, and self-propelled creature that he is, has organized his space according to his needs and desires; he has created his own environment; he has organized himself into groups the energy output of which is greater than the sum of individually unorganized capabilities; and he has created intellectual schemes which explain and justify all that he has done. We contend that all this cannot be explained by theories which assert that man is nothing but an organism responding to external stimuli. Anthropologists have a long time held that man's greatest invention, (human) culture, was an adaptation of revolutionary significance in the history of the world. This work is intended as a simple affirmation of that thesis.

NOTES

[1]In the discussion which follows, it may sometimes appear that society, and, thus, social structure, is a mere by-product of power. This is likely to be disturbing to the sociologist and anthropologist since such a nation may be thought to reduce the significance of the subject matter of their studies and therefore reduce their own importance. No matter: most sociologists have had no difficulty rejecting such schemes when they have been presented in the past, which is the reason so much space must be taken here in reintroducing them.

[2]Dahrendorf (1959:199) distinguishes "elite" theories, exemplified by Pareto and Mosca, from "conflict" theories in that the elite theorists place special emphasis upon ruling groups to the neglect of the residual "masses."

[3]Important leaders of Figueres' National Liberation Party, such as Jorge Rossi, ex-President Francisco Orlich, and presidential candidate Daniel Oduber are descendants of the historically important political families, although each represents a marriage between a daughter of the upper class and a rich newcomer, which may explain their loyalty to Figueres.

[4]"Majority rule" or the expression "the majority rules" can be easily dispelled as an exception to the principle of ruling minorities since the majority merely votes. We must note that in the U.S., for instance, voting is commonly referred to as a "right" or a "duty"--no one has the "authority" to vote, nor is voting expressed in terms of power except by politicians and others when they wish to attribute the power they have to the voter, who, relatively speaking, has none. What was once the "Negro vote" when the Negroes were a faceless, powerless Black mass has recently been converted into "Black Power" through the adoption of extra-electoral procedures to further their claims for political participation.

> The fact that a people participates in electoral assemblies does not mean that it directs its government or that the class that is governed chooses its governors. It means merely that when the electoral function operates under favorable social conditions it is a tool by which certain political forces are enabled to control and limit the activity of other political forces [Mosca 1939:98].

[5]The leader of one's own party is "charismatic" while the leader of the opposition is "demagogic." Many Americans refer to Roosevelt as charismatic but will not use the same word to describe Hitler, who was equally charismatic.

[6]Dahrendorf uses for an example the career woman who cannot comply with the neighborhood norm of daily female gossiping, but it might be better to think in terms of immunities, i.e., some persons are exempt from the operation of certain sanctions because of the very special recognition given to the status they occupy.

[7]He contrasts the historian's view of history, viewing the past as the past, and the view of the politician, who sees certain events of the past as having transcendental political meaning.

[8]Dahrendorf (1968:19ff.) emphasizes "role" as the intersection of the society and the individual. Roles invariably involve expected behavior and the expectations are enforced by sanctions. Sanctions vary according to their compulsory nature, those which are imperative being what we ordinarily consider positive law.

APPENDIX A
DESCENDANTS OF ANTONIO DE ACOSTA AREVALO



APPENDIX B

I 1 Antonio de Acosta Arévalo

II 1 Antonia de Acosta Aguilar
2 Agustín de Alvarado Azofeifa

III 1 Antonia de Alvarado Acosta
2 Manuel de Alvarado
3 Pedro Nicolás Fernández Acosta

IV 1 Juana María Alvarado Alvarado
2 Tiburcio Sáenz
3 Petronila Chacón Aguilar
4 Félix Fernández Tenorio
5 Josefa Evarista Hidalgo Oreamuno

V 1 Cayetana Ulloa Guzman
2 Manuel Sáenz Alvarado
3 Manuel Fernández Chacón
4 Dolores Oreamuno Muñoz
5 Mariano Montealegre Bustamante
6 Jerónima Fernández Chacón
7 Joaquín Fernández Hidalgo
8 Carmen Salazar Aguado
9 Santiago Fernández Hidalgo
10 Guadalupe Salazar Aguado
11 Ana Fernández Hidalgo

VI 1 José María Castro Madriz
2 Pacífica Fernández Oreamuno
3 José María Montealegre Fernández
4 Ana María Mora Porras
5 Mariano Montealegre Fernández
6 Guadalupe Gallegos Sáenz
7 Francisco Montealegre Fernández

VII 1 Inés Aguilar Cueto
2 Juan Rafael Mora Porras
3 Cayetana de Acosta Aguilar
4 María Catarina Tenorio Castro
5 Manuel Felipe Fernández Acosta
6 José Cipriano Fernández Tenorio
7 Basilia Ramírez García
8 Manuel Carranza Aguilar
9 María Josefa Fernández Tenorio
12 Manuel Borbón
13 Rosa Fernández Hidalgo
14 Gordiano Fernández Ramírez
15 Aureliano Fernández Ramírez
16 Mercedes Acuña Diez-Dobles
17 Juana Fernández Ramírez
18 José María Jiménez Carranza
19 Práxedes Fernández Ramírez
20 Joaquina Ramírez García
21 Miguel Carranza Ramírez
8 Victoria Gallegos Sáenz
9 Jerónima Montealegre Fernández
10 Bruno Carranza Ramírez
11 Froilana Carranza Ramírez
12 Braulio Carrillo Colina
13 Domingo Carranza Ramírez
14 Inés Cueto de la Llana
4 Juan Fernández
6 María Josefa Umaña Corrales
10 María Eulalia Fernández Umaña
11 José Hermenegildo de Aguilar Siles
12 Lucía Fernández Umaña
13 José Mateo de Mora Valverde
22 Josefa de la Luz Chacón Aguilar
23 Miguel Antonio Aguilar Fernández
24 Feliciana Mora Fernández
25 Eusebio Rodríguez Castro
26 Juan Mora Fernández
27 Juana Castillo Palacios
28 Antonia Mercedes Mora Fernández
29 Hilario Zeledón Masís
15 Manuel Aguilar Chacón
16 Sebastián Rodríguez Mora
17 Francisca Zeledón
18 Pedro Zeledón Mora
19 Florentino Zeledón Mora
20 Celedonio Zeledón Mora

APPENDIX B
FAMILY SAENZ ULLOA

Generation



I 1 Manuel Mercedes Sáenz Alvarado
2 María Cayetana Ulloa Guzmán

II 1 Anselmo Sáenz Ulloa
2 María de la Rosa Bonilla
3 Rafael Gallegos Alvarado
4 María Ignacia Sáenz Ulloa
5 Diego María Sáenz Ulloa
6 Micaela Carazo Bonilla
7 José Nicolás Sáenz Ulloa
8 Domitila Carazo Bonilla
9 Francisco Javier Sáenz Ulloa
10 Margarita Llorente Lafuente
11 Cipriano Fernández Tenorio
12 María Sáenz Ulloa

III 1 Rafael Gallegos Sáenz
2 Mariano Montealegre Fernández
3 Guadalupe Gallegos Sáenz
4 Francisco Montealegre Fernández
5 Victoria Gallegos Sáenz
6 Luis Diego Sáenz Carazo
7 Brígida Chavarría Alvarado
8 Agapito Jiménez Zamora
9 Inés Sáenz Carazo
10 Andrés Sáenz Llorente
11 Mercedes Sandoval Pérez
12 Vicente Sáenz Llorente
13 Marcelina Esquivel Fernández
14 Pascual Sáenz Llorente

IV 1 Julia Sáenz Sandoval
2 Maximino Esquivel Echandi
3 Miguel Narciso Esquivel Sáenz
4 Rosa Sáenz Sandoval
5 Carlos Sáenz Esquivel
6 Celina Herrera

V 1 Julio Esquivel Sáenz
2 Adelia Valverde Carranza
3 Jaime Esquivel Sáenz
4 Julia Salazar
5 José Joaquín Esquivel Carrillo
6 Oliva Esquivel Sáenz



II 13 Narciso Esquivel Salazar
III 15 Aniceto Esquivel Sáenz
16 Isaura Carazo Peralta
17 ? ? Flores
18 José Antonio Esquivel Sáenz
19 Salomé Sáenz Carazo
20 Miguel Narciso Esquivel Sáenz
21 Rosa Sáenz Sandoval
22 Teodora Echandi
IV 7 Roberto Esquivel Echandi
8 Arabela Bonilla Mora
9 Fabián Esquivel Flores
10 Carmen Fábrega Fábrega
11 Julia Sáenz Sandoval
12 Maximino Esquivel Echandi
V 7 José Joaquín Peralta Esquivel
8 Adela Esquivel Bonilla
9 Carlos Peralta Echavarría
10 Angela Esquivel Fábrega
11 Julio Esquivel Sáenz
12 Adelia Valverde Carranza
VI 1 Manuel Escalante Durán
2 Marta Peralta Esquivel

14 María Ursula Sáenz Ulloa
23 Manuel de Jesús Esquivel Sáenz
24 Dolores Carrillo
25 Camilo Esquivel Sáenz
26 Pacífica Sáenz Carazo
27 Macedonio Esquivel Sáenz
28 Manuel María Esquivel Sáenz

13 José Joaquín Esquivel Carrillo
14 Oliva Esquivel Sáenz
15 Francisco Esquivel Sáenz
16 Adelia Valverde Carranza

13 Jaime Esquivel Sáenz
14 Julia Salazar
15 José Joaquín Esquivel Carrillo
16 Oliva Esquivel Sáenz
17 Francisco Esquivel Ugalde
18 Claudia Jiménez Zavaleta

3 José Joaquín Peralta Esquivel
4 Adela Esquivel Bonilla

APPENDIX C
FAMILY ECHAVARRIA (ALVARADO)



1 José Nicolás Chavarría Sarmiento
2 Paulina Fajardo García
3 Félix Ubaldo Chavarría Pacheco
4 Ana Josefa Echavarría Fajardo
5 Manuel María de Peralta y Corral
6 Bernardino Peralta Alvarado
7 María Toribia Peralta Echavarría
8 Manuel José Carazo Bonilla
9 Micaela Carazo Bonilla
10 Diego Nicolás Sáenz Ulloa
11 Luis Diego Sáenz Carazo
12 Natalia Carazo Peralta
13 Joaquín Oreamuno Carazo
14 Angela María Chavarría Sarmiento
15 María Práxedes Alvarado Carazo
16 Félix Chavarría Sarmiento
17 Santiago Fernández Hidalgo
18 Guadalupe Salazar Aguado
19 Dolores Salazar Aguado
20 Vicente Aguilar Cubero
21 Juana Aguilar Salazar
22 Santiago Fernández Salazar
23 Francisco Echavarría Alvarado
24 María Echavarría Alvarado
25 Marta Echavarría Alvarado
26 Brígida Echavarría Alvarado
27 Carlos Echavarría Alvarado
28 María Joaquina Echavarría Alvarado

APPENDIX D
DESCENDANTS OF JUAN VAZQUEZ DE CORONADO



APPENDIX E
FAMILY MORA PORRAS

Generation



I 1 Camilo Mora Alvarado
2 Ana Benita Porras Ulloa

II 1 José María Cañas
2 Guadalupe Mora Porras
3 Manuel Joaquín Gutiérrez Peñamonje
4 Rosa Mora Porras
5 José María Montealegre Fernández
6 Ana María Mora Porras
7 José Joaquín Mora Porras
8 Dolores Gutiérrez Peñamonje
9 José Antonio Chamorro Gutiérrez
10 Juana Mora Porras
11 Juan Rafael Mora Porras
12 Inés Aguilar Cueto
13 Toribio Argüello
14 Mercedes Mora Porras
15 Miguel Mora Porras
16 Felipa Montes de Oca Gamero

III 1 José María Montelegre Mora
2 Ramona Iglesias Castro
3 Sara Montealegre Mora
4 Rafael Gallegos Sáenz
5 Diego Chamorro Mora
6 María Josefa Gutiérrez Peñamonje
7 Manuel Argüello Mora
8 Anita de Vars

APPENDIX F
FAMILY QUIROS

Generation



I 1 Calixto Quirós

II 1 Pablo Quirós Jiménez
2 Mercedes Segura Masís
3 Ascensión Quirós Jiménez
4 Bartola Montero Zamora
5 Remigio Quirós Jiménez

III 1 Teresa Aguilar Guzmán
2 Juan Bautista Quirós Segura
3 Clementina Quirós Fonseca
4 Evarista Quirós Solera
5 Rafaela Quirós Montero
6 José Quirós Montero
7 Florinda Fonseca González
8 Arcadio Quirós Fonseca
9 Amelia Troyo Fonseca

2 Ramona Jiménez Soto
6 Nicolasa Fonseca González
7 Bernarda Marín
8 Pedro Quirós Jiménez
9 Dolores Aguilar Castro

10 Jacinto Guzmán
11 Victoria Quirós Marín
12 Pedro Quirós Aguilar
13 Adela Quirós Fonseca
14 José Joaquín Trejos Fernández
15 Aurelia Quirós Aguilar
16 Justo Quirós Montero
17 María Quirós Aguilar

APPENDIX G
KINSHIP RELATIONSHIPS OF THIRTEEN COSTA RICAN CHIEFS OF STATE



□ = chief of state

1 Mariano Montealegre Bustamante
2 Jerónima Fernández Chacón
3 Manuel Fernández Chacón
4 Dolores Oreamuno Muñoz
5 Tomás Guardia Gutiérrez
6 Cristina Guardia Gutiérrez
7 Próspero Fernández Oreamuno
8 Pacífica Fernández Oreamuno
9 José María Castro Madriz
10 Manuel Aguilar Chacón
11 Inés Cueto de la Llana
12 Pacífica Fernández Guardia
13 Bernardo Soto Alfaro
14 Euxodia Castro Fernández
15 Demetrio Iglesias Llorente
16 María Joaquina Iglesias Llorente
17 Saturnino Tinoco López
18 Inés Aguilar Cueto
19 Juan Mora Porras
20 Ana María Mora Porras
21 José María Montealegre Fernández
22 Joaquina Montealegre Fernández
23 Bruno Carranza Ramírez
24 Froilana Carranza Ramírez
25 Braulio Carrillo Colina
26 Federico Tinoco Iglesias
27 Lupita Granados Bonilla
28 José Montealegre Mora
29 Ramona Iglesias Castro
30 Rafael Iglesias Castro
31 Federico Tinoco Granados

APPENDIX H
QUESTIONNAIRE

1. What qualities do Costa Ricans share with other Latins?

2. In what ways do Costa Ricans differ from other Latins?

3. What country of the world is most like Costa Rica?

4. What are the distinctive regions of Costa Rica?

5. Do you believe there are marked inequalities dividing Costa Ricans?

6. Can you name a barrio of San José which corresponds to each of the following adjectives?

rico	"rich"
pobre	"poor"
sucio	"dirty"
limpio	"clean"
chistoso	"witty (prone to telling chistes, "jokes")
amistoso	"friendly"
intelectual	"intellectual"
culto	"cultured"
típico	"indigenous" in the sense of representing Costa Rican culture, especially the folk culture associated with the rural peoples of the Central Plateau
campesino	"rural" or "peasant"
pachuco	this adjective refers to characteristics associated with the manners and habits of a Josefino group, comprised mostly of workingclass youths, whose behavior is abrasive to other Josefinos and whose activities are often associated with petty crime.
viejo	"old"
moderno	"modern"
comercial	"commercial"
agarrado	"stingy"
pachanguero	"festive" (favorable or unfavorable depending on context)
hogareño	"stay-at-home" (can refer to anything pertaining to the home)
malo	"bad"
bueno	"good"
lindo	"pretty"
feo	"ugly"

liberacionista	refers to adherents of Costa Rica's largest political party
comunista	"communist"
patriótico	"patriotic"
politico	"political"
cortés	"courteous"
saprisista	fan of San José's best futbol team
obrero	"workingclass"
egoísta	"selfish" or "egotistical"
católico	"Catholic"
vagabundo	"vagrant," but can refer in general to anyone irresponsible
polaco	"Jewish" (eastern European immigrants to Costa Rica)
negro	"black" or "Negro"
alemán	"German"
español	"Spanish"
nocturno	"nocturnal"
peligroso	"dangerous"
pintoresco	"picturesque"
tranquilo	"quiet"
callejero	"of the street"
profesional	"professional"
bien cuidado	"well cared for"

7. What are the virtues of the Costa Rican?

8. What are the defects of the Costa Rican?

9. What kind of people listen to...? [a list of radio stations]

10. What kind of people go to...? [a list of bars, nightclubs, sodas, and various landmarks]

11. What kind of people drink...? [liquors and beers]

12. What kind of people smoke...? [cigarettes]

13. What kind of people read...? [popular periodicals]

14. What kind of people are members of...? [social clubs]

15. What kind of people attend...? [secondary schools]

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BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Ransford Comstock Pyle was born October, 1936, at Chicago, Illinois. In June, 1954, he was graduated from Phillips Academy, Andover, Massachusetts. In February, 1959, he received the degree of Ars Bacheloris with a major in Fine Arts from Harvard University. From 1959 until 1962 he served in the United States Army and was stationed in the Far East. Following his discharge from the army, he was self-employed as an artist and art instructor in Boynton Beach, Florida. In 1965 he enrolled in the Law School, University of Florida, and received the degree of Juris Doctor. In September, 1967, he enrolled in the Graduate School, University of Florida and received the degree of Master of Arts in Anthropology in September 1969. He was awarded an NDFL Title VI Fellowship and continued graduate training in anthropology toward the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. From August, 1971 to September, 1972 he pursued pre-doctoral field research in San José, Costa Rica under a Foreign Area Fellowship (Ford Foundation). In September, 1973, he became a member of the faculty of West Georgia College, serving as Assistant Professor in the Department of Sociology and Anthropology.

Ransford Comstock Pyle is married to the former Carola Agnes Norcross and is the father of three children. He is a member of the American Anthropological Association and the Southern Anthropological Society.

I certify that I have read this study and that in my opinion it conforms to acceptable standards of scholarly presentation and is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

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Professor of Anthropology

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Solon Kimball
Graduate Research Professor of
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